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Abstract
This thesis has the twin purposes of (a) providing an historical
narrative of the evolution of social democratic, conservative and
liberal approaches to crime in Britain since the war, and (b) (in part
through this historical investigation) beginning to reconstruct the
social-democratic form of "socialist-criminology", in both itsacademic
and political versions, for present and future use.
The thesis is therefore organised in part as a chronological
investigation. Chapters One, Two, Three, Five and Six focus in part on
the general development of the crime debates in the 1940's, the middle
1950's, the early 1960's, the late 1960's to early 1970's, and the late
1970's respectively. But they also depart from a purely chronological
presentation in order to allow a more detailed interrogation of particular
topics in popular, political and academic debate. Thus, Chapter One
attempts to describe the general character of social democratic criminology
in the form it assumed in the 1940's, with an eye to its longer term
effects in the later post-war period. Chapter Two contains an analytical
essay on the responses of the different ideologies to Homicide and
Capital Punishment. Chapter Three departs from its narrative to examine
the re-emergence of the youth problem in the early 1960's as a major social
issue. Chapter Five devolves around an essay on the rapid development of
the major institutions of State power (particularly, social work, the
police and prisons) during the late 1960's and the early 1970's; and
Chapter Six, with its historical focus on the late 1970's, contains two
other essays: (a) on the rise of the radical Right and its critique of
criminal justice and social welfare systems, and (b) an analysis of the
relationship between Conservative and Social-democratic ideology and the
particular questions of the criminality of the powerful and so-called
organised crime.
Chapters Four and Seven depart from this form of presentation.
Chapter Four provides an account and a critique of social democratic
approaches to crimes against women and the criminality of women. Chapter
Seven is the programmatic conclusion to the critique of social democratic
criminology provided earlier: it is an attempted first move, in seriously
changed circumstances (at the end of the post-war boom), to sketch out the
elements of a reconstructed socialist criminology.
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INTR UCT ION
This thesis does not take the usual form of doctoral dissertations
in social science, and some explanation - and possibly even special pleading -
is required.
The thesis began life in 1975 as I began to produce the first draft of
a book I had just suggested to Macmillans. The idea of this book was to
try to trace the influences of social democratic ideology, in particular, on
crime policy throughout the post-war period, and the primary objective was
to try to construct a rather more specific and concrete picture of the relation-
ship between Labour Party policy thinking and the developnent of what may be
called tithe welfare approach' t to crime than is currently available in the
literature. Much of the existing literature on post-war crime policy was
(and is) merely celebratory of the welfare approach (as in the work of Howard
Jones, Barbara Wootton and others), whilst other more critical work (like the
work of the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, now published
in Policing the Crisis) was and is pre-occupied with slightly different
questions (for example, with doing a critique of existing assumptions about
the character of the state and also with advancing an account of changes in
the structure of domination, or ihegeonyut). Neither approach to the question
of social democratic crime policy and social policy generally was immediately
useful, in my view, in confronting the urgent problem increasingly identified
during the 1970's, especially by the right-wing commentators - that the welfare
approach had failed as a form of crime control and as a precursor of viable
social order. Despite the massive expansion of' the social work apparatus and
the unification of all social work agencies in 1970, and despite the passage
of the liberal Childreris and Young Persons Act of 1969, juvenile and adult
crime continued to increase exponentially. Crimes of violence, which are not
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so prone to overreportage and are not so straightforwardly the product of
changes in police practice as are the mundane property offences that make up
the bulk of the criminal statistics, increased even more rapidly than these
other of fences; and thus, although the question of crime and delinquency was
obviously the subject of an anxious and heavily ideological coverage in the
media, it was also clear that popular concern about rising crime was - in
some senses - "real". But the existing approach in Labour Party circles,
and amongst "social denlocratstt1 generally, seemed either to be to deny the
reality of such concern or else, in acimowledging the reality of crime, to
advocate even "more of the samett by way of State interventions and response.
Particularly troubling was the continuing resort, in social democratic
commentary, to the use of largely unaccountable State professionals (in social
work, in particular) as agencies for domesticating troublesome youth brought
before the courts. No more imaginative or democratic response to the question
of crime seemed to be emerging from the orthodox left in British Politics
at that time. Libertarian and conventionally radical responses in the
meantime, appeared to be even more hopeless. Many of the more libertarian
writers seemed to be caught in the sentimentality of The New Criminology,
which (with Paul Walton and Jock Young) I had criticised in Critical Criminology
in 1975 for being merely an inversion of the correctionalism of orthodox
criminology. All forms of crime (from fraud through to mugging and/or racist
assaults) could, by this token, be seen as forms of rebellious and proto-.
political action. This was hardly helpful either analytically or politically
as British society continued to polarise along a variety of dimensions and a
variety of different forms of illegal and/or anti-social activity proliferated.
Some of the radicals of the early 1970's had in the meantime moved in the
direction of using a very sophisticated but essentially very formal kind
of Marxism as a way of "theorising" the form of Law in capitalist societies.
This work always ran the danger of being a substitute for concrete and
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specific analysis of the application and content of law in particular periods,
and it was never clear to me what purchase this kind of work might have to
general political work or to particular campaigns on policy, whether
revolutionary or reformist in conception.
So I was troubled by most existing approaches and felt that the only way
to resolve my anxieties was by attempting to produce a particular kind of
narrative of post-war debates about crime. This narrative would have to have
the dual characteristics of being accurate "empirically" (it would have to
be grounded in a persuasive account of particular policy develorinents and/or
institutional characteristics) and also it would have to be sensitive to the
workings of ideology in these particular areas (it would have to try to
identify the political inputs, negotiations, victories, defeats and ccxnprcxuises
occurring). Out of this kind of narrative, it was hoped, there could emerge
a much richer and more rounded analysis of the character of Labourite thinking
about crime, the role of the liberal professional and the role of the State
generally in "social democracy" and the question of social order generally.
We would then know more accurately what social democracy was, and in what ways
it was in need of reconstruction.
I have been following through this kind of work since then, investigating
particular periods and/or topics, according to the rather generalised concerns
identified above. lQhat has happened, of course, is that the draft manuscript
just grew and grew, as my concerns expanded into new empirical fields and as
I came to examine the character not just of social democracy as ideology
(in relation to criminal and social policy) but the character of conservatism
(in both its reformist and fundamentalist or "real" forms) and professional
liberalism. This was inevitable, but in 1978 or thereabouts, I made the
decision to allow the manuscript to continue to grow, but also to try and
structure the manuscript in a slightly different way. I realised that each
of the ideologies under examination could often only really be understood in
-in their own specific detail by looking at the work of their supporters (or
tcarrjerstt) in particular areas (rape, homicide or whatever), and I also
realised that these areas could not be well understood by being constantly
resurrected in the narrative at different moments of historical time. So
I began to rewrite the manuscript in such a way that particular topics could
be examined in detail within individual chapters, whilst also trying to
maintain the flow of the historical narrative covering the whole post-war
period. This decision resulted in the production of five of the first six
chapters of this thesis in their present form. These chapters each contain
an attempt to provide an accurate historical account of the crime debate
generally in a part of the post-war period, and then each chapter departs
from the narrative to offer what can be seen as an individual essay on
individual crime topics, each of which is a particularly significant topic and
transcends a particular period in its importance. So Chapter One is an
historical account of the period of the last years of the war and the first
post-war Labour Government, but it also contains an flessaytt on the character
of the social democratic criminology which was optimistically advanced for the
period of social reconstruction by Hennann Mannheim, John Bowlby and thers.
This characterisation of early post-war socialist criminology is a useful
background to the critique that develops throughout the thesis, and the
of socialist criminology for more contemporary purposes
attempted later in the thesis. Chapter Two begins with an account of the
emergence of reformist Conservatism and so-called concensus politics and
policy generally (and goes on to offer a detailed description, for example,
of the work of R. A. Butler, as Home Secretary), but it then departs
from this narrative and kind of analysis in order to offer an analytical
essay on the responses of the different ideologies to Homicide and Capital
Punishment. This essay is supported by Appendix One of the thesis, which is
an even more detailed examination of the ttnnmbers game tt
 that occurs wherlevQr
the issue of capital punishment is on the public and/or political agenda.
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Chapter Three advances the narrative into the 1960's in the concern to follow
through the earlier post-war "moral panics t' about delinquent youth into the
changed context of "affluence". The critical discussion provided in that
Chapter of the rich sociological literature of that period and later on youth
is supplemented by a short essay on the now obvious question of the Juvenile
Labour Market. Chapter Five provides historical accounts of the developnents
occurring in various institutions of State power (social work, the police
and prisons) in the late 1960's, but continuing throughout the 1970's. In
so doing, it is also, simultaneously, an essay about the support given by
social democrats, conservatives and liberals to the emergence of what I
call, straightforwardly, a "strong state"(as well as being to some extent
a critique of other literature (like that by my friend Stan Cohen) on the
character of "social control" in Britain.) In Chapter Six, which is in part
a narrative of the 1970's, I examine the critique oiti this strong state
advanced by the new Conservative Right (on the grounds of its ineffectiveness
as a means of social control, deterring crime and containing the dangerous).
This provides an occasion for an essay examining the character of Thatcherisni
as a theory of social order as well as an analysis of the actual develoinent
of the Conservatives' penal policy in Government. But, finally and possibly
rather incongruously, this chapter contains a lengthy essay on the field that
is conventionally called the "criminality of the powerful" (fran the economic
offences of large capitalist corporations to the organised crime that is still
common in certain working class areas). It will be seen, at that point in
the developnent of the thesis, why the response of social democrats to this
field of criminological debate is so crucial politically and analytically.
The exceptions to the format I have described are Chapters Four and Seven.
Chapter Four is exclusively concerned with the question of women and crime
and has the particular concern of excavating social democratic responses to
-6--
this particular "field". In so doing, it offers an analysis of social democratic
responses to the mundane delinquencies of girls, to prostitution, to rape and
sexual attacks, and also to pornography. I am well aware that there is no
good philosophical-episternological warrant for lumping these topics together
and that I could be accused of offering a "token" chapter on women's questions.
Ny defence to this charge would be that nearly all the empirical fields
that are subject to discussion here are the product of a massive amount of
ideological construction before they emerge as
	
As Dave Robins
and Phil Cohen observed in Knuckle Sandwich, the topic of delinquency itself,
the most coimnon topic of all in post-war crime talk, has no essential core,
no unambiguious non-political point of reference. (Robins and Cohen, 1978).
References to delinquency in everyday discussion or in policy documents have
to be	 before they can be properly analysed according to the
tenets of pure class or feminist analysis, and so too does any discussion of
women and crime. I have decided to leave the discussion of women and crime
in one chapter, with the different particular topics that chapter contains,
because that is what existing	 dictates. The task of a
deconstruction of the 	 that dominates crime policy discussion,
across the whole field of that discussion, of the kind that is now recommended
as a theoretical project by Patcarlen, Mike Collison, Paul Hirst, Frank Burton
and Mark Cousins, is not even attempted in this thesis. (cf. Carlen and Collison
(eds) 1980).
The other exception to the provision of historical accounts alongside
the particular and focussed analysis of individual fields in Chapter Seven.
That Chapter has a slightly different rationale to the others in that it
attempts to bring together the accounts of social democratic responses to
the various crime questions discussed earlier, into an analysis of the general
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character of post-war social democracy and then to provide a critical
reformulation of them. This is the programmatic conclusion to the critiques
provided earlier: it is an attempt, in fact, at sketching out the elements
of a different kind of socialist crminology and penal policy. It is an
attempt to respond to the problems I had felt were involved in existing social
democratic, radical and libertarian responses to the crime question in the
middle to late 1970's. I should therefore say that it is primarily the work
done in Chapter Seven which makes the large manuscript collected here hold
together as a meaningful project.
This requires clarification in three ways. First, I would want to say
that I think that the thesis which is presented here is also something of
"an archive". That is to say, I think that it is quite comprehensive as an
"empirical" excavation of post-war crime policy and on the detail of particular
issues and campaigns. But it is nonetheless not written from the perspective
of an empirically minded historian (albeit my first degree was from just such
a t?djscjp1ineI). The concern is to link the account to a critique of the
existing form of social-democratic ideology and it is on such a concern that
I would want it to be judged.
Secondly, however - and this may seem contradictory - this is not in
itself an attempt to "theorise" social democratic ideology in any exhaustive
fashion. I have in fact attempted to avoid entering into the important debates
about ideology which have been provoked in this country over the last decade
by the publication of the translated work of Althusser, Poulantzas, Gramsci
and others. I have felt content, in this particular project, to advance (as
I have described) an historical account that is primarily informed by the
concern at identifying the detailed "working" of ideology in general and of
social democratic ideology in particular. I am well aware that the accounts
provided here are open to criticism for their formulation of ideology, and in
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particular for a certain "instrumentalism" to which I am prone (I think by
political instinct).
The third reason for stressing the organising function of the concluding
chapter is that it is the point at which any originality that there may be
in this thesis is most operative. 2
 I am enormously conscious that large
sections of this thesis have drawn heavily on other work, sometimes for
purposes of exposition or critique but often also for the purpose of advancing
the argument on. 3 But in Chapter Seven the attempt is made to go beyond
that and to advance a new basis for socialist approaches to crime.
The decision to submit this manuscript for a doctorate was made some
time in the late 1970's, as the manuscript grew in length and became more
and more inappropriate in its existing form for publication by Macmillan.
My existing registration at the University of Sheffield bad first been
made in 1975 and I now decided that the manuscript on which I was still
working would continue to be written in this comprehensive fashion for presentation
as a thesis. It could then perhaps serve as an archive in the University
Library. But I also decided to distill certain sections of the thesis (and
Chapter Seven in particular) and reorganise thom in order to fulfil my
contract with Macmillan. The result of that process of distillation, completed
in May 1981, but with an introduction linking the argument to the riots of the
Summer of 1981, is to be published later this year under the title Law and
Order: Arguments for Socialism. (Taylor, I. (1981)).
Existing rules and regulations about University doctorates not only advise
against the kind of rather discursive and political kind of thesis that is
presented here. They also seom to deny the tendency, mentioned earlier, for
all authorship, except for that of the hermit, to be collective and social.
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So although it may be invidious for a thesis that is required to be an individual
accomplishment to acknowledge a massive indebtedness to large numbers of
people, I do want to record the names of individuals who really have helped
me get this together.
I have had great assistance on particular points in the thesis fran
Alan Clarke, Mike Fitzgerald, Bob Gaucher, Eddie Jachcel, John Pratt and,
in particular, Carol Smart. I also benefitted enormously (especially in
relation to the examination of the Children and Young Persons Act of 1969 in
Chapter Five) from sitting in on the lectures given on Juvenile Justice
during 1978-9 by Tony Bottoms. I have also been greatly influenced at
various points by the work of Stuart Hall, and by the work of his collaborators,
John Clarke and Tony Jefferson. Mike Simpkin and Carole Dale have been a
great help on the question of professional liberalism. Patrick Devlin has
been one of the greatest helps, though, although he was not ever aware of it.
I thank all of these people.
Most of all, though, this project has gone on for a long time, and I
could never had done it if it had not been for Ruth Jamieson. She has
affected this thesis in all kinds of ways, from her insights of special
quality to her belief that I might one day finish. It is finished now,
which may be some kind of gift. But I will never be able to repay what she
has done to make it possible. Her tune starts now.
Taylor
2th August, 1981.
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Introduction
Footnotes
1. I clarify the sense in which I use the terms "social democrat" and
"social democracy" in Chapter One of this thesis.
2. At the risk of extending the point, there may be some originality also
in the discussion provided in Chapter Two on Socialism and Homicide
and in the essay in Chapter Six on the Criminality of the Powerful.
3. I think that this process of drawing on other work is probably inevitable,
especially if the concern is to cover so broad an historical and
empirical terrain. I have not seen a better formulation of this fact,
however, than that advanced by Todd Gittlin in a recent critical book
on the mass media in America. He begins his acknowledgements by noting:
t tWe think in society; authorship is always indebted, always
a process that takes place in an historical situation, on ground
prepared by many hands. The ideas in this book are mine, but
directly and indirectly, in extrapolation and critique, they draw
on many writings by many people, many conversations about politics
and culture"
(Gittlin, 1980, p. xi)
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Chapter One	 Crime and the Post-War Settlement 1945-51
..1 Introduction : "Social Democracy" in the 1940's
An increasing number of powerful voices in both Britain and North
America tell us that we are suffering from too much "socialism". The
socialism in question is a vague but enormously perverse and powerful creed.
It is a socialism which is said to have produced bureaucracy and the expansion
of the State, on the one hand, and yet also to have encouraged a "personal
liberation" and "unfettered self-expression" on the other. (J.Q. Wilson,
1975, p.74). It has weakened "authority" and yet also it has restricted
"free enterprise" by its "authoritarian" interventions in the economy. It
has crippled "initiative" and yet also it has encouraged dishonesty and
chisseling amongst welfare claimants and in society generally. It has produced
some material improvements in living standards, but free enterprise could
have done more. It has been conservative and resistant to the changes which
are required if we' are to survive in a competitive world, and yet it has
nonetheless unhinged the traditions on which individual and social morality
depend. And, finally, it is a socialism which has been naive in its race
relations and social welfare policies (and timid in its policing of the black
population and of welfare claimants), whilst simultaneously being authoritarian
in its general denial of the Freedom of the Individual.
One concern in what follows will be to examine the arguments of the
new Radical Right in some detail, and to show the utility and appeal of
these ideas to ruling classes and to certain subordinate groups in western
capitalist societies in the current period. This examination of the New
Right will be undertaken in most detail in Chapter Six, but we will also be
interested in the earlier Conservative heritage (which the New Right has
- 12 -
attempted to re-work) in our earlier historical, chapters on the 1940's and
1950's. (Chapters One and Two) . We will concentrate on the use of the law
and order and crime questions by the Right, although we are aware that
these questions connect up in extremely important and "effective" ways with
other questions (of welfare, education, morality etc.) in the ideologies of
both the old and new Right; and we are aware that these connections are
different for the old and the new Right. Here we can only anticipate our
later discussion by indicating that the law and order rhetorics of the old
and new Right are part and parcel of the attempt to defend the discipline
exercised by the State over the population in general and simultaneously to
provide "freedom" (for "the individual" to pursue his business and personal
life untrammelled by excessive State interference).
The examination in this thesis of the general ideologies of the Right
and of rightwing criminology takes second place, however, to our concern
to outline the weakness in existing socialist thinking and practice on the
questions of crime and law and order. We are particularly intrigued, in
this respect, by the willingness of many left-wing thinkers in the past and
in the present to concede that the question of law and order works "naturally"
and inevitably to the advantage of the Right, when it would seem the parlous
social conditions now obtaining in capitalist societies in the West
increasingly demonstrate the impossibility of social order under the
capitalist "mode of production". We shall discuss this (crucial) question
directly in the final chapter of the thesis. For the moment, however,
we have to recognise that it is the impossibility of social order under
"socialism" (or under liberal welfare states, in the American version)
which has been *tfirmeci 	 in popular consciousness, and on the
policy agenda of Governments by the recent ideological work (and
the Law and Order campaigns) of the radical right.	 This 'socialism"
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is, quite clearly, the reformist-liberal version of social democracy
which has been dominant governmentally in Britain from about 1945, and
which has also been influential in a different form (for example, as the
"New Deal") in the United States, especially during the administrations of
Presidents Truman, Kennedy and Johnson. The New Right's critique of
"socialism" is in part a critique of the "liberalism" that has characterised
State policy (especially in the welfare field) in the post-war period in
nearly all western societies.
So some clarifications are already required. The relationship
between State liberalism and "popular" public opinion is by no means
uncontradictory, as is demonstrated by the contemporary "backlash" against
"welfarist" and liberal policies in public opinion polls and in national
elections, especially in Britain and America and especially amongst working
class populations themselves. Stuart Hall and his co-authors have put this
succinctly in respect of the British case
"The connections of this liberal 'reforming' ideology to the
working class are extremely complex. At the most fundamental
level, it has been the organised struggle of the working class
which has played a crucial role in forcing the expansion of the
State in a welfare-orientated direction. However, the social-
policy orientation of the Labour Party (Fabian-reformism) has
been massively shaped by the new petty-bourgeoisie. The
social-democratic demands for equality, welfare and the 'caring
society' have taken a form which is strongly structured by
the conceptions of these 'disinterested' liberal professions
and semi-professions."
(Hall et al, 1978, p.175)
The precise form assumed by the Welfare State in Britain has therefore
depended in part on the practical interests and concerns of the non-commercial
middle class employed by the State and, in particular, on the ideology -
of professional liberalism - which has developed to describe and legitimate
the practices of these middle class State workers. One concern of this thesis
will be to spell out in some detail the practices of State workers in the
area of crime, and the relationship of these practices to the liberal theories
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which have more or less monopolised the field of criminology (and official
crime policy) until very recently.
But clearly a very closely connected concern will be to excavate
historically the process whereby this liberalism penetrated into specifically
socialist conceptions of the reform and reconstruction of industrial
capitalist society. Our interest will be with the period between 1945 and
the present, but in particular with the period of the first post-war Labour
Government, elected as it was (in July 1945) with the massive parliamentary
majority of 168, and a clear popular mandate for "social reconstruction".
(Cf. Addison, 1975).
So we will be interested in the details of the interpenetration of
liberalism and social democracy in the post-war period, and in the effects
of this "conflation" on the question of crime policy. But we do not intend
to give the impression that this interpenetration was a straightforward
consequence of the massive development of a middle class population of
"professional liberals" during the post-war period. A very similar erosion
of the social-democratic commitments of the Labour Party had occurred in the
immediate aftermath of the Great War of 1914-18, in the very same year that
the Party had adopted Clause 4 as the core of its Constitution, "to secure
for the producers by hand or brain the full fruits of their industry, and the
most equitable distribution thereof that may be possible, upon the basis
of the common ownership of the means of production and the best obtainable
system of popular administration and control of each industry and service".
As Tom Nairn has observed, the "language of Labourism was tired and
bureaucratic .... even/as moment of most daring advance" (Nairn, 1964, p.68).
But what was even more telling was the substance of the very first resolution
brought by the Labour Party's National Executive Committee to the first
conference after the adoption of the new Constitution
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"The resolutionwas about 'Social Reconstruction' after the
Great War, and envisaged 'the gradual building up of a social
order based .... on the deliberately planned cooperation in
production and distribution, the sympathetic approach to a
healthy equality, the widest possible participation in power,
both economic and political, and the general consciousness of
consent which characterises a true democracy.' It was not
easy to pierce this astounding miasma of well-turned cliches.
But the more clairvoyant of the left-wingers noticed the
absence of any definite reference to the ownership of the
means of production and distribution, and a Mr. Fairchild of
the British Socialist Party rose to protest. This resolution
was hardly in accordance with the fine new constitution, he
pointed out, and might even be interpreted as advocating
'cooperation' between workers and employers. 'The resolution
entails the creation of an army of bureaucrats and experts',
he insisted, 'and there is no recognition of the claims of
Labour to direct the means of production in the interests
of the class represented at this conference."
(Nairn, Ibid.)
Mr. Fairchild's objections to this 1918 resolution anticipated the way
in which the nationalisation of private industries by a later Labour Government
would, indeed, occur - within an economic strategy emphasising the unity of
interest of capital and labour, embodied in the State. But he also foresaw
the way in which this "incorporation" of unequal social groups could be
presentable as constructing a "community" of the "general interest",
particularly if such incorporation was undertaken primarily through the State
(rather than through private capitalist industry itself). The "army of
bureaucrats and experts" would be the necessary guardians or representatives
of this "sympathetic" and consensual form of social reconstruction. They would
be the bureaucratic embodiment of State institutions providing social services
and assistance. They would serve to demonstrate that. capitalism had been
fundamentally transformed, and replaced by a caring, planned and regulated
social order operating in the general interest.
Mr. Fairchild's arguments were posed, however, as a critique of the
limitations of a social democracy which, in 1918, was yet to be constructed.
For Labour Party members then, and also in 1945, the construction of such a
caring, planned and regulated social order was an utopian futuristic project,
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exciting massive degrees of personal commitment. Especially in the aftermath
of the war against Fascism, the social democracy of the Labour Party was
widely seen as the means to a fundamentally different form of social order
and also as a means to the achievement of new forms of human relationship,
based on the equality necessitated by the war-time effort rather than on
inequalities of pre-war class society. In total contrast to the cynical,
defensive and managerial politics that came to dominate the Labour Governments
of the 1960's and 1970's, 1940's social democracy brought forward a general
commitment to "social reconstruction" as a national project and also specific
reformist commitments (for example, to the introduction of universal social
insurance, health provision and education, and to the reform of existing child
care services) from very broad constituencies in the working class and middle
class alike.
Hermann Mannheim, for example, a criminologist whose work we will
discuss later in this chapter, was absolutely tireless during the 1940's in
his travels around the country, lecturing and propagandising in the name of
social-democratic reform of law and particularly the reform of the court system.
He was quite clear that he was living and working in a period of fundamental
social transformation, and indeed the frontispiece of his book of essays,
Criminal Justice and Social Reconstruction,s dedicated to the proposition that
they were revolutionary times. Conceptions of this kind of the Labour Party's
project in Government were widespread in the 1940's and they successfully
demanded the support and excited the aspirations of very large numbers of
people across the middle and working class alike.
The "socialism" of the 1945-51 Labour Government and its widespread
supporters was, indeed, a particular form of reformist social democracy.
Born out of the long struggles of the trade union movement in the nineteenth
and early twentieth century, and out of an ongoing dialogue with Liberalism
as to the proper content of radical politics, this "socialism" had already had
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lengthy political period of gestation. Ralph Miliband has traced the ways in
which the popular democratic forms of the early socialist movements were
gradually replaced by an overwhelming emphasis on the struggle for socialism
as being equivalent to the training of election candidates and the
winning of a Parliamentary majority for Labour. (Miliband, 1961). But it
required the experience of the Depression and then the radicalisation that
occurred during the Second World War to refine this generalised political
heritage (of parliamentarianism) into a set of particular projects for a
Labour Government in power at the level of the State. The Depression and
the General Strike served to re-emphasise Labour's responsibility to reform
away the structures of privilege and fundamental social inequality that
remained so central a feature of British class society. They dramatised the
continuing injustice of class inequality in Britain. Paul Addison suggests
that the defeat at Dunkirk in the early years of the War was equally powerful
in dramatising the ineptitude of an unreformed ruling class and in encouraging
a rapid politicization of the general population to the Left. Class inequality
was not merely unjust; it was also inadequate as a basis for the national
mobilisation required by the war. (Addison, 1975). The experience of war
was also effective, as many writers on the history of the Welfare State have
observed, in opening the eyes of large sections of the middle class to the
living and working conditions of sections of the working class. The contact
established between the classes in the bomb shelters and during war-time
duties were the basis for the massive degree of support for Lord Beveridge's
Report on Social Security in 1943, and its insistence on the State henceforth
providing for universal "security from the cradle to the grave". (of.
inter alia Bruce, 1961).
Taken together, the Depression and the war provided the specific
"conjunctural" basis for the election of a social democratic Government committed
in particular to a heavy degree of State intervention in the economy. Such
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state intervention was required in order to ensure the planning of capital
investment and industrial production according to an agreed conception of the
national need, rather than according to the exigencies of the market. The
"market" had been shown to be inadequate in the national war-time mobilisation:
so much more was it inadequate to the task of post-war social reconstruction.
In particular, "the market" could not be relied upon to avoid the cycles of
boom and slump of the inter-war years - which had eventually resulted in the
Depression; nor either (as Keynes so persuasively and publically argued)
could "the market" be relied upon to produce the surplus with which to
underwrite Lord Beveridge's Welfare State proposals. So the "statism" of
1940's social democrats was a specific commitment - to the use of State
machinery, in an interventionist fashion, in the capitalist market economy, to
guide investment, planning, distribution and consumption, in order to check
the inherent tendencies of capitalism to cycles of success and failure and also
to the production of goods and services on the basis, only, of the existence
of market demand. The State's interventions were intended, therefore, to
channel goods and services produced by capitalist industries according to
social need.
In this project, it was self-evident that institutions providing
"basic amenities" in the fields of health, education, and welfare, (hospitals,
clinics, surgeries, schools, child welfare institutions etc.) and also
industries which serviced the whole community with universal needs (like fuel,
transport, or communications) should be nationalised by the State in order to
ensure that they provided these needs and amenities on a cheap and an equitable
basis. Where possible, indeed, the costs of servicesb the public (like
health) should be entirely borne by the State, in order to ensure that the
poor should not be deterred from using these services by their inability to
pay. The depth of social democratic commitment to this form of statist
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intervention can only be understood now, of course, by an act of historical
imagination: 1940's social democrats had personally withessed, in the
Depression and during the War, the parlous conditions of living - of health,
eduation and general life possibilities of working class people at large -
which were the alternative provided by "the market".
The State's interventions in the economy were to be paralleled by
State intervention in the body of civil society itself. This intervention
was directed in part at "privilege" and in particular at the domination of
a traditional ruling class over politics and over the administration of the
State apparatus. This attack on privilege took the form, however, not of
any displacement of the existing holders of power in the Civil Service or
in other branches of the national and local state, but rather involved a
vast expansion in the numbers of administrative and executive workers employed
by the State, especially in the fields of health, education and social security.
Cumulatively, the activities of the workers in education and social security
in particular were seen as part of a generalised attack, mounted through the
State, on social and personal deprivations within the working class, as well
as being recognition of the importance of the non-commercial middle class in
the project of social reconstruction. So this form of "social democracy"
did not require any confrontation with existing centres of power in British
class society: rather, it circumvented confrontation by attempting to attack
the conditions it saw to be associated with the inequality of the lower class,
and by attempting to influence the reputation and status accorded to different
occupational pursuits, reducing the honour attaching to traditional ruling
class occupations (like the law or, indeed, like "business" itself).
So the attack on privilege mounted by the post-war Labour Government
actually left most of the existing institutional centres of ruling class power
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(like the judiciary) intact, and there was no hint even of any programme
to democratise these institutions or to make them accountable to the broad-
based constituency of Labour support, or to the community in general. What
the social democratic project did involve, however, the the reconstruction
of the existing State and, in particular, the addition of new State
institutions, to underwrite and to carry through the "social reconstruction"
of existing economic and social relations that was prefigured in the social-
democratic economic and social policies constructed during the war and earlier.
As we have said, an act of historical imagination is required to
understand the depth of the popular and professional commitment that this
version of social reconstruction could and did excite. This form of social
democracy was, indeed, the most progressive form of politics to have gained
legitimacy in the popular imagination and the programme of a political party
in Britain at that point in time. Its legitimacy was recognised, for example,
even in the ranks of the Conservative Party itself. Conservative social and
political philosophy was very clearly outflanked and discredited by July 1945,
and had lost its previously secure middle-class base.
The party itself was dominated by the very same leadership that had
proven itself unable to solve the economic problems of the Depression. In
the aftermath of the 1945 election defeat, a struggle began within the
Conservative Party, which resulted in the so-called "Right Progressives" gaining
control from the traditional "Tories", and in the beginning of "Butskellism"
emerging in Conservative thinking on policy. In Butskellism a commitment to
state planning and intervention, to the financing of social welfare, and to
political and economic reform, rapidly made Conservatism appear as a mild form
of Labourism, distinguishable only by the concern of Conservatives to protect
the traditional institutions of legal authority (the courts, the police and
the law itself) and the "liberty of the individual" from the encroachments of
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the more powerful welfare state. (cf. Gamble, 1974, c.3). The dominance
of social democracy in the 1940's, in other words, forced a transformation
in the political thinking of the traditional party of the English ruling
class: to an extent that is now the subject of regret and nostalgia, on
the part of some contemporary Conservatives.2
By the end of the 1940's, in other words, "social democracy" was no
longer the political preserve of the Labour Party alone. It was also, on
the one hand, the general goal and rationale informing the activities of
the increasing numbers of liberal professionals employed by the State, and
further it was increasingly dislodged from its Labour Party moorings by the
ideological work of the new Tory leadership. By 1951, the year of the
Festival of Britain, and also of the third post-war election, the Conservative
leadership had succeeded in extinguishing the popular view of their party as
the party of privilege, by moving onto the terrain of consensus politics,
giving support to the expansion of the welfare state and to the expansion of
state expenditure on social needs in general. "Soôial democracy" had
accrued both a (professional) liberal and a (Conservative) nationalistic
interpretation.
As we indicated earlier, a part of the concern in this thesis will
be to follow through this reconstruction of social democratic politics and
policy, especially in relationship to crime and law and order. What should
be clearer now, however, is that the "reconstruction of social democracy"
took place on different levels. The contemporary New Right attack on post-war
social democratic government is at least in part an attack on those "Right
Progressive" Conservatives, like R.A. Butler, lain MacLeod, and others, who
attempted to disconnect the popular support for social democracy from the
Labour Party by moving the Tory Party Onto the terrain of consensual politics.
It is also an attack on the attempt of Labour Governments to use the State
in a project of reconstructing social order, through the "authoritarian"
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provision of health, education and social security for all. And, finally,
it is also an attack on the ideologies and practices of the liberal
professionals (in particular, in state education and social work). Each
of these elements coexisted "invisibly" in the social democratic consensus
initiated electorally in 1945, and which constituted the parameters of
political argument in Britain until the General Election of 1970. Each of
these elements (of Butskellite Conservativism, Labourism of the "statist"
variety, and professional liberalism) deserves to be analysed and understood
separately but also they have to be understood in the way in which they
inter-acted together.
We have already said that the dominant form of social democracy
in respect of welfare and crime policy was that of professional liberalism.3
Two clarifications are required to this statement. Firstly, to signal the
rising importance of the non-commercial middle class in the field is not to
say that the fundamental institutions of penal power, like the courts,
police and prisons, were in any way dislodged or replaced during the early
post-war reconstruction. On the contrary, as we shall see later, the
"repressive apparatus" 4 of the State was ultimately actually strengthened
and expanded by the early post-war social-democratic governments, both in
respect of its scope and coverage (over broader segments of the population)
and in terms of its power (for example, in respect of the sentencing powers
of the courts). The first post-war Labour Government's Criminal Justice
Act of 1948 contained, amongst other proposals, the provision for the
introduction of Detention Centres, and increasing amounts of public expenditure
were allocated, after 1948, to the penal system and the police. Putting this
another way, the well-rehearsed procedures of the courts and police in
apprehending and sentencing mainly lower class petty criminals and delinquents
were largely uninterrupted throughout the period of "social reconstruction".
The institutions of class justice established in the early years of British
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capitalism were preserved and even strengthened.
But the point to be made is that this expansion of the "repressive
apparatus" of the State occurred relatively invisibly, by virtue of the
dominance of liberalism in contemporary accounts as to the character of the
"modern" penal and justice system. The advancement during the 1940's of
large numbers of middle class State workers in social work and associated
disciplines and occupations, for example, threw up a literature and a set of
professional wisdoms legitimising the existing operation of the courts,
police, prisons and social rvicas a specific contribution to the larger
task of social reconstruction. These institutions were characterised as
working together in the task of rehabilitation: they were all in the business
of identifying and "servicing" individuals who needed re-socialisation in
order to be able to take proper advantage of the economic and social
opportunities that were promised by Social Reconstruction.
The second point to make about this version of professional liberalism
is, indeed, to underline and reiterate the professional liberal's own
description of him/herself as a servicing agent. The defining characteristic
of professional liberalism, and the service it did to social democratic
reconstruction, lay in the particular technical skills it brought to bear
(for example, in "rehabilitative" family casework with problem families) and
not in the general support that liberals might give to social democracy
politically. Putting this another way, the professional liberal's skills
could in principle be put to use in support of different versions of social
reconstruction, and were therefore only "contingently" related to the precise
political goals of social democracy.
This is an important point to emphasise for, as we will see, the
"liberal profession" of social work, for example, did begin to generate a quite
specific professional ideology (as to the proper parameters and most desirable
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forms of the social work task etc.), which contained its own implicit politics.
This politics increasingly prioritised the paramount importance of the
professional's relationship with his or her client and the interests of the
client over and above any other defining criteria (like the interests of
the client's own community, for example, or the achievement of some specific
goal). In so doing, this occupational ideology increasingly emphasised
"permissiveness" towards the client as the fundamental and defining feature
of the social work task, and increasingly disconnected social work practice
from the larger ongoing task of social reconstruction, or, indeed, from any
larger political or social definition as to the functions of the social work
relationship. But whilst emphasising 'permissiveness", this occupational
ideology also talked increasingly of "correction' and especially of "treatment's;
and the object of this "treatment" was no longer the inequality of an
urireformed capitalist society (as in Labour Party conceptions of the social
democratic project) but the client himself or herself. For liberal
professionals engaged in treatment work, the pathologies in need of correction
were increasingly those to be found in individuals rather than in the social
relations within which individuals were located.
The development of this neutral occupational ideology in social work
occurred alongside the elaboration of commitedly social democratic versions
of social work's functions by psychologists like John Bowlby, for whom the
social worker had a quite specific role in rebuilding family units disturbed
by the war, as the foundation upon whom the building of a new social order
would depend. But these larger political functions were often silenced in a
social work literature that spoke, increasingly, of good client-worker
relationships as the goal of the social work task.
Later in this thesis, we shall be examining the precise ways in which
the three discrete ideologies of Labourism, professional liberalism and
Butskellite conservatism interpenetrated on particular issues and at particular
- 25 -
times. For the moment, we want to register the fact that each of the
ideologies had to work, from the early 1940's onwards, within a larger set
of political parameters, as to the general desirability of social reconstruction
and the specific need for a welfare state, which may fairly be summarised as
being a popular, national consensus around the reconstruction of British class
society into a " social democracy".
It is apparent that some definition of terms is going to be required
if our argument in this thesis is going to be sustained. We shall therefore
refer to the version of social democracy that was articulated within the
Labour Government and by its supporters (in academic and popular circles)
as the Labourite version - in the sense in which Tom Nairn has referred to
"Labourism", as an ideology prioritising the State as a guardian of universal
interests (e.g. via social security and welfare provision) and attempting to
unify capital and labour in the "national interest". Professional liberalism
and Butskellite Conservatism will be discussed directly as such, but we will
also recognise the support given in these ideologies to "social reconstruction"
in our continuing description of them as "social democrats".
Labourism and Crime in the 1940's
We want to begin with a narrative outlining the main features of
Labourite thinking and policy-making on crime in the immediate post-war period.5
Later on in this chapter, we will want to pay some attention to Conservative
work on crime and law and order over the same period, and to look at the
shifts which were becoming apparent in social democratic work.
In the narrative, we will refer to the work done on crime - whether
by politicians, by judges, by police spokesmen or by academics - as "criminology".
We fully recognise that this will offend some liberal academics, in particular,
who would reserve the description of "criminology" only to that work which is
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done by professional criminologists, consequent on the proper amount of
research and training. And it may be a strange use of the word for other
readers also, in that we are not attuned to thinking of the work done on
"crime stories" or court cases by journalists, for example, as criminology,
any more than we think of press statements by the police or the judiciaj in
such terms. But we think it would be to totally underestimate the importance
of this kind of public ideological work on crime and law and order issues to
give it any other weaker description: 6
 it is all criminology in the sense of
offering out, explicitly or implicitly, definitions of the character of real
(or serious) crime, theories of its causes and prescriptions as to how 'it"
can be controlled or corrected. It is also criminology in that it attempts,
like all criminology (no matter how 'neutral' some criminological work by
academics may appear) to persuade its audience of the desirability (or
otherwise) of certain kinds of action by the police, the courts or by other
agencies, and indeed the desirability (or otherwise) of existing forms of
social order.
There is at least one major limitation to the narrative form we will
adopt. The use of materials from speeches made at the time (in Parliament or
elsewhere) or from journals and newspapers can encourage a certain kind of
empiricism, in which the accounts that were offered of events or processes
by participants in them or by their contemporary observers takes the place of
any analysis of the logic of the events by the
	
In this chapter,
for example, the enormous emphasis in speeches and written materials during
the 1940's on social reconstruction and the over-weaning hegemony of social-
democratic politics could lead us into a kind of idealist history, in which
the massive restructuring of the State that occurred in Britain during this
period and in the 1950's was seen to result from the ideological formation of
social democracy itself. In fact, as Ian Gough and others have so ably
demonstrated, this reconstruction of the State, and in particular the use of
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Keynesian measures of intervention by the State in the economy, was common
to nearly all western societies during this period, almost irrespective of
the political complexion of their Governments. (Gough, 1979) .' In
particular, our caution should be alerted by the rapid introduction of welfare
state measures into the United States simultaneou4y with the continuing
articulation of an anti-socialist rhetoric by the U.S. Government and
Opposition. So is not our purpose to see the actual restructuring process that
occurred in the relationship of the State to civil society and to the economy
as being directly the result of ideological struggles successfully conducted
by the Labour Party and/or the other consensual social-democrats of the time.
But it is our intention to argue, as we shall later, that the precise form
assumed by the restructured State (as an instrument providing universal social
security; as a guardian of the common interest of labour and capital in
industrial relations; as a defender of the general interest against criminals,
delinquents, subversives etc., etc.) was very much determined at the level of
ideological work by Labour supporters and by other supporters of social
democratic reconstruction. We shall return to this more theoretical point
later in the thesis.
historical excavation of "Labour criminology" in this period immediately
encounters the overwhelming concentration of such criminology on the
delinquencies of youth as the core topic for discussion. Government commissions
and academic committees debated this question from the early 1940's onwards,
and even before the end of the war, the question of "deprived" or "disaffiliated"
youth was high on the agenda of problems that were likely to be confronted
by a Labour Government during the process of social reconstruction. The issue
remained a high priority, as we shall see, throughout the 1940's, and it was
no surprise when the first academic journal on criminology to be published in
Britain (launched in 1950 by a hybrid collection of psychologists,
psychiatrists and criminal lawyers calling itself the Institute for the Study
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and Treatment of Delinquency) was called the British Journal of Delinquency.
But an important concern in the talk about crime in the 1940's was
with what were called, in some accounts, "economic offences". Economic
offences appeared to have included both "white-collar crimes" (crimes committed
by individual businessmen and other members of the middle-class in the course
of their occupations) and corporate crime (committed by industry or by other
powerful institutions), but also, and perhaps most importantly, offences
connected with the black market (in rare goods and services) which flourished
in the period of rationing and shortages (i.e. at least until 1948-49). The
concern with economic offences was very much a reflection of the broader
shifts in political ideology towards "social democracy", animated as it was by
the attempt to remove double-standards from the enforcement of law (which had
been an important focus in Labour Party critique of class society in Britain).
The correction of white-collar, corporate and black-market crime was therefore
an essential component of popular criminology in post-war Labour Britain, for
these were offences committed by people in positions of privilege, taking
advantage of their social position in order to further their own (already
socially advantaged) interests.
Both of the dominant conceptions of crime in post-war Labourism were
born of recent political and social experiences (rather than of some simple
"empirical" observation of post-war social problems). They were born of
the memory of the Depression and, more immediately, the War itself. In
particular, Labourites appear to have been strongly influenced by some
"positive" lessons drawn from the two periods of hardship and struggle, and
notably by the development in the Depression and in the War, of a "sense of
community". The bringing-together of individuals from the same class, or on
occasion from across the classes, in a common struggle (for material and psychic
sustenance, or, in the War, for the defeat of the common enemey) entailed
a temporary suspension of the conflicts - and also the personal isolation and
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estrangement - of class society. For the upper and middle classes, this
experience of community, or togetherness, was later said to have been
responsible for 'a fit ... or series of fits ... of conscience" (Bruce,
1961, p.271) - the creation of the Welfare State itself, and also in some
accounts the support given by the middle class to the Labour Party in the
1945 Election. For social-democrats themselves, the experience of togetherness
was an embryonic demonstration of the potential human consequences that could
result from the reform of a class society. It was a togetherness which was
celebrated in the wartime novels and essays of J.B. Priestley, in the pages
and photographic essays in Picture Post and in the journalism of the Daily
Mirror. It was a togetherness born of the "common decency" of the common
man (first eulogised in Orwell),but a togetherness which was by no means
confined to one class. "Working together" was a means for all the people to
fight the war, untrammelled by a "parasitic, amateur and incompetent
establishment". "War radicalism" was a particular form of populism in which
"The 'people' were seen as being forged by the war, entering
society as a force to be reckoned with through mass mobilisation,
experience in air raids and the breaking-down of working-class
ghettoes. They would survive the war only by working together,
united, decent, fighting against Fascism abroad and an
establishment at home."
(Cultural History Group, 1976, p.38)
This vision (of the bringing together of citizens of different classes
in a common struggle) permeated the reforming activity and the evolving
ideology of the social democrats in 1945-51. It found a place, for example,
in the original post-war plans for housing, in the ill-fated proposals for
well-financed communities of council houses on the fringes of large cities,
and also in the New Town proposals (proposals from which many a retreat was
later to occur). (Darke 1981). And it also found a place in proposals for
the introduction of comprehensive state education in all local authority
areas (which were to have some effect, though twenty years on from the
Education Act of 1944). But the ideology of "community" was also strong in
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the attention given by Labourites throughout the 1940's to the family.
The concern with the family appears to derive, in part, from social-
democratic observations of the effects of family division during the war,
and from the development of an account of the causes of delinquency in which
the family played as important a role as that of the unequal economy itself.
In 1942, a body entitled the International Committee of the Howard League
("a committee of men and women of thirteen nationalities brought together
by the fortunes - or misfortunes - of war") 8
 had begun to meet in order to
produce explanations for the problems of youth that were likely to be
encountered after the war, and to advance policy suggestions for dealing
with them. In the introduction to their report, eventually published in 1947,
under the title of Lawless Youth, the authors recall that they had "visualised
the problem, now a grim reality, of winning back for society, the children
and young men whom war had made rebels and outlaws", and they commented on
the need for the child care services and the juvenile justice system to be
a means for reintegrating "lawless youth" into their families, and the means
for giving support for those families weakened or broken by the experience
of the war.
The general thrust of the International Committee's recommendations
was summarised in the chapter contributed by Margery Fry, the Vice-President
of the Howard League. For her, the essential feature of reform should be
that
"... the treatment of young offenders as well as of other
children in moral danger, should be dictated by the special
needs of the individual case: the 'offence', where such
exists, will be regarded as a symptom".
(Fry et al, 1947, p.2O) 9
The "grim reality" to which this .Report had earlier referred .wa
the general increase in all forms of crimes known to the police througout
the war-time period (Table One), and also the continuingly increasing number
of offences against the Defence Regulations, which governed the proper conduct
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of the War by the citizens. 10
 Offences against the Defence Regulations
increased from 59,911 in 1939 to 186,429 in 1943, before declining in the two
last years of the War.
TABLE ONE
CRIMES KNOWN TO THE POLICE (1939-45)
(excluding offences against Defence Regulations)
Violence	 Receiving
against	 Sexual	 Frauds	 Breaking	 Other
the	 Offences	 and False	 and	 Larceny Crimes	 Total
Person	 Pretences Entering
1939	 2,899	 5,015	 17,561	 52,295	 219,478	 6,523	 303,771
1940	 2,424	 4,626	 16,998	 49,340	 225,671	 6,055	 305,114
1941	 2,727	 5,608	 21,392	 52,876	 268,738	 7,314	 358,655
1942	 3,050	 6,766	 21,079	 56,166	 267,789	 10,039	 364,889
1943	 3,432	 7,784	 20,964	 58,543	 272,186	 9,851	 372,760
1944	 4,162	 8,079	 21,922	 73,890	 297,930	 9,027	 415,010
1945	 4,743	 8,546	 23,254	 108,266	 323,310	 10,275	 478,394
Source: Criminal Statistics (1939-1945 (published 1947)
Cmnd. 7227
TABLE T)
INDICTABLE OFFENCES KNOWN TO THE POLICE 1946-1948
Breaking	 Fraud and	 Violence
and	 False	 Sexual against	 Other
Larceny Entering Receiving Pretences Of fences the person Offences Total
	
1946 310,650 114,690	 8,130	 14,080	 9,329	 4,062	 11,548	 472,489
	
1947 330,918 111,789 	 8,976	 18,459	 9,999	 4,408	 14,027	 498,576
	
1948 349,358 112,665	 9,044	 19,326	 10,922	 5,183	 16,186	 502,684
ource: Criminal Statistics, England and Wales (1959) (cmnd.11OO)
There was, therefore, an increase of some 30,000 offences known
to the police over the first three post-war years.
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In large part, these increases in crime were interpreted as increases
in youthful delinquency (although no separate figures were presented for
adolescent and adult offences during the war-time period); and overwhelmingly,
these increases were discussed in terms of the disruption caused to the
family by the war.
This threat to the family was felt to be expressed, in one respect, in
the increase in the number of illegitimate births during the war (from 25,942
in 1939 (4.19 per cent of recorded live births) to 64,064 in 1945 (9.35 per
cent of live births). These increases resulted from the increased geographical
mobility experienced both by men and by women during the period, as many
more women had the opportunity to leave the home to work in the factories
and/or to join the military services, and the majority of men were fully
mobilised and dispersed away from their own neighbourhood and community. In
1943, a Ministry of Health sub-committee reported on the problem of the unmarried
mother, and recommended the appointment of social workers to help deal with the
unmarried mother and her child in the community. This establishment of
domiciliary services, going into the mother's home, was a radical transformation
in the State's response to unmarried mothers (who had previously been taken
away into institutions). In the words of Jean Heywood, the historian of the
British child-care services, the "old association of the poor law with
illegitimacy was ended ... at a stroke".
The provision of domiciliary services was supported by the creation
of State nurseries for young children on a previously unparalleled scale. In
Heywood's words
the partial mobilisation of women, the need for many
of them to spend a large part of their day working in the
factories, the absence of fathers on service, or relatives
at work, and the destruction of houses by bombing require
the state to intervene in another way in providing
residential nurseries where young children could be given
the care and attention impossible where family life had
become non-existent, and where they could be protected
from enemy attack."
(Heywood, 1959, p.l36)
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The State's increasing provision of facilities for unmarried mothers
and for working parents was justified, therefore, as part of a project of
providing a form of family life for children who would otherwise not experience
it, as a result of the effects of the war. (cf. also Riley 1979).
The more well known measures taken by the State in evacuating thousands
of children from major urban areas and other potential targets of enemy attack,
taking them away from their parents and placing them in the temporary care of
families in other (usually rural) areas, were also important in wartime
experience in underlining the importance of the family (and in prioritising
the family as a central institution in the forthcoming, post-war project of
social reconstruction).
"... this does not seem to have been accepted until the
wartime disruptions between 1939 and 1945 demonstrated
its truth, the fact that the family still preferred to
cling together as a fundamental unit in the face of
every obstacle. In spite of carefully contrived plans
to evacuate young mothers and children, to safer areas,
they refused to remain divided, and gradually, in ones
and threes and then in groups and crowds, they returned
to their homes and family circle ...
(Heywood, 1959, pp.134-5)
Support had to be given, both economically and 'ideologically", to
families in trouble (in need of care and protection), and the attempt had to
be made to create substitute family settings for children and adolescents
whose real families were temporarily or permanently non-existent or unable
to cope. The recognition of these problems at the level of the State was fairly rapid
during the war, and action on them occurred quickly after the election of the
Labour Government, although the immediate spur to action appears to have been
an individual incident. The level of "maladministration" and indeed "repression"
in the existing child care services was highlighted, graphically, in 1945 by
the deathof the 12 year old Dennis McNeill (from a cardiac failure resulting
from violent attack, from a foster parent and under-nourishment) 1l The
Monckton Inquiry, reporting on the incident, put the blame for McNeill's death
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on the division of responsibility for the child's placement in a foster home
between two committees of local government as well as between two local
authorities. By 1948, the recommendation of a Committee of Enquiry, under
Dame Myra Curtis, into the regulation of the standards of the child care
services, recommended that formal responsibility be given to a single
Government agency (the Home Office), and this was incorporated into the Children
Act of 1948. Child care was made the responsibility, in other words, of a
national State agency, rather than being left to voluntary, amateur, care
workers, and volunteer foster parents.
Weakness or inconsistency in the control exercised over children by
the family was seen as an encouragement to delinquency, especially in the
conditions of the war-time period, with a variety of other malignant influences
at work (for example, in the black market) and an increase in the number of
opportunities for illegitimate gain (especially, during the early years of the
war, in looting of properties hit by the air-raids). Herinann Mantheim, whose
work we shall use throughout this chapter, commented on " ... the indirect
effect of theiterlife, particularly on juveniles" and observed in 1941 that
"(juveniles) hardly ever chose to go to the same shelters
as their own families ... parental control has become a
thing of the past ... and even the police experience
great difficulties in tracing juvenile delinquents."
(Mannheim, 1955, p.92, reprinting an essay of 1941)
In nearly all the accounts of delinquency and crime written in the
1940's, the problems were temporary. The period of social reconstruction
after the war would be a period in which the family would be restored and
strengthened, and the sense of community experienced temporarily in the
war-time period institutionalised as a permanent feature of social and economic
relationships in a reformed welfare state. Crime and delinquency, the
expression of inconsistent family control and socialisation brought about by
the war, would decline and lose significance in proportion to the success of
social reconstruction.
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"it would be altogether wrong to regard the rise in
crime as something extraordinary or particularly alarming.
it is nothing but the natural result of six years of total
war with all its inevitable moral, psychological and
economic repercussions, and there is consequently nothing
original in the many official and unofficial attempts to
explain the present situation. The general cheapening of all
values; loosening of family ties; weakened respect for the
law, human life and property; especially property of the
State and of big firms; scarcity of all consumer goods, the
black market, and the resulting rise in prices; rationing
and the well-justified austerity policy of the Government;
easy accessibility of many bomb-damaged houses, and lack of
trained police officers and, finally, the activities of
deserters are, usually, maybe rightly, put forward. It was
Mr. Chuter Ede, the Home Secretary, who said 'No one would
have thought of stealing a second hand shirt in 1939; today the
sight of a shirt on a clothes line has become a temptation"
(Mannheim, 1955, p.110 - reprinting an essay written in 1947)
For Mannheim, therefore, and for the other social democrats with whom
he collaborated (for example, on the previously-mentioned committee of the
Howard League for Penal Reform), the increase in delinquency, and general
disorderliness of youth, resulted, primarily, for a collapse or reduction in
the moral and personal regulation exercised by individual families, rather
than from any other features of the wartime and early postwar situation. The
slight increases in the numbers of male adolescents found guilty of offences
in the later 1940's (from 47,124 9 to 20 years olds in 1946 to 56,252 in 1951)
(Wilkins, 1960, p.11) were a result of circumstances obtaining in these
adolescents' recent (war-time) past and not a consequence of their experience
of the present (social reconstruction). Delinquency was not conceived, for
example, has having to do directly with changes in the employment situation
of youth (from very high levels of employment in the war, with wages far above
the pre-war level, to much reduced levels in the immediate post-war period).
The employment situation wa only discussed by Manrtheim in terms of the
ability of ex-prisoners and other groups usually deemed unreliable or unemployable
to contribute to the war effort, and to post-war economic revival:
Given the scarcity of labour in the war, he says
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employers have had to abstain from asking awkward
questions about the past ... (and) on the whole, it
seems that the old lag has admirably stood the test and
is giving very little trouble. As far as he is concerned,
recidivism, as happened during the last war, is likely
to diminish considerably."
(Mannheim, 1955, p.94, reprinting an essay written in 1941)
Press reports of the time were at one with Mannheim in stressing the
primacy of effective moral socialisation in the control of delinquency, and
in some cases were sophisticated enough to point to the importance of such
socialisation in allowing youngsters to withstand the harmful effects of "the
inflated earnings of youth today" (Mannheim, ibid., p.105). This particular
formulation of the youth problem (as a problem of moral training) was also
given support in the pamphlet released by Conservative Central Office in 1946,
but originally written up for the Parliamentary Committee on Post War
Problems, and released as a response to the proposals anticipated in the
Criminal Justice Bill later that year. In this pamphlet, however, it was not
simply rapid increases in affluence that might undermine the moral senses of
working class youth (and the population in general), but also the tendency for
these increases, in a period of Labour Government, to be associated with the
increased regulation by the State of economic and social life.
an improvement in social and economic conditions is
not, in itself, sufficient to promote law and order. In
the United States of America, in the nineteen-twenties,
a crime-wave during a period of great material prosperity
established once again that the decisive factor is not the
affluence of a nation, but its general moral tone and the
extent to which public opinion supports the laws. More
recently in this country a multiplicity of unpopular
restrictions, inevitable no doubt in war time, has shown
how dangerous are conditions in which the normally well-
conducted citizen tends to regard the infringement of
such restrictions as a legitimate exercise of his ingenuity."
(C.P.C., 1946, p.5)
In the debate in the House of Commons on the Criminal Justice Bill of
1947, Osbert Peake, Conservative M.P. for Leeds North, and Under Secretary of
State at the Home Office during the pre-war Conservative Government, made what
was later to become a common Conservative link between economic stringency and
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the resulting state control and regulation (with the emphasis on the latter)
as the cause of the conditions in which crime would naturally arise.
"It is a sad thing that growing shortages and increased
controls have done much to foster gambling, black markets
and all sorts of petty crime. These things have put a
premium on dishonesty and have diminished respect for
the law, and there are great moral as well as economic
and financial dangers at the present time."
(Hansard, Vol.444, 27 November 1947, Col.2162)
We shall return to the question of Conservative criminology in the
1940's later in this chapter. For the moment, we should simply note that a
common ground had already been established in Conservative and Labourite
discussion of delinquency: delinquency was a product - specifically - of "bad
families". That this diagnosis was linked to different criminological theories
overall (of inconsistent socialisation on the one hand and over-regulation
of life by the State on the other) did not prevent the identification of the
family as a cause of delinquency from becoming an agreed topic within social
democratic criminology as a whole). Nor either, we should add, did Mannheim's
identification of faulty family socialisation patterns as a cause of delinquency
mean that he was unconcerned, as a socialist, with the relationship of
delinquency to inequality and poverty. But what is clear is that Mannheim,
like other social democratic writers on poverty, saw the abolition of poverty
as a long-term, cultural as well as political, affair; requiring changes in
values and practices in poorly functioning families, as well as in neighbourhoods
and, in some cases, in whole regions of the country. In this account, the
family had to be strengthened not only in order to be an effective institution
morally, but also because of the importance of the family to social reconstruction.
Families might soon have to be prepared to move from areas of dying industry
and declining employment opportunities to the New Towns, for example, and they
would have to adjust to new working and living conditions in their changed
enviroments. Temporary upturns in economic affluence might therefore actually
result in increases in criminal and delinquent behaviour on the part of families
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who were the least well prepared for the disorienting effects of relative
wealth.
"Although poverty and unemployment may rank high as crime-
producing elements, we should never forget that, in most
cases, they can become effective only in cooperation with
other factors or may be neutralised by favourable ones.
Likewise, events which, as a rule, have a crime-preventing
effect may lose this character under special circumstances.
And, finally, nothing is more dangerous than a sudden
change in man's fortunes and even the most propitious
happenings may require a long process of education and
training before they are properly digested. These
are platitudes, but their practical implications are
sometimes overlooked. To shower inflated wages upon
an adolescent entirely unaccustomed to them may easily
upset his mental and moral balance, give him an equally
inflated sense of his own importance and impair his
relations with his family."
(Mannheim, 1955, p.105, reprinting an essay of 1942)
Manrtheim's "realist" appreciation of the tasks that might have to be
performed by the family during social reconstruction was paralleled at the
time by the very popular accounts offered out of juvenile troubles and social
disorder generally, by psychiatrists and psychologists. An important figure
in the early 1940's was Anna Freud herself, in the Hampstead Nursery,
researching and publicising widely the emotional consequences of separation
on young children, with particular reference to the problem of an absent
father. (cf. Burlinghani and Freud, 1942 and 1944>. This work was continued,
and also given further variations, by John Bowiby, who, like Freud, was active
in the broader social-democratic constituencies, as well as within psychiatry
itself. (Bw1by,1947-9) 2
 Bowiby's most well-known study, Forty-four
Juvenile Thieves, is famous for his finding that some 17 of the 44 boys
studied had suffered some early or prolonged separation (in the first five years
of their lives) from their mother or father. Bowiby concluded that the
delinquency of his adolescent thieves resulted from the experience of
"maternal deprivation". (Bowiby, 1946). In that work, and even more
influentially, in Child Care and the Growth of Love, published in 1951 and
written for the World Health Organisation, Bowiby was concerned to provide
"scientific" arguments for the importance in child development of a child's
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'earliest ties to his mother' and as the authoritative history on post-war
child care policy observes, the publication was well timed (it was helpful
to government departments wrestling with the problem of homeless and deprived
children) and it was presented as "a message (which) appealed to the heart
as well as the head ... (being) readily translated into layman's language
Few research studies can have had such a favourable launching, nor such a
profound impact". (Packman, 1975, p.23). Gordon Trasler, perhaps the most
archetypal of social-democratic psychologists, was later to generalise out the
findings of Bowlby, Stott, Andry and others into a general theory of delinquency
as resulting from the "inconsistent socialisation" that he argued to be
prevalent in working-class families in particular. (Trasler, 1962;
½ndry, 1960; Stott, 1952). The use of inconsistent techniques of punishment
and reward, and the lack of differentiation in the conditioning resulting
from non-verbal or physical exchanges, was ineffective as a means of preparing
working-class adolescents for the increasingly complex demands of modern
industrial society. The task of the caring agencies, in working with the
delinquent adolescent, was to provide the socialisation on which the adolescent
could confront these more difficult demands, at work, at school and in leisure.
The work done by psychologists and psychiatrists in the area of
delinquency gave rise to a new terminology with which the experts in treatment
could formulate an expert, professional criminology. The delinquent's behaviour
came to be talked of as the "acting out" of "psychic traumas", as an attempt
to "resolve anxieties" over masculinity (in homes with inadequate father
figures and dominating fathers), or as an expression of a "personality breakdown"
of a kind that is most likely in disorganised working-class families. There
was also a marked growth of interest, in the 1940's and later, in the 1950's,
in the prevention of delinquency, as a possible alternative to treatment and
correction at a later date. Prevention was to be attempted via interventions
into 'problem' families by psychiatrically-trained case workers. An increasing
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nunber of studies appeared into the pathological determinants of "pre-
delinquency' and social maladjustment, and there was a rapid development in
the number of so-called longitudinal studies of cohorts of children, with
a view to identifying "scientifically" the cumulative interaction of particular
family and personality characteristics that were deemed to be 'productive of
delinquent outcomes'. Conflicts of view did arise in this work between psycho-
analytical writers like Bowiby for whom institutional placements were less
desirable for children from broken homes than foster homes or adoption
(institutions were thought by him to be less successful as mother substitutes)
and other social welfare thinkers for whom this view of deprivation was
altogether too individualistic. Jean Heywood puts the point clearly though
simplistically
"The effects of Bowlby's work ... while very necessary
had tended to confirm social workers in their emphasis
on individual relationships and it was not until 1965
that two sociologists, Peter Townsend and Brian Zbe1-Smith,
published their discovery of poverty in the welfare state."
(Heywood, 1978, p.203)
A characteristic feature of the psychological studies of delinquency
in the 1940's (and 1950's) however was their openness towards "sociology"
(taken to mean the study of the environment and its social effects, as for
example, in the relationship between housing conditions and family breakdown).
There was no fundamental dispute (in the immediate post-war period) between
sociology and psychology over fundamental philosophical questions: the
primacy of environment or personality in the causation of delinquency was by
and large thought to be an empirical question, to be investigated in each
individual instance. As a result of these investigations of particular cases,
it should be possible for social workers and correctional staff to develop
programmes of "individualised treatment".
Perhaps the most important consequence for "practical" discussions of
crime that was occasioned by the acceptance of psychological and sociological
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diagnosis of individual cases as a central part of the social-democratic
response to crime, was the conversion of the existing penal system to
"rehabilitative optimism". 13 The problems of crime and delinquency were in
principle resoluble through treatment; the crucial issues were to do with
diagnosis, measurement, financial provision for treatment institutions and
staff, and patience.
The rise of rehabilitative optimism and of treatment expertise was
signalled in a variety of penal policy initiatives in the early post-war
period. But one of the most significant legislative effects was the Criminal
Justice Act of 1948 which, amongst other provisions, substantially increased
the use of probation with both adults and juveniles (officially as an alternative
to institutionalisation), abolished hard labour in prisons, and corporal
punishment generally; introduced Remand Centres (to be used in lieu of prison
for the pre-trial containment of 17-21 year olds); and legislated for the
financial support of "new treatments" for offenders, as yet to be fully
developed. The Times' editorial summarised the guiding principle of the Act
as being "that there must be no despair of humanity". (31 July 1948) •14
3. Labour and the Treatment Professionals
By 1948, three years after the end of the War, and a short time after
the high point of the "popular socialism" of the war-time period, the criminology
applied by the Labour Government had become a matter for expert intervention,
diagnosis and treatment. Delinquency as such, the core 'behaviour" in talk
about crime, had been disconnected from the social contexts of the economy, and
the structures of class and power, and relocated into a psychodynamic theory
of maladjustment. The work of the International Committee of the Howard League,
beginning in 1942, and of Mannheim and others, had helped to create, and to
provide Government support for, a "treatment establishment" as a part of the
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emerging Welfare State apparatus. The"treatment establishmenI was held
together by its acceptance of the view of delinquency as a symptom of a
deeper maladjustment, by its tolerance of the gentler sociological theories of
environmental deprivation and by a commitment, of a profoundly ideological
kind, to ttrehabilitative optimism". The intervention of trained experts
(social case workers) in the affairs of working-class families was justified,
on social scientific grounds, in "saving the children" from the known effects
of deprivation and, morally, in bringing to them the benefits of "individual
treatment".
Prior to the recognition of treatment as an appropriate area of State
activity, for example in relationship to the family, social work had been by
no means so significant an occupational pursuit and by social work ideology
has been by no means so elaborate. "Caring" for delinquents and children
"at risk", and engaging in programmes of prevention and treatment, had been
more of a voluntary, amateurish occupation, a leisure pursuit, often of the
unoccupied wives, daughters and relatives of powerful industrialists,
Churchmen and other right-thinking powerful citizens. But, given the seal of
approval of dominant social democratic politics and the authenticity of a
scientific, socio-psychological terminology, the treatment establishment
was significant enough, by the early 1950's, to enter into a confrontation
with the other constituency with the legitimacy and power to engage in popular
and in official criminology: the traditional apparatus of law enforcement of
the police and the judiciary.
Highly influential within the "treatment establishment" in the early
post-war years were the European refugee criminologists and social reformers
who had worked on the International Committee of the Howard League in producing
Lawless Youth. Many of these figures - Mannheim and Max Grunhut from Germany,
and Grabinska and Radzinowicz from Poland - exhibited very clearly what
Perry Anderson has called "an elective political affinity with British social
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democracy". Like Malinowski in Anthropology, Eysenck in Psychology,
Wittgentstein and Popper in Philosophy, Isaiah Berlin in Political Philosophy
and Namier in History, these "white emigres" had chosen to come to England
(rather than America, for example) because of their respect for the climate of
"tradition, continuity, and orderliness" in England (Anderson, 1968). Mannheim
and Grunhut in particular appear to have established relatively secure
teaching and research positions in the early post-war period, and to have had
close contact, especially via Harold Laski and the London School of Economics,
with the Labour Party and the Government. Mannheim and Grunhut were indeed
highly enthusiastic and committed proponents of the ideology of treatment,
and both went around the country making contacts with social workers, local
government politicians, and educationalists in order to prepare the way for
social reform in the name of rehabilitation. The relationship of the treatment
establishment to Labour's intelligentsia and Transport House, and Government
planning departments, was rapidly transformed, from being a relationship of
insiders (who make the decisions) and outsiders (who petition, lobby or sent
delegations) into a close and "fraternal" relationship of friendship between
experts. A common complaint in the editorial pages of legal journals in the
1940's was that criminologists like Mannheim had greater inside knowledge of
impending legal and penal reform than the legal profession itself. This
"imbalance" of professional representation in Government circles was to be
corrected by the Conservative Government of 1950-9, with the parameters of
expertise being broadened to include the police and the judiciary, and the
patronage of Government being extended away from the LSE and toward Leon
Radzinowicz and his small criminological department within Cambridge University
Faculty of Law.
The receptiveness of Labour Party officials, Ministers, and policy
makers to the treatment establishment had partly to do with their belief in
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the importance of discipline within the family as a solution to individual
delinquencies (a belief born of the experience of working-class parents
preparing their offspring for entry into work) and, of course, partly to do
with the limited nature of their critique of the capitalist "order". There
was (and is) no recognition, in Labour's analysis of later capitalism, of
the alienation of the individual in the capital-labour relationship, of the
crisis-ridden nature of political economy on which it is based, or the
contradiction between capitalism as a mode of production and social-democratic
dre;ams of a stable, planned and consensual social order ("a cominuriity'). There
is, however, in the analysis offered by Labourism, a repugnance for the more
obvious human effects of the capitalist mode of industrial organisation,
and the inequalities in living standards and human provisions that tend to be
associated with it. In particular, in early 1940's versions of Labour Party
penal thinking, there was a profound opposition to the use of measures of
legal coercion (long prison sentences, or even fines, for juvenile and adult
property offenders in particular). "The law" was still associated, in Labour's
sentiments, with the employing class; the police themselves being seen as
defenders of the "boss class" during the General Strike and in some cases, as
defenders of the Mosleyite marches in the 1930's. To allow juvenile offenders
to be dealt with by the law enforcement apparatus was to compromise with the
authority and the institutions of the unreformed capitalist order; and it
was also to make the juvenile offender suffer the stigma of a court appearance
and subsequent criminal labelling in the working-class community. Where
possible, the use of the Law as a solution to delinquency, in particular, was
to be avoided; and treatment was the most obvious, and certainly most socially
supported, alternative.
The alliance of the Labour Party and the treatment worker was also
seen for a time to be successful in the reduction of the crime rates of the
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immediate post-war period, for in the year after the Criminal Justice Act,
the numbers of offences known to the police did actually fall, by some
8 per cent.
TABLE THREE
CRIMES KNOWN TO THE POLICE 1948-50
(Indictable offences)
Violence
Breaking	 Fraud and	 against
Larceny and
	 Receiving False	 Sexual	 the	 Other	 Total
Entering	 Pretences Offences Person 	 Offences
349,358 I 112,665	 9,044 I	 19,326	 10,922	 5,183	 16,186 1502,684
	
949 301,591	 91,445	 7,206	 17,358	 12,015	 5,235	 15,019 459,869
	
950 301,075	 92,839	 7,586	 27,561	 13,185	 6,249	 14,946 461,136
The increase in the official crime rate in 1950 was alnst entirely due
to police activity in the pursuit of fraud and corruption in and around the
black market. Otherwise, the official rates appeared to support Mannheiia's
earlier arguments that the post-war crime problem was temporary, and that it
could be reduced by the effective intervention of treatment workers. In 1951,
however, the rates began to show an overall increase (to 524,506 indictable
offences known to the police. Nearly all this increase was accounted for by an
increase of 54,000 in the numbers of larcenies known to the police)
By the end of the 1940's, the understandings that bound Labour to the
treatment establishment on the question of delinquency and crime were quite
firmly established. The task of the Labour Government was seen to be to reform
the social and economic order, to provide 'security from the cradle to the
grav&, and to eliminate the worst excesses of class inequality andinjustice;
and the task of the treatment establishment, in parallel, was to reform and
correct the pathological individual in the hope that he might be able to take
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up his membership of the reformed, social democratic, community. The practical
activities of the treatment establishment and the social-democratic Government
were each carried through in the name of the ' sense of community" we discussed
earlier in this chapter. The community" was largely unidentified (as a term,
it had as much meaning as the references to the "national interest" in Labour
Party talk in the 1960's and 1970's), but its most important characteristic
was its classlessness. "The community" was a transcendence of class (in the
same way as the wartime struggle itself provoked a sense of togetherness,
suppressing divisions of class), and it was to the betterment of community,
rather than the living conditions of any class within it, that social democrats
and treatment workers were supposed to be committed.
Most of the problems that were discussed by Labourite politicians,
academic criminologists and social administrators and treatment workers, were
of an essentially £ctical nature. A closure had been effected in which even
social philosophers like Ginsberg were expected to be interested (as they
were), in a utilitarian fashion, in the reconstruction of British society as
a welfare state. Philosophical enquiries into the nature of crime, or the
ultimate objectives, and operating assumptions, of social-democratic or treatment
projects, would probably have been regarded, in the atmosphere of the post-war
period, as conservative, diversionary, or perhaps as idle and precious.
The criminology of Labour and the treatment specialists was firmly
bound up with the question of youth and its "treatability". Youth posed a
threat to the social reconstruction of Britain as a "community" organised around
the institution of the family; but the troublesome behaviours of youth were,
at the same time, clearly understood as the result of the pathological
circumstances of the recent wartime experience. The expert initiatives of the
social case worker were required to treat such pathology in particular by
the provision of substitute family settings or by the correction of the
problem family.
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4. Social Reconstruction and Crime Control
But the wartime conditions were also seen, for example by Mannheim,
to have encouraged a variety of so-called "economic offences", amongst adults
as well as among youth. Alongside the traditional urban crimes of burglary
and shop-breaking, increases were noted in a variety of other forms of property
crime. Particular concern was expressed over an outhreak of looting in the
winter of 1940-1, which resulted in 4,584 cases being heard before the London
courts alone during 1941; and also much deplored was a tripling in the number
of cases of smuggling (with 16,000 "interceptions" or seizures in the financial
year 1945-6) . At the end of the war, attention was also focussed on a large
number of currency offences, which were known to have been the work of members
of Armed Forces on the Continent, and also of British visitors to the Continent.
(Mannheim, 1955, pp.111-112). In 1949, Harold Silcock published a re-interpretation
of the increases in crimes of theft between 1938 and 1947, and suggested that the
78 per cent increase over the period was in part to be explained as resulting
from the activities of "Black Marketeers", and others. The value of the property
stolen "in transit" during this period, and later written off, (notably
textiles) increased from £2.5 million in 1938 to £13 million in 1947 (Silcock,
1949). The overall number of indictable offences of fraud and false pretences
known to the police increased from 13,122 in 1945 to 27,415 in 1951 (an increase
of 108.9 per cent, by far the largest rate of increase of any of the offence
categories) (Criminal_Statistics, England and qa1es, 1959).
For Mannheim, these increases, like the delinquencies of youth, were
artifacts of war-time and immediate post-war conditions, and not, as Sir Cyril
Burt and others in conservative circles within psychology were to argue, the
result of ineffective repression of" mendacity ". The prevalence of first
offenders in the statistics on looting, smuggling, war-time profiteering, and
in offences against food control and lighting regulations was a demonstration of
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the fact that these activities were engaged in by juveniles and young adults,
temporarily out of parental control, and presented with one-off opportunities
for material gain: there was no evidence of any general outhreak of "pathology"
or of any general commitment to a criminal career (although commitments of
this kind might eventually develop if there were no Governmental initiatives to
control the economic offences of the powerful):
"Looting and the various types of profiteering are nothing
but more pronounced forms of general patterns of anti-
social behaviour which remains unpunished in times of
peace, and their perpetrators, though public nuisances,
do not therefore rank as professional law-breakers.
In other words, the juvenile looter may represent only
a further stage in the normal development of the slum
child who is used to picking up things lying about on the
pavement, and the war profiteer is only the somewhat more
unscrupulous war edition of the smart businessman who,
under normal circumstances, manages to keep to the right
side of the law."
(Mannheim, 1955, p.iO3, reprinting essay of 1942).
Elsewhere, Mannheim insists on its being the duty of the Courts to enforce
existing laws against the "white-collar" criminal, and in particular fraud
(which he sees as being economic gain won without productive effort).
"As long as the extreme dangers resulting from this type
of anti-social behaviour are not clearly realised, and
as long as legislators and administrators of criminal
justice fail to take appropriate measures against white-
collar crime, it is nonsensical to expect the penal
system to be successful in its fight against the ordinary
thief and burglar and small ry"
(Mannheim, 1946, p.119).
The legitimacy of Labour Government initiatives across a wide range
of issues was in part connected with the enforcement of law against economic
offenders as much as against the "ordinary" thieves and burglars.
"It is becoming clearer every day that social recon-
struction and the future of crime are largely dependent
on the attitude of society towards it."
(Ibid., p.120)
A report in The Times, some two years later, makes it clear what
Mannheim had in mind in urging action on economic offences, and the importance
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for Labour of the enforcement of law "without fear or favour".
"on 4 May ... Mr. Gaitskell, in his capacity as Minister
of Fuel and Technology, during the second reading of the
Motor Spirit Regulation Bill, informed the House of
Commons that the loss of petrol to the black market was
estimated by the Government as 100,000 tons a year.
(The Vick Committee, which had just reported, had a
figure of 160,000 tons) • He continued that this (was)
'a moral scandal which should not be tolerated. We
have a remarkably high standard in such matters and the
petrol black market is an unfortunate lapse from that
standard. It is surely wrong that people should benefit
from the black market at the expense of fellow-motorists
who are playing the game and obeying the rules."
(The Times, 5 May 1948)
In the commentaries of Mannheim, Gaitskell and others, the economic
offences connected with the black market, with fraud, and with currency
offences, were presented as dishonest, and immoral, departures from normal,
honest capitalist endeavour. Dishonesty and immorality were more likely to
occur, and less likely to be noticed and prosecuted, in a market that was
uncontrolled by the State, with individual economic offenders being able to hide
their misdemeanours by stealth or by presenting them simply as examples of
sharp business practice. But fraud and other forms of white-collar crime -
far from being merely devious examples of efficient capitalist practice - were
actually akin (in cause as well as in morality) to the criminal behaviours of
the racketeers at work in the black market. Indeed, the spread of business
malpractice and individual cases of white collar crime was probably due to
the corrupt influences of the "mobs' percolating through into business.
According to later commentators, it was in the 1940's that London's "underworld"
began to be a professionally organised (by Jack "Spot" Cromer, Bill Hill
and others), and out of their experience of the black market that the later
leaderships of the "East End gang" (notably the Krays and the Richardsons) were
to emerge. In social-democratic accounts like that of Mannheim, organised crime,
like white collar crime, was an indication of the corruption of individuals
(who were prey to deviance by virtue of faulty upbringing), taking advantage
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of the opportunities presented by the uncontrolled, and relatively unpoliced,
free enterprise market.
One of Mannheim's concerns in his definitive text on post-war crime
was to encourage the State to use the criminal Law much more extensively in
the "world of business", and, indeed, to examine the use of legal control for
this purpose by the Soviet State to see what lessons could be drawn for Britain.
(Mannheim, 1946, pp.195-9)
The involvement of delinquents in economic offences was then connected,
in Mannheim's account, with the fact of youth having been provided with "bad
examples" by the economic offences of some adults, or, in some cases, by youth
having fallen into "bad company" - for example, with members of the Armed
Forces returning from the war, or, indeed, deserters (many of whom appear to
have mastered the technique of smuggling, fraudulent conversion and other
sophisticated economic offences). So far as deserters were concerned
"Very soon after the onset of the crime-wave, the view
was expressed by the authorities and the press that the
rise in crime was largely due to the activities of
this group of outcasts of whom, according to official
estimates, there were about 20,000 at large (as against
80,000 after World War 1). Unable to get identity
cards and ration books in the legal way, they were
said to be living largely on their wits, and always
ready to commit even serious crimes."
(Mannheim, 1955, p.114, quoting essay of 1947).
Maimheim notes that the attempt to encourage the deserters to return to
"normal life in the community" by the granting of an amnesty, was largely
unsuccessul, because of "the force of retributive tendencies in the population."15
For those commentators with "retributive tendends", deserters were not
the only source of poor example, and corruption, affecting the youthful
population. The Justice of the Peace and Local Government Review, in 1947,
moved from a discussion of desertion to note "the presence in the country of a
fairly large number of aliens of various nationalities, refugees and others,
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whose activities may not always keep them on the right side of the law."
The article continues
"We do not wish to say too much on this subject, because
we are uncertain of the real facts, but we do feel strongly
that as far as this class of person is concerned the
Courts have a special duty. The Aliens Order 1920,
Article 12(b) (a) and the third schedule of the Order set
out the circumstances in which a Court may recommend to
the Secretary of State that a convicted alien be deported.
We feel that it is the duty of the Courts at the present
time to approach this question of recommendation from
the standpoint that it is for the alien, if he can, to
show cause why he should not be recommended rather than
for the court to consider why he should. We should not
at any time keep in this country aliens who refuse to
obey our laws unless there are strongly mitigating
circumstances in their favour, and at the present time,
it is doubly important to get rid of them, and so leave
the police free to deal with the native criminals who
cannot be deported."
(Justice of the Peace and Local Government Review, CX(2)
12 January 1947, editorial on "The Crime Wave")
Once the scapegoating of a certaingment of society begins, whether
for its alleged role in "moral decline", the "undermining of authority", or
in officially-recorded crime, the nature of the debate over 1 causes" tends to
shift ground. Causation is thought to have been established - the corruption
of the youthful, the naive or the disturbed by 'butsiders" is seen as the
self-evident explanation of the presence of pathology (crime, deviance, dissent)
in an otherwise healthy society. The debate then tends to shift to the
relative responsibility to be accorded to different outside, or minority, groups.
In the 1940's, the Conservative press, along with some elements in the judiciary
and the police, began to debate, either overtly or by inference, the
relationship between the "crime wave" and the presence of aliens, deserters,
and other potential corruptors in the post-war population. 16 There are no
studies of the effect of such scapegoating in the crime-talk of the 1940's on
the various migrant groups, or on those demobilised from the services; but we
can see that conservative writers in the legal press were able to use the aliens'
involvement in economic offences as a topic distracting attention away from the
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economic offenders identified and deplored in Mannheim and other Labourite
accounts • The debate in the legal journals (and in some of the weekly press)
was conducted in terms of a largely conformist British culture being threatened
by the presence of migrant groups, whose norms and customs were often at
odds with those of English Criminal Law. There was little attention paid to
the possibility that the various migrant groups might themselves be the target
of attacks and theft from sections of the neighbouring British population, and
that they might suffer the double disadvantage of not feeling readily able
to ask for the protection of the local police. 	 Social democratic writers
certainly did not directly challenge the increasing numerous accounts of
Polish, Ukrainian, or other migrant group involvements in crimes; for to do so
might have required a more critical examination of the notion of "community"
vis-a-vis nationality and social class.
For Mannheim, one of the major dangers in the apparent growth of
economic offences was the possibility that youth might come to imitate the
deserter, or, in some cases, the white collar criminal. The youthful population
(and especially that section born to inadequate or broken families) might
transfer their loyalties to a more exciting alternative - the outlaw. Indeed,
in other accounts of the delinquency of the period, the element of excitement
in delinquency - in what was a rather drab and puritanical period of social
and industrial reorganisation - was given as an "additional causal factor ".
The chances of 'youngsters" developing an interest in delinquency and
crime as "excitement" was also being worried about increasingly in relation
to the content of the new mass media that were beginning to open out in the
1940's. During the war, the media had been confined to the role of straight
information provision (as defined by what information was helpful to the
wartime effort); but in the immediate post-war years the radio and film industries
began to play on other important cultural themes. The radio serial, Dick Barton -
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ecial Agent, was the subject of critical comment, and one Police Chief
called for the programme to be banned on the grounds that it constituted
'crime propaganda", and the gangster film, No Orchids for Miss Blandish
opened to a similar reception in 1948, and was actually banned by organisations
representing more than a thousand cinemas (Chibnall, 1977, p.55; Yallop, 1971).
The elements of a "causal connection" (between crime and the mass media) were
beginning to be sketched in by the end of the 1940 I s, although they did not
really gain primacy in crime-talk until after the advent of television.
The possibility of young offenders drifting into criminal careers,
as a result of these associations, and also as a consequence of the general
economic shortages, was now considered to be a serious problem in both Labour
and Conservative accounts. For Nannheim, an appropriate political response
would be to increase the size of the Police Force, 18 and also to improve the
level of technology under its control (detection of the economic offender
would be no simple matter). This would have deterrent effects on juveniles as
a whole, as well as allowing for more of the minority of disturbed adolescents
"in need of care, protection or control" to be apprehended and handed over to
the care of treatment workers.
It was at this point in the evolution of a Labour criminology in the
1940's that a link was made with the existing law enforcement apparatus. The
Police were to be supported, and encouraged to direct their attention towards
preventative work with juveniles, as well as to bring juveniles to court as
often as was necessary. Encouragement was also given to the Police in their
role as detectives, especially in working on fraud, "fiddles" and on black
market offences - the "rackets" - an area of expertise in which the police took
great pride in the 1940's (cf. Hart, 1951)	 There was, indeed,a considerable
"moral panic" in the late 1940's over the widespread activities of the so-called
W Spivs "and i5rones" (a terminology, according to the Daily Telegraph, derived
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from the race-course fraternity of the 1890's, and applied in the post-war
period to sharp-practitioners, con-men and other skilled operators on the
margins of legitimate and illegitimate business practices): it was alleged,
in characteristically Labour style, that the Spivs and Drones were making
"easy pickings at the expense of the wider community t1 . (cf. Hopkins, 1963,
pp.97-100). According to one later commentator, public anxiety was excited,
in the main, by the more violent and "really" criminal of the spivs. The
"wide boy" version of spivvery as such met with a rather more tolerant, not
to say admiring, public response: it was a "cocking of the snook" at the
rigidity and bureaucracy of the "Age of Austerity". Alan Deacon observes
that the "spiv", as a black marketeer, actually provided "nylons, chocolates,
and other luxuries" which people wanted to buy as a means of mitigating
the overall atmosphere of austerity, and that spivs were often admired as
"exploiting a clumsy bureaucracy rather than (their) customers". In addition
"Arthur Helliwell's tales of "spivery" made his Sunday
column of the People the most widely read in the country
(whilst) the cartoonist, Osbert Lancaster, and the
comedian, Arthur English, made the flashily dressed
"wide boy" a national character".
(Deacon, 1980, p.446)
In a situation of national shortage of labour, however, the
Government had to act against what Prime Minister Clement Attlee called
"a section of the population which serves no useful purpose" (Hansard,
6 August 1947): and particular attention was given to the drones, the able
bodied bult unemployed "idle rich" of whom it was felt there was one million,
"most of whom spent their time in gambling dens and night clubs" (Deacon,
ibid). If the drones were idle, the spivs were also likely to move out from
the black market into other forms of crime, especially in the bad company
they encountered in the black market
"In 1948 The Times deplored the failure to search positively
for the 20,000 deserters, without the right to a ration
book, as yet unpardoned, who formed the pool of lawbreakers.
They had been taught the techniques of violence in wartime
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and were bitter enough to exercise them now; indeed, London
in 1946 attributed nine per cent of all crimes to them.
By 1950 a legal paper had stated that the ordinary citizen
no longer felt safe in his own home, and the Lord Chief
Justice had earlier cited cases of old people trembling,
often with good reason, when they heard a knock on the
door at night. The statistics showed that every large
school in the country could hope to have on the register
a couple of active criminals who had no fear of the police".
(Hopkins, op.cit.)
Conjectural though arguments of this kind may have been (and
reported in language that was to become familiar in the litany of moral
panics over crime throughout the post-war period), they were in part responsible
for the increase in expenditure on the police from the central Government
funds during the late 1940's, along with an upturn in recruitment (prompted
by the award of a pay rise), and an increase in the amount of ama1gairtiion
and investment in technological support within the Police Force as a whole.
Along with measures to increase the size and efficiency of the police
force, Mannheim and Labour criminologists like Grunhut envisaged a need for
a massive expansion of the treatment and correctional institutions. Between
1947 and 1952, seventeen new open and medium security prisons and Borstals
were built, but even the opening of the new institutions was insufficient to
match the increase in the daily average prison population, which rose from
12,910 in 1945 to 20,687 in 1951, the highest figure since 1877. As a device to
combat the overcrowding in prison, the Prison Commissioners for the first time
allowed three prisoners to a cell. (Thomas, 1972, p.181) •20 There was
clearly no in-principle objection within the Labour Government to the use of
prison sentences, especially in the era of rehabilitative reform within the
Prison Commission, and especially for "young adults" who were engaged in
acquisitive crime. A distinction began to emerge in Labour Party talk about
youth and "young adults" (the 17 to 21 year olds)	 between those who were
deprived, on the one hand, and those who were simply ungrateful, recalcitrant
and undisciplined; a distinction which closely paralleled the distinction in
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the Beveridge Report and in the thinking of Labour Party and Fabian Society
social policy makers, between the "deserving "and undeserving "poor. The
fact that a section of youth appeared not to appreciate the efforts of the
reforming Labour Government was explained, in Labour circles, as the result
of that section having been contaminated with acquisitive, individualistic
and dishonest preferences. In some Conservative accounts, too, a distinction
of this kind emerged: J.D.W. Pearce, a prominent liberal Conservative and
psychiatrist, identified acquisitiveness as one of the pathological effects
of inadequate socialisation, along with fluency and aggression, in the
personalities of the juvenile delinquent. (cf. Pearce, 1952). In social-
democratic writing, however, the corruption was seen almost as a contamination
deriving from the period before social reconstruction, in much the same way as
criminologists in the Soviet Union, during the 1920's and 1930's, interpreted
the crime, delinquency and alcoholism of the time as a "contamination from
the West" and/or as 'u1ture lag " from before the Revolution. (Cf. Connor, 1969) 21
The fear of this "contamination" deriving from "bad company" was
certainly used by the then Home Secretary, Mr. Chuter Ede, in justifying the
creation of the Detention Centre in the 1948 Criminal Justice Bill. A central
function of the Centres was to segregate "young adult offenders"(aged 17 to 21)
from adult prisoners, which had previously been impossible in the British
penal system. But it was clear that other motives were involved. In the
debate on the Bill, Mr. Ede commented on the Centres in the following terms
.there is a type of offender to whom it appears
necessary to give a short, but sharp reminder that he
is getting into ways that will inevitab'' lead him
into disaster. It is hoped that these Detention
Centres which will be set up gradually will enable
that warning to be given. Their regime will consist
of brisk discipline and hard work."
The introduction of the Detention Centre (as well as the support
forthcoming for the Police, and for a "reformed" and expanded system of prison)
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is evidence of the continuing, if muted, influence of law-enforcement thinking
in the late 1940's. The Detention Centre which was modelled, according to
Nigel Walker, on the "penal camps" used by the Army th discipline its own
young offenders, was first spoken of by a Departmental Committee of 1938,
as an alternative to corporal inishxnent. After the war, in the context of
the general anxiety over youth, the introduction of the Detention Centre was
soon demanded by the Magistrates' Association, as it had already been by
the senior London magistrate, John Watson, in his boolc, The Child and the
Magistrate, published in 1942.
Watson argued in terms which closely anticipated the 1948 formulation
used by the Labour Government's Home Secretary
"there is a very definite demand for some form of treatment
which would be of short duration, but thoroughly unpleasant,
and available as a penalty for minor offences, including
minor breaches of probation."
It is not clear whether Watson or Ede had any particular type of
youthful offender in mind here, or whether the argument was simply intended
to underline the need for a coercive institution as a support for the new
"rehabilitative" measures, a guarantee that the proper conformist behaviours
could be enforced, should moral persuasion and resocialisation fail. Certainly,
the Howard League was totally unconvinced of the utility of Detention Centres
as "rehabilitative measures" and could not identify the "type of offender"
for whom the Centres might be intended. Even Conservative spokesmen in the
House of Lords, in that Chamber's debate over the Criminal Justice Bill,
confused the Detention Centre with Attendance Centres. It seems likely,
in other words, that the pressure for the creation of the Detention Centres
marks an early stage in the struggle the magistracy (and the law enforcement
apparatus) to draw up its battle-lines in defence of coercion in the criminal
justice system, in the face of the early advances of "rehabilitative measures"
and the 'treatment establishment".
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The 1948 debates also illustrate the beginnings of the use of
abstract images of social order and social disorder in post-war criminology.
The references in and around this debate to "very definite demands for (a
certain form of) treatment" and to " types of offender to whom it appears
necessary to administer a short, but sharp reminder" were not obviously
understood, either in the House of Lords or in the Howard League, as having
any clear application to any particular kind of youthful disorder. 22 The
mere mention of youth had already begun to conjure up an imagery of disruption -
for Labour, the disruption of a consensual social order organised around
the family, and, for Conservatives, the disruption of authority and the
effective learning of (subordinate) social roles. As we shall see later, the
image, or "metaphor", of yputh as disruption, appears repeatedly in post-war
talk about crime, but the basic elements of this metaphor were already well
established by 1948. By the time that Rock n' Roll and the Teddy Boys began
to emerge as identifiable options for post-war youth, the message they had
to emit to the adult audience had already been well scripted and rehearsed.23
5.Conservative Criminology in the 1940's
The abstract metaphors were present in both Labour and Conservative
accounts (for example, in the Conservative Party pamphlet, Youth Astray,
of 1947, which was prepared by a committee which included both the previously-
mentioned Watson and Page). But where Mannheim, Grunhut, Fry and other
Labour Government spokesmen located the disturbance of youth in a psychodynamic
and environmental "theory of crime", Conservatives were articulating an
alternative account, albeit on a tentative basis. Crime was a behaviour quite
specifically of the criminal classes in this account, and it was a behaviour
which was therefore to be expected in all societies, irrespective of the
particular social structure of the society, or the particular disruptions a
society might experience (for example, in war). Simply, there are evil men,
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immune to moral or social reform, and the system of social control and law
has to be such as to deter or otherwise to catch and to contain these men.
The "frailties of human nature" being what they are, say Conservatives, we
may all be prey to temptations, and a strong legal system and police force is a
useful protection for the population as a whole (in defending both persons
and property). But there is a qualitative distinction between an individual
failing of character (a single act of delinquency) and the commitment to
delinquency (or adult crime). The commitment to crime and/or delinquency
is evidence of a commitment to the attempt to amass wealth outside the labour
market without working: it is evidence that an individual belongs to the
Ucriminal classes" (who are understood as those groups who have not accepted
the moral values underlying "modern social order" - that wealth is to be
worked for, and that the inequitable social position within the social order
are, to some extent, justified by the fact that the occupants of those
positions or their relatives have worked hard to obtain them).
There was a clear distinction, therefore, for Conservatives, between
those juvenile delinquents who are found guilty, in court, of "grave misconduct"
(who may be taken to exhibit "criminal tendencies") and juveniles who had
been "led astray" (who may not, in other words, be really delinquent, but who
might still require some rehabilitative treatment, or possibly, some
correctional experience of a deterrent nature). The 1947 Conservative
committee's proposals oposedthe blurring of the distinction between the
disadvantaged" and the 'de1inquent" child which they saw in the proposals
of the International Committee of the Howard League, and in the direction of
Labourite penal policy thinking generally. Real crime (the amassing of wealth
by members of the "criminal classes" outside the labour market) had to be
clearly deterred and controlled, whilst occasional delinquencies resulting
from the deprivations of the working classes as a whole should be combatted
via Governmental economic policy and by individual rehabilitative measures.
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The discovery of the committed delinquent must take place through
"due process" in court. Guilt must be proven before any serious penal or
welfare decisions are taken, and the onus of proof must be on the prosecution.
It is in the courtroom that the basic test of democracy, as the defence of
individual freedoms, is carried through: 24 and, consistent with the classical
philosophies on which pure Conservatism depends, it is the responsibility
of a Inagistracy to adjudicate, neutrally, the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
The magistracy and judiciary are representatives of a general interest only -
the social contract that is society - and are seen (classically) to be immune
from the "interests" of the propertied and the working classes alike. They
represent the authority of "the society as a whole".
A continuing theme in Conservative thinking in the early 1950's
which was present in a less emphasised form in Youth Astray, was the growing
threat to "authority" - primarily as a result of the disruptions of the war,
but also, significantly, by some aspects of Labour Government activity in
the early post-war period. In the context of delinquency and crime, the
proposals made to substitute welfare proceedings in family tribunals (by
Margery Fry in Lawless Youth) constituted a challenge to the authority not
simply of "the Court" but also the ability of the society as a whole to
exercise its authority over delinquent youth, and adult criminals. The
"threat to Authority" theme was certainly muted in the 1940's and always
overlain by the concern of the Conservatives to give support to the popularly
welcomed attempts of the Labour Government to tackle "deprivation" and
poverty. At no time did the concern for "authority" approach the hysterical
levels of the late 1970's. But the elements of a Conservative response to
"welfare" were clearly being articulated, with the defence of the courts,
the police and the legal system being presented as the guarantees of
"individual freedom", and a neutral agency of the general interest, as well
as being, in some Conservative accounts of i.e. continuity of
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established tradition and (therefore) the natural order of things.
The guardians of this tradition at a local level, the Magistrates,
were on the defensive in the earlier years of the Labour Government. In the
early post-war political climate, with many of the traditional forms of class
authority (like the aristocratic leaderships of the police and the military)
under critical popular scrutiny, the magistrates were apprehensive of the
Government and indeed of its supporters in the increasingly powerful social
work and treatment professions. These anxieties were fuelled by the appointment,
in June 1946, by the Home Secretary, of a Commission on the Justices of the
Peace, "to review the present arrangements for the selection and removal of
Justices of the Peace, ... and to report what changes, if any, in that system,
are necessary or desirable to ensure that only the most suitable persons are
appointed to the Commission of the Peace". For a time, that most reliable
institution of class power in England at local level appeared actually to be
under threat, and in the pages of the Justice of the Peace and Local Government
Review a certain nervous anxiety was letectable. The report of the Commission,
published in 1948 and enacted in 1949, did recommend changes in the method
for the appointment of J.P. 's by the office of the Lord Chancellor. The power
of political parties over the appointments was restricted a little by the
recommendation that the main criterion for selection should be "fitness for
discharge of judicial duties"; and by the recommendation that the local
advisory committees, who nominated individuals for the Bench, should be drawn
from "different sections of the Community". Also, a statutory age of 75
was established for retirement. But this was hardly the fearsome or
revolutionary Report anticipated by the Bench, and this recognition, along with
the concessions made to the Magistrates' Association in the Criminal Justice
Act of 1948 (the introduction of Detention Centres, appears to have restored the
confidence of this part of the law enforcement apparatus, and also encouraged
it to work for further Conservative measures).
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45. Labour and the Police
The core organisation for the defence of "Authority" (alongside
the Magistracy and the Prison Service) was, in practice, the police. Like
the Magistracy, the police force had to adjust to the reformative climate
of the early post-war years; but, in addition, in a climate characterised
by some anti-authoritarian feeling, they had to distinguish themselves from
the agencies of State authority with whom the British population had been at
war. Sir John Noylan's The Police in Britain, published in 1946, was in part
an attempt to distinguish the British police from the police forces of the
totalitarian State. According to this author it' precisely because of
"antiquity" of "the office of constable" with its unbroken lineage of 700
years" that there was a sense of trust between the citizen in Britain and his
police force as well as a sense of the police being responsible through the
local constabulary, to neighbourhood and community.
The police force was in a "haphazard", under-financed, and undermanned
state at the end of the war, 25
 and it was also less popular in some quarters
than the more accountable local auxiliary police and Civil Defence wardens of
26
the war time period. In some Labour circles, as we have mentioned earlier,
there was a continuing resentment of the role of the police in the General
Strike period and during the struggles against the Fascist marches in the
1930,9.27 Recruitment of new manpower into the police had been at a standstill
in 1941-5, with most potential constables being taken directly into the armed
forces; and the level of police pay had been allowed to fall to around about
the national average. This remained the situation in the immediate post-war
period, and in 1949 there was a very high number of vacancies in all forces,
and especially in the Metropolitan force. The size of the police force actually
fell from 63,980 in 1939 (one policeman for every 648 in the population) to
60,190 in 1949 (one for every 727); and expenditure on the police also fell as a
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proportion of total government spending from 2.4 per cent in 1938-9 to
1.3 per cent in 1949-50.
This "decline of the police" was in no way the result of any
concerted attack from the Government. The Police Act of 1946 was actually of
some help to the Force, in introducing some efficiencies through amalgamation,
in providing for new equipment and also in providing support for the opening
of the National Police College. But the fragile - cooperative but cool -
relationships of the early post-war period eventually strengthened and warmed
to the point where, by 1949, the Government was able to accept the recommend-
ations of the Oaksey Committee for substantial pay ñses for police (bringing
them well above the national average and having a rapid effect on the police 's
recruitment problems).
There is little doubt that the publicity given by the popular press
to the murder of P.C. Edgar by an army deserter in February 1948 played a
part in the improvement of the policets fortunes; and it may also be the case
that the efforts of Sir Harold Scott, as Metropolitan Police Commissioner,
to improve the image of the Force by cooperation with the making of films like
"The Blue Lamp", (in which policemen were depicted as folk-heroes) had some
impact on public opinion. (cf. Chibnall, 1977, p.270). Equally important,
however, was the fact that the Labour Party in Government came increasingly
to need the help of the Force, po1itica1y, especially after 1947.
The renewed outhreak of Mosleyite activity in London, in 1947,
resulted in attempts from the Left of the Labour movement to break up the
Fascist meetings, and marches. Barry Cox reports that
"... the police interpreted their powers under the 1936 Public
Order Act to obtain the names and addresses of hecklers to
mean that they should give such information to the meeting
chairman. The Fascists exploited this cheerfully, to the
dismay of their opponents, who accused the police of assisting
in the formation of a Mosleyite blacklist ... (D.N.) Pritt
raised the matter in the Commons, but Chuter Ede, the Home
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Secretary, defended the practice because it enabled the
chairman of meetings to pursue private prosecutions, if they
wished to, when the police did not undertake public ones."
(Cox, 1975, p.4O)
In 1948, as a response to the continuing harassments from the
Fascists,Chuter Ede banned all political marches in London for three months,
a ban that was renewed, in the event, until 1949.
The links formed between the Government and the higher echelons of
the Metropolitan Police Commission during this period were generally useful
as challenges came increasingly to be posed to the direction of Government
policy itself, from the Left. The spread of strikes through the London and
Merseyside docks during 1947-50 was the most obvious sign of a disenchantment
with the gradualism of the Government's economic and social policies, especially
in traditionally militant working class constituencies. The Government's
response to the dock strikes was to use the Special Branch in an attempt to
discredit the unofficial Port Workers' Committee as a Communist cell. Tape
recordings of speeches by the P.W.C. organiser were passed to Arthur Deakin,
General Secretary of the T.G.W.U., who expelled the individuals concerned
from the union; and in ApriL 1951 seven dockers were tried for organising
strikes in contravention of war-time legislation still in force. (Bunyan,
1976, pp.l24-5). The role of the police in the anti-Communist campaign
directed by the Labour Government, especially after 1947-8, at the Left, is not
on public record; but the purge of "'i from the Civil Service initiated
by Prime Minister Attlee must have depended, in part, on police information and
encouragement.
One of the most significant moments in the developing relationship
of the Labour Government and the police occurred in the context of the
accusation of corruption in Government circles made by a Mr. Sidney Stanley
in 1948. Stanley, a Polish emigre, ne Ko.hsychy, who described himself as a
"promoter of business contracts", made public allegations that several senior
and junior ministers and civil servants had taken special favours from industrial
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and commercial representatives in exchange for their being ensured Government
contracts. 28 The investigation of these allegations by the Lynskey Tribunal
(Cmnd.7617) required close cooperation between the Attorney-General
(Mr. Hartley Shawcross) and the police. In the event, no criminal charges
were laid against any members of the Government, but Mr. John Beicher,
Parliamentary Secretary at the Board of Trade resigned, after the publication
of the Tribunal's Report, and Mr. Stanley was deported, th criticisms that
this was too severe a punishment, and suspicions of a desire to have Mr. Stanley
29
removed from the public eye. (Gross, 1963).
The increasingly close relationships of the Government and the police
appear to have developed in parallel with a loss of direction on the part of
the Government, which has been widely commented on in subsequent histories
of the economic and social policies of the first post-war Labour Government.
The economic recovery suffered a temporary set-back, and the Right and Centre
of the Party led by Herbert Morrison argued for a policy of "conso1idation
and (under the pressure of campaigns from business over nationalisation) for
resistance to the demands from the Left for further extensions of public
ownership.30 The beginnings of the Cold War, in 1947-8, gave an impetus to
the Right, and enabled them to associate any radical opposition, especially
on the industrial front, with Communist influence and 'infiltratior. In
1948-50, just at the point where the Government appeared poised for a massive
appropriation of "the commanding heights of the economy", and "when the
economy appeared to be regaining both internal and external balance, there was
a. substantial shift away from planning in the direction of a free market
system" (Rogow, 1955, p.41). The "retreat from planning" and the so-called
"bonfire of controls" of 1948-50 marks a point of collapse in Labour's
reconstruction of the economy, and the beginnings of an acceptance in the
Labour leadership "that the objectives of private industry harmonised with the
aims of the Labour Government". (Rgow, 1955, p.44). The close reconciliation
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of the Home Office and the police, in 1949, in the form of considerable pay
rises, can also be read as evidence of the Government's general move towards
a. consolidation politics. It certainly is evidence of a renewal of influence
of the police, and hence of the 'law enforcement' approach to questions of
social order within the Labour Government itself; an influence that continued,
with similar reciprocal benefits, in the rest of the post-war period.
In one area, there was clear evidence of the conflict of view between
the Government and advocates of traditional forms of policing, and that was
over the nature of the "police task". A Home Office Committee, appointed by
Home Secretary Chuter Ede, on 30 August 1950, "to investigate the performance
of police on "extraneous" duties" refused to accept that the traffic-policing
functions of the police (which had obviously increased in the line with the
increases in motor vehicle use after the war) 31 were not "within the ambit
of police work proper" (Report of the Committee on Extraneous Duties, 1953, para.5)
Chief Constables and other witnesses had argued before the Committee for
police to be relieved of these duties, in order that they might concentrate
on the pursuit and control of "real" criminals. The Committee on Extraneous
Duties withdrew some already anachronistic responsibilities from the police
(in the area of tax control), but argued that "uniformity in the extra duties
performed by police forces is neither necessary nor desirable" (para.40(i)).
For this Committee, the police force was a "peace-keeper" in the most general
sense, with a proper responsibility for traffic and domestic problems, as
well as for crime control, and for the policing of industrial disputes and
political demonstrations in the broader society. It was precisely this
conception of the police's role, of course, which increasingly came to inform
Labour's policy of support for the police across a broad range of activities.
The active participation of the police in the juvenile and adult court was
encouraged by the Howard League, in Lawless Youth, and in the Criminal Justice
Act. It was a conception of policing which increasingly found a place in local
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police forces in a general political climate emphasising the importance of
common sacrifices in the universal interest, as well as amongst Police
Chie adjusting to changing priorities in the thinking and policy-making
of a Labour Government.
For Conservative commentators on crime in 1945-51, also, the police
were to be encouraged, but primarily in their capacity as representatives'
of Authority and as crime-fighters. The delinquencies of the young were
evidence of a commitment to illegitimate ways of obtaining financial gain:
they threatened the moral fabric of an industrial society that required that
the mass of the youthful population in each generation should accept the
need for productive labour. The police were to be given the power, equipment
and manpower to carry through the crime-fighting, and delinquency-controlling,
task, and they were to be encouraged to bring lawbreakers to court for
punishment. Law enforcement, as opposed to treatment or mere "peace-keeping",
was the primary role of the police. The strength of the Police Force increased
rapidly, under the Conservative Government elected in 1951, from 62,910 in
1950 to 72,850 in 1960, and, indeed, the proportion of Government resources
spent on the police also increased, rapidly, by 256 per cent between 1950 and
1965 (as compared with a growth in the Gross National Product of 163 per cent).
(Martin and Wilson, 1968, pp.70-i). It has also been noted, vis-a-vis the
police's experience of the Government after 1950, that
"the recurrent attacks (on Government expenditure) by balance
of payment crises, and stop-go Government economic policies
were delayed and arbitrators awarded less than the Police
Federation demanded on occasion but there were not cuts.
Police building was held up ... by checks on local authority
spending, and perhaps most important of all, the development
of central services, in particular radio communications, was
slowed by shortage of funds. Though they occasioned much
heart-breaking at the time, none of these measures could
compare with the inter-war cuts in wages, long delays in
spending and inability to put new ideas into effect."
(Martin and Wilson, 1968, p.7l) (my emphasis)
By 1951, at the moment of the return of a Conservative Government under
the influence of the "Progressive Tories", the police, magistracy and prison
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services were firmly in favour in Government circles, and with the outgoing
Labour Party itself. Amongst Labour Government supporters, the police were
in favour, consensually, as "peace-keepers", as detectives (working against
the fiddles and swindles of the economic offenders) ,30 and as crime-prevention
agents working, in collaboration with social workers, in "the community".
But for Labour and Conservative commentators alike, the police were becoming
increasingly important as guardians of the parameters of the new consensus
politics of the post-war era, and the "crime" they policed increasingly
understood as being the behaviour of the youthful, the individual economic
offender (the "spiv '), and, to some extent, the political and industrial
groups who were involved in challenges to the consensus over welfare,
planning and reform already established between the two major Government
parties.
7. "The Climax of Labourism"
Ralph Miliband refers to the early programme of the 1945-50 Labour
Government of nationalisation and socialisation (of health and education)
as "the climax of Labourism". In so doing, he wants to identify the fatal flaw
in the assumptions of many of the Labour activists of 1945, namely that the
measures of 1945-8 were "the beginning of the social revolution to which he
believed the Labour Party was dedicated". Instead
"... his leaders took these achievements to be the social
revolution. Of course, they would readily agree that there
was still much to be done to consolidate the social
revolution. But, as far as they were concerned, the bigger
part of the task had, by 1950, been completed. And they
therefore were genuinely impatient with the argument that
there remained a citadel to be conquered. They believed
it to be already occupied."
(Miliband, 1961, p.308)
Though the "citadel" was "occupied", international tensions were
requiring a rearmament programme (as over Korea in 1949) and cycles of boom
and slump were proving difficult to contain - a wage freeze was imposed in
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1948 and rationing of both necessities and luxuries was continued throughout
1948 and 1949. It was clear that social reconstruction and "an end to
sacrifice" were going to be no overnight achievement, however well
intentioned the Government. The character of Labour's social policies
and rhetorics on crime in such circumstances was therefore no surprise. Crime
and delinquency were "short-cuts" to material gain, and they were therefore
parasitical on the mass of the population, which was seen to be engaged in
worthy labour and self-denial. The juvenile offender and the economic offender
were identified as the primary criminal threats to reconstruction precisely
because public experience and knowledge of these behaviours did threaten the
Labour Government's emphasis on the importance of "postponing gratification"
and on the equality of sacrifice during continuing conditions of austerity.
These were sentiments which no Conservative spokesmen would deny.
But, as we have shown, Butskellite Conservatives had already participated in
an ideological reconstruction of the central themes of "social democracy"
in which other connotations had been constructed around the agreed problem
areas (the family as an agency of disipline; the State as a source of
unwarranted interference and on the court as an institution for separating out
the depraved from the deprived). This was ideological work which was to
give the Conservative Party, the organised party of the ruling dass,
considerable ideological advantage as economic conditions were transformed
from those of "austerity" to those which were described, in the 1950's, as
"affluence".
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CHAPTER ONE : FOOTNOThS
1. Later in the chapter, we discuss the very limited reforms proposed by the
iiaOffce Committee that was struck in 1946 to investigate "the present
arrangements for the selection and removal of Justices of the Peace".
No such committee was established to investigate the judiciary as such.
2. During the run up to the General Election of 1979, spokesmen for the
existing leadership of the Tory Party went to great lengths to
distance themselves from previous post-war Conservative Governments'
policies on social welfare. In large measure, these spokesmen seem to
have been influenced by Sir Keith Joseph's earlier ideological work
on "State dependency" as a form of decadence and also as an obstacle
to the creation of free market of independent producers. See, for
example, Joseph's speech of 1974 "Britain : a Decadent New Utopia", in
which he argued that "delinquency, truancy, vandalism, hooliganism,
illiteracy, decline in educational standards .... teenage pregnancies
drunkenness, sexual offences, and crimes of sadism ... (arise)
because the message is that self-discipline is out of date .... that
the poor cannot be expected to help themselves .... that the State
(should) do more." (Guardian, 21 October 1974)
3. In contrast, the dominant form of social democracy in the 1940's in
relationship to the economy was that of Labourism, in the sense that
Labourism prioritised the use of the State to ensure the production
of some goods and services to meet universal social needs and also
to mitigate the cycles of boom and slump and their effects.
4. The term "repressive apparatus" is used by Louis Althusser in contrast
to his notion of the "ideological State apparatus" (of the welfare
and educational systems) (Althusser 1971). In introducing this term,
however, we do not want to give it uncritical approval: it is clear
from the body of work in the thesis that the so-called "repressive
apparatus" is frequently, and probably routiny, involved in
ideological work at the level of the State (see, for example,our
discussion of the Police Federation and the Association of Chief
Constables as constituent elements in the New Right (Chapter Six).
5. The narrative is constructed from a reading of a variety of journals
(like The Magistrate, The Justice of the Peace and Local Government
Review, The Sociological Review, New Stateman and Nation etc.) as well
as from the weekly Hansard. It also draws on a variety of texts by
professional Labour and social-democratic criminologists and psychiatrists,
and, in particular, Mannheim (1946, 1955), Pearce (1952), Ferguson (1952),
Stott (1952) and the International Committee of the Howard League (1947).
There is some use, also, of the work of the Conservative Party's
perennial spokesman on juvenile courts, John Watson (1942, 1950) and
the Conservative Party's report on which Watson worked (1946).
6. In order to emphasise the fact that criminological work is no preserve
of the expert and professional, and that popular ideas on crime and law
and order are constructed in "commonsense", in everyday conversation,
and also via a reading of the popular press and media, we had originally
intended to speak of "crime talk" as the crucial area of analysis. The
problem with this formulation is that it does not identify the everyday
commonsensical work (of politicians, journalists and Everyman alike)
as sufficiently consequential. We want to emphasise that it is
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precisely in these exchanges occurring between politicians, journalists,
'experts' and Everyman that real criminology occurs.
7. Accounts of "social reconstruction" which are formulated in terms of the
wer of the reforming, "welfarist" ideas alone ignore all kinds of
awkward empirical features of the post-war settlement in Britain and
elsewhere. They ignore, for example, the fact that the State doubled
its share of National Product from 13 to 27 per cent during the first
World War and increased it to 30 per cent before the Second. (Barratt
Brown, 1971, p.201). They also underplay the extent to which similar
forms of "reconstruction" of State policy were occurring in other
western societies, where social-democratic ideas were much less
influential. Ian Gough has shown how the proportion of Gross Domestic
Product spent on social expenditure in nearly all western societies
by the early 1970's was in the narrow range between 17.1 per cent
(in the u.s.) and 23.7 per cent (in Sweden), and that the approach to
these levels of expenditure in each society had followed a very similar
pattern. (Cough 1979, pp.78-80). Keynesian interventions by the
State into the economy and into civil society were occurring in all
western societies, in the attempt to "plan" capitalism away from the
slumps of the 1930's and in the attempt to restore the faith of a
relieved, war-weary population in th benefits of some form of free
enterprise economics. We must be careful therefore that we do not
exaggerate the extent to which the expansion of the activities of the
State in the immediate aftermath of the war was essentially "social-
democratic" in inspiration.
8. The International Committee of the Howard League appears to have
been an ad-hoc creation of European social democratic criminologists
based in London in the early 1940's, exiled by the events leading up
to the war. The influence of Mannheim is apparent in the final report,
and it may be more than a coincidence that in 1942, Harold Laski, close
friend and sponsor of Mannheim (to whom Manriheim dedicated his Criminal
Justice and Social Reconstruction), as well as being chairman of the
Labour Party, had suggested to the Home Office that a Royal Commission
on Crime should be established in order "to create the atmosphere of
large-scale social change". (Lodge, 1975, p.12)
The International Committee which was established by the Howard League
was undeniably social-democratic in outlook. But it should not be
thought that Conservative Party Members in Parliament or outside were
entirely opposed to the League and its liberal positions on crime and
penal policy. Sir Samual Hoare, Home Secretary under Chamberlain before
the war, was a member of the Howard League and a prison visitor. Also
prominent in the League were John Watson (Chairman) and Leo Page, both
of them J.P. 's and both of them members of the Conservative Policy and
Political Education Committee's subcommittee on the treatment of
offenders (the group which had produced Youth Astray, published in 1946).
In this pamphlet, proposals " ... to replace juvenile courts by
committees of educationalists and social workers are deprecated".
Many of the Conservative penal reformers in the Howard League, and
around Watson and Page, were involved directly in the Butlerite
initiatives in the Home Office in the late 1950's. John Watson, the
then Chairman of the Conservative Sub-committee, was active in many
of the enquiries of the 1950's, and has made it his concern to comment,
at book length, on behalf of the Magistracy, on the various changes in
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juvenile justice legislation since. See Watson 1942, 1948, 1950,
1965, 1970.
9. The notion of the offence as "a symptom" and the idea that treatment
should be extended to children in moral danger, finds a place in
the crucial section 1 (2) of the Children and Young Persons Act of
1969, where the target population is identified as children in need
of care or contro1. The influence of Lawless Youth as a whole on
Labour Party and social democratic thinking on crime could be the
subject of an individual research project, but it is clear that the
arguments advanced in 1964 by the Lord Longford Study Group of the
Labour Party in Crime a Challenge to Us All, (the originating document
in the construction of the 1969 Act) were by no means unconnected with
the arguments against the courtroom as an adequate arena for assessing
a juvenile's "treatment needs" originally advanced in the 1947 Report
of the Howard League.
10. The Defence Regulations dealt with a variety of areas, from the control
of industrial and building operations to the protection of the financial
markets. They also were used to ensure the immobilisation of motor
vehicles when not being driven, and to prosecute people found looting
abandoned or bombed premises. The official statistics indicate that
1,754 people were found guilty, during 1940-45, at Assize and Quarter
Sessions, of offences against the Defence Regulations. Of these,
686 were imprisoned and 147 were sentenced to penal servitude.
(Criminal Statistics 1939-1945 (1947) p.12)
11. The description of the child care services as repressive and as
thaotically' maladministered appeared, initially, in a famous letter
written by Lady Allen of Hurtwood to The Times in 1944. Her
denunciations of the Poor Law ideology dominating British child
care were fully supported by the Curtis Committee in its Report of
1946.
12. In an article in The Sociological Review in 1947-9, Bowiby crossed
over the usual disciplinary boundaries, and argued for the application
of the perspectives of what Moreno, an American psychiatrist had
called 'sociatry' to the post-war mobilization of British Society.
Psychiatrists and social scientists should join together and act as
'doctors to social groups' (p.48), in order to unlease the 'terrific
drive (that) there is in people towards achieving better personal and
group relationships'. It was the existence of these drives which
ensured that Sociatry would not be put to authoritarian ends; and,
indeed, Bowiby argued, the characteristically pragmatic and realistic
style of social democrats. It was in Germany, where religion and
philosophy had flourished, that Nazi authoritarianism had succeeded.
"The legal, religious and philosophical techniques failed" and hence
it is) science which is bringing to the aid of the traditional and
not very effective legal, religious, and philosophical techniques for
making people good, powerful new techniques for achieving the very
ends they value." (p.47). In Bowiby's formulation, science and
expertise achieve an almost inherently social-democratic status by
virtue of the good (the egalitarianism, collectivism, altruism, etc.)
they release in Man.
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13. The idea of the prison system having rehabilitative functions was by
no means new in itself: Ignatieff and others have shown conclusively
how the prison system originated in the context of classical philosophies
which identified and legitimated prison as an institution in which
reflexion and penitence, and an essentially voluntary decision to
reform, could occur. (Ignatieff, 1979). What was different and
specific th the rehabilitative optimism of the 1940's was that it
occurred within a generalised climate of social democratic reconstruction:
prisoners were to be given the chance to become full citizens in the
new democracy. (Cf. the discussion of the work of Home Office Prison
Coimnission in Thomas, 1972, c.9).
14. The Criminal Justice Act of 1948 was, however, also responsible
for the introduction of the Detention Centre. This would appear to
contradict the characterisation of the Act in The Times, and indeed
to militate against many of the liberal measures introduced by the
Act. The coexistence of 'liberal' and 'coercive' penal measures in
this Act is some indication of the changing character of Labour
Government criminology, from 1942 in particular, as discussed later
in this chapter.
15. The scapegoating of deserters as the source of the post-war crime-wave
was aided by the well-publicised involvement of deserters in two
police killings, in February 1948, and in July 1951 when four policemen
died. Steve cliibnall notes how "the killing of policemen has played
a particularly prominent role in the development of law and order
crises since the war, becoming a potent symbol of lawlessness."
(Chibnall, 1977, p.54).
16. The insularity and incipient racism of the Conservative press and
certain spokesmen in the Conservative Party on the aliens issue was
matched by an overwhelming lack of interest in the social po1iies
being pursued elsewhere as a means of post-war reconstruction in the
world. Examples of this 'Little England' perspective were to occur
during the debates over capital and corporal punishment and the
Criminal Justice Bill in the House of Commons in 1948. Lt. Col.
C. Gage, Ulster Unionist M.P. for Belfast South, who had acted as an
Assistant Deputy Judge Advocate General with the Canadian forces in
Belgium during the war, nonetheless commented on the use of statistics
on countries where capital punishment had been abolished as follows
"I am not impressed by the argument as to statistics in other
nations t is an attractive argument and, at first blush, one
would like to accept it, but the psychology of criminals
differs with nations as well as with people."
(Hansard, vol.449, 14 April 1948, col.1063)
Ethnocentrism is a continuing (possibly deepening) feature of
contemporary English conservatism (and it is a 'quality' to which the
social democrats in favour of consensus have metaphorically and
naturally adjusted). It is responsible for what foreigners find to be
an amazing lack of interest on the part of the English politicians
and also the British police and social workers in experiments and
programmes conducted abroad.
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17. The blindness of official criminologies in the area of immigration
and crime is highlighted in John Lambert's study of Crime, Police and
Race Relations in Birmingham, where the high rates of reported crime
in some immigrant areas in the 1960 's were shown to be to a significant
extent the result of the large number of crimes committed against
immigrants (as well as being the result of different policing practices
in migrant areas) . Cf. Lambert, 1970)
18. Mannheim writes "The English police, and, in particular, the
Metropolitan Police Force, have always been counted among the most
efficient forces in the world, and they amply deserve all the praise
bestowed upon them ... according to the Home Secretary, (however)
the total male strength of the Metropolitan Police is 14,850 as compared
with an authorized establishment of 19,740". (1955, pp.112-113,
quoting article of 1947).
19. The police were not immune themselves from the general climate of
reconstruction and reform, and there is evidence of a considerable level
of concern amongst the police over offences arising out of privilege.
The police had had their full share of 'privilege' during the war, with
many a Chief Constable being disdained, and even subverted, on account
of his Conservative, or aristocratic, style and politics. Accounts
of the police for this period are very much taken up with the police
detective, burrowing away in pursuit of the crimes of the powerful, the
racketeer, in the 'mobs' and the fiddler who was defrauding the hard-
working community as a whole. (Cf. Martienssen 1951, c.VIII) The
number of people found guilty of 'frauds and false pretences' in England
and Wales increased sharply from 13,122 in 1945 to 27,358 in 1949.
20. The prison system, though increasingly overcrowded, was undergoing
considerable changes in the late 1940's and, in particular, it was
adjusting to the general climate of 'rehabilitative optimism'. The
abolition of so-called tprogressive stage system', whereby a prisoner
could earn his privileges by good behaviour, was gradually reformed
away as an anachronistic and deterrent conception; and many of the prison
buildings of the pre-war period were revamped to provide a system of
'regional training prisons', to which were sent 'stars' (first offenders)
and 'trainable ordinaries'. The rest of the prison system was
categorised into central prisons (to take prisoners serving three years
or over) and local prisons (for remands and short sentence offenders)
(Rose, 1961, pp.247-8).
21. There is no doubt that many Labour supporters interpreted the advent
of the Labour Party to power in 1945 in rather the same terms as many
socialists before them had interpreted the success of the Bolsheviks
in 1917.
In the frontispiece to Criminal Justice and Social Reconstruction,
Mannheim repeats a quotation from the Beveridge Report: "a
revolutionary moment in the world's history is a time for revolutions,
not for patching".
22. When it came to applying the Detention Centre to particular offender
types to "individualising" Detention Centre treatment, the sentencing
Magistrates themselves experienced a similar set of problems. The
Criminal Justice Act of 1948 has specified that one of the criteria for
sentencing to a Detention Centre should be that of a first time offence.
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But the Centres were used, in_practice, to accommodate mainly youths
with quite considerable institutional experience. For a discussion
of the discrepancies between the official theory arid the actual
practices of the Detention Centres, see S. Cohen, 1969.
23. The first formulation of the notion of "youth", and specifically
moral panics over youth, being "a powerful but concealed metaphor for
social change" was that of Anthony Smith (1975, p.242), but it has
since been taken and extended in the work of the Birmingham Centre for
Contemporary Cultural Studies 'Mugging Group' (discussed in Chapter 3).
24. The insistence on due process in the courtrooms as the defining feature
of 'criminality' has an intriguing consequence in the practical policy
talk of Conservatives about crime - for the defaults of the powerful
are suppressed (they are not real crime, by definition). In practice,
the Conservative insistence on due process is selective: the right of
prisoners to due process and proper defence, when accused of disiplinary
offences in prison, has not been publicly supported by Conservatives -
for to do so would be to blur the clear distinction between the
conforming citizen and the criminal, and to threaten a fundamental tenet
of Conservative philosophy.
25. The community control exercised over Civil Defence, and other volunteer
wardens and police during the war may have helped strengthen the antagonisms
that have often been observed in England towards the idea of a national
(or indeed a powerful) police force. There was considerable hostility
towards the amalgamation of the small police forces that was legislated
in the Police Act of 1946; and Labour and Tory members of Parliament
united to press, successful1, for an amendment to the Act such that
no county or county borougW
	 be combined with an authority larger
than itself (Hart, 1951, pp.63-4). The struggle over the need for a
representative and responsive police force in an increasingly centralised
State, continued in the arguments around the need for an independent
complaints procedure in 1976. But the Royal Commission of 1962 had
already created a major wedge in any such accountability by arguing for
the development of special squads to deal with major national "crimes"
and disruption. (See our discussion of the Police in c.S.)
26. The description of the 'haphazard' state of the police is that of
J.M. Hart in The British Police; and Hart is also the source for the
report of the ideological problems confronted by the Force immediately
after the war (Hart, 1951)
27. There were apparently differences of view amongst Labour supporters over
the role of the Police during the period of the General Strike and the
Fascist marches; but a special bitterness for the volunteer 'special
constables' of the Strike period. It was surprising to many party
members and lawyers, however, that absolutely no attempt was made (for
example, in the major relevant legislative act, the Criminal Justice
Act of 1948) to control the police's power to appoint special constables,
or to reform the control exercised by the police over powers of arrest,
evidence and identification; or over the procedure for making complaints
against the police. The relationship of the police and the Government
was fragile: and the determination of the Government to behave as
a national Government dissuaded them from any attempt to interferein the
"internal affairs" of the Force. Professor Terence Morris, personal
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communication, February 1977). Crucially, no attempt was made to have
Chief Constables accountable in their day-to-day activities to the local
authority watch committees. This accountability had been lost to the
central Government in the 1930's, in much the same period that the
Labour Party began to form the majority party on many local councils.
(Bunyan, 1976, p.72).
28. The parallels between the subject-matter involved in the Lynskey
Tribunal and that of the investigations into the affair of John Poulson,
during 1974-6 are obvious. Indeed, where Edward Heath in 1973 designated
Poulson's activities as evidence of 'the unacceptable face capitalismt,
Judge Lynskey remarked in 1948 that the 'whole question' facing his
tribunal was to decide what could be counted as 'legitimate business'
(see Gross, 1963, pp.284-6). The difference between the two cases is
that the allegations of Sidney Stanley resulted in a full-scale
investigation by Tribunal, with a spirited, and well-publicised, defence
of the Government, by Hartley Shawcross, who opened a cross-examination
of Stanley. Three connected reasons can be advanced for the Government's
concern to 'clear the air'. The Stanley allegations were used, by
some Conservatives and by some sections of the mass media, as evidence
of a corruption that they argued was an inevitable result of creating a
Government State apparatus for economic planning and initiative. (The
view of Rogow is that opportunities for illegal gain, along with many
other problems being experienced economically at the time, arose out of
the inadequacies of the Government planning machinery, and, in particular,
the Government's attempt to use methods developed in wartime for the
regeneration of a peacetime economy.) A second reason for the Government's
activity in the Tribunal, however, was its determination to continue what
it saw as a project of moral reconstruction (a task that would be rendered
less legitimate if Stanley's allegations were to go unanswered). Thirdly,
the economic climate of 1948 was one that continued to require "equality
of sacrifice" - as evidence in the continuing campaigns against spivs,
drones, racketeers and others, and, most crucially, in the imposition by
Sir Stafford Cripps of a wage freeze, and the continuation of shortages
and rationing. The Poulson allegations occurred in a very different
conjuncture. But it is clear from the findings of the House of Commons
Disciplinary Committee in 1977 that a full and open Tribunal of Lynskey
proportions could have been embarrassing to both major political parties
to a fairly senior level. The Labour Party could have suffered to some
extent, in so far as that party continues to claim that it is engaged
in the moral re-ordering of society, as well as in the management of the
relations of Capital and the State.
29. Conspiratorial interpretations of the Lynskey Tribunal are helped by the
fact that the Attorney-General chose to open the Tribunal's cross-
examination personally. This was the first occasion in the history of
Tribunals on which Government Ministers had exercised this power.
They are also supported by the fact that Stanley was deported (and
thereby effectively silenced on the details of his accusations).
30. The direct pressure on the Government (in the form of newspaper
advertisements) was then, as later, mainly around the question of
nationalisation (especially of the steel industry). There was little
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or no opposition from the large corporations, or big business, to the
measures taken to create the 'Welfare State'. The utility of public
and free education, socialised medicine, and welfare generally in
creating social peace, and in cutting some of the costs of private
industry (as well as in creating large, guaranteed State markets for
certain kinds of products) had been well understood by the managers
and long-term planners of large scale industry and capital. (cf. Rogow
1955, Barratt Brown 1971).
31. From 3,157,000 vehicles of all descriptions in 1939 to 4,113,000
in 1949. (Martin and Wilson, 1968, p.61).
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Chapter Two
Crime and Affluence
This chapter has two main purposes. We want to continue the narrative
initiated in Chapter One in order to examine the effects wrought by the
post-war Keynesian boom of the 1950 's on the character of popular and
official criminology. In particular, we shall want to examine the character
of the "consensus" that was apparently created between Conservatives and
Labour on the desirability of welfare and treatment as the official State
response to crime.
But later we shall want to depart from our narrative in order to pay
particular attention to the issue which came to dominate official and popular
criminology, particularly during 1953 to 1957: the issue of capital punishment.
The detailed attention we will be giving to this debate is made necessary in
part by the importance of these debates at the time (there was indeed an
essentially political public debate conducted in the mass media and elsewhere
on this question throughout the middle 1950's), but it is also justified by
the more long-term significance of the (partial) abolition of capital
punishment in 1957. The importance of this abolition lay in the confirmation
it appeared to give to the claims of social democrats - and liberals - that
the advance of reformist measures and the achievements of consensual, liberal
forms of social order was "inevitable") In North America and Britain alike,
abolition had a metaphorical importance in signalling the arrival on what
was mistakenly thought to be a permanent basis - of a "modern" social order
underpinned by an essentially civilised or caring State. So our discussion
of homicide and capital punishment in the 1950's is intended to describe the
parameters of the new political consensus as well as being an "empirical"
analysis of the campaign for abolition itself.
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-2.1. The Reality of Affluence
The 1950's were lived as an "age of affluence". That is to say that
the expanding mass media, which we will examine later, Conservative and
Labour politicians alike, and many other important "definers" of events
agreed on perceiving substantial increases in standard of living in all
sections of society. These increases were attributed by Conservatives to the
vitality of private industry, and by Labour to the planning of the mixed
economy by the State, but crucially, there was an ideological consensus
around the idea of Britain becoming an increasingly affluent arid also more
equal and democratic a society.
There was considerable support for this view in most of the economic
indicators during the 1950's: the wealth produced by the economy does appear
to have increased considerably during the period of the 1951-64 Conservative
Governments; industrial production was 40 per cent higher in 1964 than in
1951, full employment was uninterrupted throughout, average earnings
increased by some 110 per cent (30 per cent relative to inflation), and the
consumption of cars, consumer durables of all kinds, and overseas holidays
all increased to remarkable extents - by some 20 per cent for the population
as a whole (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1970, pp.55-6)	 A social and economic
revolution appeared to be in progress, ending the period of austerity and
ushering in an epoch of consumerism. "People's capitalism" did indeed, as
one of the Conservative Party's ideologues of the time, Lord Woolton,and others,
had argued, appear to "work". A "sense of classlessness" was spoken of in
both Conservative and Labour accounts - caught for posterity in Harold
Macmillan's proclamation after the 1959 General Election that "the class war
is over and we have won it", and also being the subject of painful debates
within the Labour Party on the future of Clause Four, and the commitment of
3the Party to act as the agent of "workers by hand or by brain".
- 80 -
The sense of classlessness arose not only out of the increase in
personal spending power occasioned by the boom, but also out of the rapid
re-housing programmes of the period, with the populations of the slums and
the IDnbed-out inner city being transferred into New Towns or into sprawling
council estates, with an attempt being made thereby to introduce what was
euphemistically called a social mix into areas of British cities. 4 A
primary political issue between the two major parties during the 1950's, was,
indeed, the speed with which the war-weary British population, recovering
from austerity and asking for its expectations of a better life to be fulfilled,
could be re-housed; and the Conservatives' widely unexpected Election victory
of 1951 may well have resulted from their pledge to build some 300,000 houses
a year (as against Labour's commitment to continue building 'at the present
rate' - of 200,000 per year). Certainly the victories of 1955 and 1959
resulted from what many inside the Conservative Party regarded then and now,
as an unhealthy degree of State direction and expenditure in support of
popular housing. The re-housing programme had the effect, along with the
impact of the earlier Education reforms of 1944 (which were resulting in many
working-class children escaping from their background, and moving onto
"college" or even to University), of obscuring fundamental structures of class
society from view. In reality, the very slight trend, established during
the 1938-1949 period, towards a greater equalisation of income in British
society, was slowing down between 1949 and 1954, and thereafter the trend
virtually stopped, with the richest 6 per cent consistently receiving some
20 to 20½ per cent of all "personal allocated income" throughout the period
between 1954 and 1967 (Westergaard and Resler, 1975, p.40). On the housing
front, the Conservatives' insistence, throughout the 1950's, on the payment
of market prices to private landowners, as land became more scarce, resulted
in local authorities having to pay "full market value" for building land by
1959, and by the middle of the 1960's, the building of council houses, partly
- 81 -
as a result of the cost of land (and interest payments), accounted for less
than 40 per cent of all new housing (Westergaard and Resler, 1975, pp.135-6).
The educational reforms of the 1940's "benefitted all classes ... the
educational qualifications normally required at any point of the occupational
scale (having) simply been raised" (Westergaard 1965, p.89), so that fr the
majority no real opportunity existed for upward social mobility via education.
The "withering-away of class" which was so central a theme in the dominant
ideology of the 1950's was, indeed, in Westerga:rd's words, a "contemporary myth".
But the myth was nonetheless popularly accepted, and the general increases
in living standards were thought to have involved a substantial reduction in
the inequalities of pre-war Britain in respect of income distribution, housing
allocation and educational opportunity. Ideological work by Conservative
ideologues and by journalists in the popular press attributed the
arrival of the new "classlessness" to the advance of "people's capitalism"
(which was characterised by a guided mixed economy, fundamentally motored by
the power of private industry, fuelled by consumer demand and individual
initiative).
On the left, the advance of the Conservative Party, coupled with the
ideological offensive celebrating the achievements of the people's capitalism,
evoked two connected responses. On the one hand, the Labour Party's electoral
defeats of 1951, 1955 and 1959 were greeted with what Mervyn Jones called at
the time "a disgusted turning away ... a painful sense of being cheated".
(Jones, 1959, p.1). The Labour Party leadership was seen as having "sold out"
on the commitment of 1945 to a thoroughgoing programme of socialist
reconstruction. The hesitation and loss of direction that occurred in 1948
was the moment at which the Labour leadership had been corrupted by power; and
from that moment on they were no longer really representative of the authentic
Labour Party membership in the country. The late 1950's withessed the growth
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of a variety of movements and organisations, like Victory for Socialism,
which had as their major concern either the winning of the party leadership
to "socialist policies" or the staging of some form of coup to unseat the
existing, unrepresentative leadership.
But other commentators on the left began to worry and speculate as to
the character of the social changes that were apparently increasing the electoral
support for the Conservatives and thereby unpacking the level of support for
the Labour Party which had remained remarkably resilient until l95l.
Increasingly, the advance of affluence began to be understood by commentators
on the left as the advance of a particular form of affluence (going to
individual consumers rather than to the enrichment of communities) ; and the
effects of this "affluence" were increasingly seen to contradict and to
undermine the vision of social reconstruction that had been so popularly
articulated during 1945. Amongst political scientists like Mark Abrams and
amongst popular sociologists like Ferdynand Zweig
	
there was talk of the
einbourgeoisement of the affluent workers, increasingly committed to the
achievement of middle class status through amassing ever increasing numbers of
"consumer durables" (from refrigerators to televisions etc.), and of the
increasing tendency for workers of this kind to vote Conservative. (Abrams and Rose
1960; Zweig, 1961). Insofar as workers in the well-paid car industries of
the Midlands, for instance, engaged in strike action, this did not reveal a
commitment to class struggle so much as an "instrumentally collective" approach
to the achievement of high wages with which to reap the benefits of affluence.
(Lockwood, 1960). The fear of commentators on the social-democratic left was,
indeed, that the workers had become "bourgeois".
2.2. Images of Affluence
The realities of post-war affluence were increasingly understood in the
1950's by the way in which these realities were constructed in and by the
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rapidly expanding mass media. A massive expansion occurred in both the
circulation of daily newspapers and in television ownership throughout the
1940's and 1950's. The daily press of Britain increased its total recorded
circulation from 9,903,427 in 1937 to 15,449,410 copies per day in the
immediate post war years; and the Sunday press increased from 15,700,000 in
1937 to 29,300,000 in 1947 (Williams, 1961). The 20,000 television sets of
1947 increased to 2,700,000 in 1952; and expanded exponentially , from then on
(reaching 13 million in 1964). By the winter of 1957-8 surveys showed that
just under half the British population watched television for four hours an
evening (Hopkins, 1963). The radio sound audience declined from 9 million in
1954 to 3 million by 1957.
The consequences of the rapid expansion of the written and visual media
were profound. During the war, social and political questions had been the
subject of considerable discussion and adjudication within local communities
(on street corners, in pubs or, occasionally, in bomb shelters), and popular
politics was referenced in this way by a degree of personal experience or
argumentation. Newspapers as such were infrequent during the 'war, and short
on information, due to wartime censorship and also due to paper shortages;
and the population had to rely on the radio or cinemas (and the celebrated
Pathe News) for information beyond that obtainable via local gossip, the
grapevine, and personal experience. Authoritative confirmation of rumour, or
"news", was often a matter for personal enquiry or investigation.
The advance of television and the popular daily press probably did not
"kill off conversation", as popular folklore continues to insist, but it
certainly reorganised the form of popular conversation, especially by introducing
television programmes and news stories as the source of the information informing
such conversations. Events and social processes came to be presented,
selectively, to mass audiences (of press and television) by small numbers of
professional journalists and other media professionals, who used an increasingly
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elaborate and private professional ideologyio determine the newsworthiness
and/or the entertainment value of news stories and television programmes.
Again, it is not that this ideology represented a complete break with earlier
forms of journalism (for example, with the yellow press of the Victorian
period): it is rather that such journalism became a more prominent and
inescapable feature of everyday life, and also that the advent of a visual
medium like television gave the ideologies informing journalistic and television
practices a sensory power they might not otherwise have possessed.
It is certainly not our intention in what follows to overestimate the
effectivity of "the media", in assuming that the media's "messages" are
necessarily more important and persuasive than any other source of cultural
experience. We certainly believe that popular use of newspapers, in particular,
was then and is now more sceptical and even cynical than many students of the
media's "effects" would have us believe. There are in fact no studies of the
ways people made use of the popular press or of television in the 1950's and
1960's for political or social ends, and any attempt to analyse the "decoding"
of the media by their audiences would therefore be conjectural. We also want
to be historically sensitive to the existence of radio and cinema as mass
media in the earlier twentieth century, and the lengthy nineteenth and
twentieth century history of newspaper journalism. But we think it would be
naive to ignore the fact that
"in twentieth-century advanced capitalism, the media have
established a decisive and fundamental leadership in the
cultural sphere. Simply in terms of economic, technical,
social and cultural resources, the mass media command a
qualitatively greater slice than all the older, more
traditional cultural channels which survive".
(Hall, 1977, p.340)
Moreover, we cannot improve on Stuart Hall's formulation of the precise
maimer in which the mass media have "progressively colonized the cultural and
ideological sphere"
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As social groups and classes live, if not in their productive then
in their 'social' relations, increasingly fragmented and sectionally
differentiated lives, the mass media are more and more responsible
(a) for providing the basis on which groups and class construct an
'image' of the lives, meanings, practices and value of other groups
and classes; (b) for providing the images, representations and ideas
around which the social totality, composed of all these separate and
fragmented pieces, can be coherently grasped 'as a whole'."
(Hall, Ibid.)
The work done during the 1950's by the media in constructing a social
imagery portraying the lives of other groups and also an image of the "social
totality" was of paramount importance in presenting the facts of increased
economic affluence in a particular, selective and imaginary fashion. The
consequence of this work was, indeed, the legitimation of the "age of affluence"
as an accurate description of events, and the associated legitimation of the
fundamental trajectory of Butskellite economic and social policies.
One of the most obvious features of newspaper and television content
in the 1950's (especially, but not only, in fictional programming) was the
overwhelming preoccupation with the family. Situation comedies like Life with
the Lyons and I Married Joan and feature stories in the popular press tellingly
created humour and entertainment out of the serious question of 1950's family
life, in particular trying to offer out an account of the role of the wife
and mother in the age of affluence. Increasingly, the image emerged (in
television entertainment as much as in advertisements) of a wife/mother
properly located within the family, but with an increased opportunity for
leisure and for active involvement in the life of the family, due to the advances
occurring in labour-saving technology.6
The focus on the family as the important arena of social life increasingly
displaced the "community" which had been at the centre of social life in wartime
and post-war images of social reconstruction. The public character of ordinary
life in the wartime community, celebrated in the Picture Post and in Pathe News,
was replaced by an emphasis on an increasingly privatised existence within the
family. 7
 Unwittingly, indeed, media professionals produced an image of the new
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life of post-war Britain which legitimated and enabled the reproduction of the
consumer culture required by the new industries of the post-war period. 8
But this focus on the family as an important element in the maintenance
of a stable social order was complimented by journalistic and editorial
celebration of the opening out of new opportunities for social mobility and
success, especially for the working class. Commercial television carried a
"give away" quiz show every day of the week, and two on Saturdays; and the
transformation of old music-hall artists like Arthur Askey and Ted Ray into
star television comedians, and simple working class girls like Norma Sykes
(Sabrina) into sex symbols encouraged the increasingly numerous television
audiences to believe in the possibility of their own escape from routine working
class existence, given luck, into fame and fortune. Newspapers like the News of
the World began to establish massive circulation during this period by their
investigations of the attractions and perils of upward social mobility. The
development of commercial television after 1955 is also thought to have helped
to break the domination of ruling-class language, idiom and accent (as
exemplified in "BBC English") over "proper" political and social debate.9
The increasing social mobility was later to find its most memorable "literary"
moment in the publication of John Braine's satirical novel on Room t the Top.
So the developing newspaper and television media tended to make sense of the
real changes that were occurring in people's living standards and lived social
conditions and relationships through certain specific images. These images
(of the wife/mother, the family, consumerism and social mobility), taken
together,constituted a theory of how social reconstruction would and should
now proceed which was very close to the theory of a "People's Capitalism"
(a popular "property-owning democracy") now being propounded within the
Conservative Party. It was a professional journalistic ideology, in other
word5,which had been constructed and formulated not so much by reference to any
proven empirical reality as by reference to ideological work undertaken by the
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new Conservative Party leadership and by authoritative spokesmen for industry
and coimiierce, and by other individuals and social groups who were accorded
the authority to comment on the character of the social "revolution" that
was being wrought by "affluence". Like journalistic ideologies of earlier
periods, post-war television and newspaper worked to reproduce an imagery of
the character of social order which gave authority and legitimacy to the classes
which were dominant in the broader society. That is also, of course, to say
that the new media presented new opportunities for groups which were in
dominance in the broader society to speak, via journalists, editors, advertising
agencies and special interest programming, to mass audiences, in order to
either sell goods or to market ideas.
Just as the imagery in the media worked to construct a theory of social
order, so also it worked to suggest theories of social disorder. One of the
most popular of all the television shows of the period, however, was Dixon of
ck Green (a programme in which the fascination of criminal law-breaking was
consistently understood but on the basis of the avuncular father-figure,
P.C. Dixon, reminding the audience, at the end of each episode, how crime does
not pay). Young delinquents were consistently. portrayed as being misled by
their own upbringing or by falling into "bad company"; and even adult criminals
were seen as being the product of faulty socialisation or as being guilty in a
husan and understandable way of succumbing to temptation. Crime and delinquency
were portrayed as the activities of individual malefactors who were obviously
inadequate or disturbed in some way, and who therefore were unable to come to
terms with the obligations that went along with the benefits of living in a
modern, reconstructed social democracy. The implicit contrast was always with
the crime situation depicted in television series from the United States, like
Highway Patrol, where dangerous and disturbed individuals from the under-class
were depicted as threatening the very fabric of social order and being dealt
with b a firebrigade type of policing. The image of the unarmed British "bobby"
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(relying on popular consent to his authority) was underwritten, in Dixon of
Dock Green, by favourable accounts of the work of probation officers, social
workers and the medical and psychiatric services, as a demonstration of the
effectivity of consensual and rehabilitative character of the British State's
response to lawbreaking.
In television series like Dixon, and later Fabian of the Yard, as well
as in daily and weekly newspaper stories about crime and disorder, for example
in the News Chronicle and the News of the World, "characters" had to be both
credible and also entertaining. They had to relate to popular experience
whilst also being part of a "script". These twin necessities worked in such
a way as to produce a series of stereotypical images of the criminal and of
the police, which were "stereotypical" in the particular sense of being drawn
from a popular genre continually reworked by media for consumption by a mass
audience, for the purposes of entertainment. It was not therefore that the
images were "typical", in some demonstrable way, of the "real world" of crime.
It is rather they were drawn from a repertoire of criminal types and of types
of policemen (etc., etc.) already constructed in ideology, and only then applied
to newly scripted crime fiction and/or news stories about real criminal events.
These sterypes (for example, of avuncular policemen, inadequate women
offenders and adult criminals "in bad company") were a powerful source of
reference for popular criminology, in people's everyday conversations, precisely
because they were drawn in part from earlier popular experience: they
connected with that experience, although they rarely expressed its essence.
As we shall see in Chapter Three, the stereotypes were by no means all
so benign as those which were marshalled in Dixon. In the aftermath of a
murder of a Cypriot in Camden Town in 1955, the imagery of youth in the media
was increasingly transformed. The Teddy Boy was increasingly depicted as
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representing some more fundamental departure from "conformity" than earlier
youthful troublemakers. Increasingly, working class youth who adopted
Edwardian styles of dress were depicted as "outsiders" (in need of firm measures
of social control rather than merely "treatmetit"). The labelling of youth
as "outsiders" appears to have arisen from the attempt to explain the otherwise
inexplicable youthful excitement that accompanied the emergence of Tidy Boy
styles in 1953-1955, as well as the "violence" that occurred (in the form of
vandalism on cinema seats) in the aftermath of the showing of Rock around the
Clock and other rock 'n roll movies during 1956. (Rock and Cohen, 1970, p.310).
Increasingly, the argument involved in the use of the stereotype was that the
Teddy Boy was an identifiable "psychological type", who was "addicted" to
violence and who was clearly influenced "pathologically" by the influence of
(merican) music and dance fashions. He had therefore to be given the
stereotypical attributes of an anti-social, dangerous "outsider", immune to
the gentle influence of welfare and treatment. These attributes were drawn,
as required,from already available legal discourses (governing the sentencing
of dangerous offenders) or from psychological theories (identifying the source
of pathology in individual personalities).
So the work done within the newspaper and television media in the 1950's
undoubtedlytab1isl-d an exhaustive "gallery of folk devils" 10 which was
said to contain most of the sources of danger to social order in the newly
affluent society. The gallery of devils was also clearly classified and
categorised in order to identify the social harm which could be expected from
each deviant type, especially around the distinction between the types in need
of containment rather than rehabilitation. There is no doubt that this popular
criminological source of reference was put to use in later periods, especially
in respect of troublesome youth, in constructing largely spurious accounts of
new youth subcultural styles. The accounts of the Mods and Rockers owed as much
to the earlier exploration of the theme of affluence by the media as they did to
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any real investigative exploration of the new found importance of bikes in
working class culture in 1962. The work done during this period provided the
conditions of existence of the labels that were used in later instances of
"societal reaction" to crime and delinquency. They also undoubtedly contributed
to public "knowledge" of crime and delinquency (arid therefore to popular
criminology) in such a way as to encourage the acceptance by official criminology
that there were pathological youth (as well as merely disturbed youth) in the
body of the welfare state.
To highlight the importance of the mass media in this way is not, however,
to identify media professionals' insensitive or arbitrary use of stereotypes
as the source of the ideological messages that were carried by these stereotypes.
We have already suggested that television programmes and news stories worked
to produce accounts of social order, under the new conditions of affluence,
which reproduced the existing patterns of power and influence in the broader
society. That is to say that television and newspaper content was then a
product not only of the professional ideologies governing the proper practice
of journalism or the constituents of "newsworthiness", but also of ideological
exchanges occurring between the social democratic left and the Conservative
Party. Television and newspaper journalism in the 1950's and indeed in the
1960's work to define and to reproduce the boundaries of a political consensus,
elaborated by authoritative sources in Parliament, in industry and commerce, and in
the local and national state. In Stuart Hall's formulation
"In the interplay of opinions, freely given and exchanged, to
which the idea of consensus always makes its ritual bow, some
voices and opinions exhibit greater weight, resonance, defining
and limiting power - for the pure consensus of classical liberal-
democratic theory has long since given way to the reality of a
more shaped and structured consensus, constructed in the unequal
exchange between the unorganized masses and the great organizing
centres of power and opinion - the consensus of the 'big battalions',
so to speak .... (I) n its own way and time, room must (also) be found
for other voices, for 'minority' opinions, for 'contrary' views, so
that a shape, to which all reasonable men can begin to attach
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themselves, emerges .... The production of consensus, the
construction of legitimacy - not so much the finished article
itself, but the whole process of argument, exchange, debate,
consultation and speculation by which it emerges - is (a) key
aspect of the media's ideological effect."
(Hall, 1977, p.342)
It is to the continued production of this "consensus" and "legitimacy"
in the Conservative Governments' socialand penal policies that we now turn.
2.3. The Conservative Governments of 1951 to 1964
Penal and Social Policy
The social-democratic origin of many of the contemporary assumptions
about crime and deviance in the early 1950 's did not deter the managers of
Conservative penal policy. The Conservative Party had come to accept the
importance of social-democratic initiatives in general, and indeed the Welfare
State itself, as means of ensuring social peace (and, residually, as a useful
market for many of the products of private industry). Many of the specific
policies in process of development or initiation in the Eome Office from the
last years of the Labour Government were taken over and extended. Encouragement
was given to the Police Force in its concern to move towards a more preventative,
social work role (in the establishment, in 1951, of the Juvenile Liaison Scheme,
initially in Liverpool), and interest was shown, in Conservative pamphlets and
public discussion, in the series of research studies into delinquency and
related social problems, produced by the Nuffield Foundation after 1952, and
in the abolitionist tone of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment,
originally commissioned by Chuter Ede, Home Secretary of the Labour Government,
in 1949, but reporting in 1953. In 1957, as we shall see later, after two years
of public debate over capital punishment, a free vote was allowed in the House
of Commons. Some few months later, a bill that contained some of Sydney
Silverman's proposals to abolish capital punishment was given its third reading;
and the State relinquished voluntarily its right to take a life for a life,
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except in certain specified circumstances. In the same year, R.A. Butler
moved from the Chancellorship of the Exchequer to the Home Office, and
announced that he regarded this appointment as an opportunity for infusing
the Home Office with a "spirit of reform and zeal for progress". (quoted
in Gamble, 1974, p.83).
The fact that the criminal statistics in 1955 showed the beginnings of
an upturn in recorded crime excited the attention of many rank-and-file
Conservatives; but it did not fundamentally alter the Tories' governmental
commitment to welfare and treatment. In 1959, two years after becoming Home
secretary, R.A. Butler produced the important White Paper, Penal Practice
in a Changing Society, in which the dominant emphasis was on reform, on expert
intervention by trained personnel, and on the encouragement of criminological
research, and experimental treatment measures (in particular, through the
auspices of an expanded professional Probation Service). This report has
indeed been seen as the manifesto for professional specialists in the area of
crime-control and treatment, and helped pave the way for the belief that the
1960's would be the decade of the probation officer, in terms of the emphasis
and the resources given to different occupational groups in crime control work,
whilst also arguing for an expansion in the use of open prisons. (cf. Jordan,
1971). Three reports from the Home Office's Advisory Council on the Treatment
of Offenders - on Alternatives to Short-Term Imprisonment (1957), After Care and
the Supervision of Discharged Prisoners (1958) and The Treatment of Young
Offenders (1959) - were received, and these, along with the Report of the
Morison Committee into the Probation and After-Care Service, produced in 1962,
became the basis, with the 1959 White Paper, for legislation, in the Criminal
Justice Act of 1961 and in Children and Young Persons Act of 1963. The
Children's Departments within local authority areas were encouraged to take
on a role in preventative work with families, in all cases where it was felt
that such intervention might prevent a court appearance, including the granting
- 93 -
of 'assistance-in-kind' (cash) to needy families; and the Probation Service
was asked to take on the responsibility of initiating similar programmes for
young offenders, and for areas where there were large numbers of offenders at
risk. In the Criminal Justice Act, provision had been made for the compulsory
after-care by probation officers of young offenders released from Detention
Centres, and a further Advisory Council Report on The Organisation of After Care,
appearing in 1963, recommended that approved school boys should receive the
sane kind of after-care from the Probation Service on release. The emphasis
on prevention and on intensive specialist treatment in this legislation, and
in all the accompanying reports, is an indication of the fundamental commitment
of the reforming Conservatives of the late 1950's.
A later Conservative commentary on R.A. Butler's period as Home Secretary
observed that his White Paper "recognised, perhaps for the first time, that
penal policy in the modern State demanded long-range planning and the choice
of priorities, and this must be the responsibility of government." (CPC, 1966,
p.10). To the research work of the Home Office Research Unit, established in
1956, was to be added the work of an Institute of Criminology, which opened
two years later at the University of Cambridge. Law reform was made the
responsibility of the Criminal Law Revision Committee, established by Butler
in 1959, with the task of revising, codifying and consolidating the often
contradictory and anachronistic aspects of English criminal legislation and
precedent. The establishment of such a committee had been demanded, in fact,
over many years, by lawyer members of the Fabian Society, and by the Haldane
Society, as a means of modernising the existing law, rendering it more relevant
and responsive to (what was seen as) a reformed, changing and complex society,
and also consistent with the findings of social research. (cf. also Gardiner
and Martin, 1963). In 1960, BuLer established the first Royal Commission on
the Police for over 30 years, and gave it a wide brief to examine issues like
the most appropriate extent of amalgamation of forces, the power of Chief
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Constables, local and national accountability, and training and recruitment.
In all of these initiatives, the assumption of a consensus on crime as a
matter requiring treatment, and as self-evident in its meaning and definition,
was underpinned by a faith in the ability of experts, guided by scientific
research, to win the "War against Crime". 11 Where dispute did arise in the
official debate about crime in the 1950's, it tended to be over the extent to
which reform should occur (e.g. in the central government's control over the
police, or in a directed reform of law), or over the reasons for difficulty
being experienced in carrying out research in certain settings (in prisons
and residential establishments, especially, and in the autonomous local
constabularies), or in getting research findings activated.12
The ideological themes in Conservative penal policy were very much a
continuation of the focus established during the post-war Labour Government.
Though influential in many more respects than in the immediate post-war years,
the police, magistracy and prison officers still found their collective or
individual initiatives either appropriated or deflected by the Home Office,
and by the Tory leadership itself. As early as 1952, for example, two
lengthy reports were published, under a Home Office imprint, containing the
recommendations of a Committee to Review Punishments in Prisons, Borstal
Institutions and Remand Homes (Vols. I and II, Cmnd.8256, Vols.III and IV,
Crnnd.8429) (the Franklin Committee). According to one authority on this period
of penal policy, the origins of this Committee, though obscure, were that
"it was probably set up as a consequence of pressure by those opposed to
reformative measures at the time of the 1948 Act" (Rose, 1961, p.254). The
Reports recommended that juveniles who "persistently offended against
discipline" should always be sent to Borstal, Approved Schools, or to Prison,
and recommended the tightening up of Borstal discipline, Shortly after the
publication of these Reports, a special institution for "troublemakers" in
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in Borstal was indeed set up in Hull, and also special blocks were built in
some Borstals where boys could be sent as a disciplinary measure. But from
1953-4 onwards, as Butler's influence was established in the Home Office,
the use of such measures declined. The dominant emphasis in Borstal was
decidedly on experimentation in rehabilitative method, with Dr • Norman Fenton
at Pocklington Borstal, near Goole, in Yorkshire, pioneering the introduction
of group counselling, and with an increase in the use of probation officers
and social workers in the after-care of young offenders discharged from
institutions. (Hood, 1965, c.5). In the same period, some twenty approved
schools (with accommodation for 990 children) were actually closed "as
surplus to requirements" and "a further 120 places were extinguished by
reducing the maximum accommodation figure in two other schools". Approved
school staff were made redundant in this period. (Ford, 1957, p.89). The
influence of the hard-line law-enforcers was in the meantime reduced, or muted,
even in the Prison Service, with group counselling being introduced at
Dartmoor, and with the official approval of the Prison Department of the Home
Office for a continuing move in the direction of individualisation of treatment
for adult prisoners being underlined by the appointment of prison welfare
officers (trained social workers working in prison) in 1955.
Objection after objection was, of course, raised in the annual conferences
of the Conservative Party to the reforming measures of the Government and to
the general emphasis on crime as a matter for treatment. Particular attention
was given to the partial abolition of capital punishment in 1957, and the
continuation of the ban on corporal punishment, dating from 1948. Crime and
punishment were the major issues at the Tories' annual conferences in 1958,
1960 and 1961, and in 1961, the pressure from the Tory rank-and-file was intense
enough to force the Government to select a motion calling for the return of
capital and corporal punishment as the motion for debate. R.A. Butler's
reply to the debate is perhaps the fullest and most sophisticated example of
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consensual ideology at work on the question of crime (in its 1940's and
1950's formulation). Mr. Butler presented the Home Office initiatives in
introducing treatment into prisons and juvenile institutions, and the attempts
to encourage research as a means of informing preventative and correctional
work and policing, as being, above all, a more effective means of controlling
crime than the coercive and repressive alternatives suggested by rank-and-
file critics in the Tory Party. Consensual measures were to be preferred,
not for their benefit on individuals as such, or even because they were
morally preferable to outright repression, but rather because they were
ultimately more effective as a way of protecting existing persons and prperty
under existing social arrangements. Moreover, in case a programme which
placed an emphasis on expertise and specialisation might smack of the State
controls and bureaucracy of the Labour Party, Mr. Butler assured the conference
that "by expert opinion ... (he did) not mean my civil servants, but those
devoted people who work in the field of youth, experienced probation officers,
and people of that type". (Quoted in Sparrow, 1965, p.170). Most importantly,
he urged the conference to avoid a situation in which Conservatives would be
presented as the cartoonists would depict them if they passed the motion
("as armed with the lash and the knout"). Rather the conference should agree
to see the crime problem "as a national problem upon which a lead must be
given by the Government ... for the issue is in fact far greater than could
be solved by any one remedy. All this involves a mobilisation of our whole
society".	 (Ibid.)
In speeches and polemics of this kind, the support of the Conservative
leadership for treatment, like the support it gave to welfare State
intervention as a whole, appeared as a direct extension or appropriation of
the social-democratic concerns of the post-war treatment establishment and
their political allies. But the call for crime to be seen as a national problem
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(and for welfare as a national responsibility of the State) effectively detached
the diagnosis of crime, delinquency and welfare problems generally from the
social-democratic politics in which it had previously been framed. The "war
against crime" was a "mobilisation of (the) whole society" in defence of a
new national interest: the defence of the people's capitalism, which other
ideologies were hard at work in describing as being of universal benefit.
The war against crime was no longer to be conducted, in other words, in the
interests of defending a reconstructed social democracy from the disruptive
influences of youth and the parasitical activities of economic offenders.
A slightly different form of displacement of the social-democratic
arguirient was advanced, a little later, by Radzinowicz and by some of his
collaborators at the newly-established Institute of Criminology. In this
version, the struggle against crime was seen as part of "the climate of social
responsibility" whereby technical criminological experts were at work on
behalf of the nation, well beyond the limits of political ideologies and the
party whip. (Radzinowicz, 1964). The weaknesses of social-democratic
analysis of crime (in particular, its absolute inability to conceive of crime
or delinquency as an index of the continuing effects of life under industrial
capitalism as such, and the kinds of life that was still required of the
worker by the capitalist) left the way clear for an essentially liberal,
pragmatic ideological appropriation which retained a practical emphasis on
"treatment" as a response to crime; but detached this from the broader
commitment to social reconstruction, to which Manrtheim, Grunhut, Laski and
other social-democratic writers had alluded and which had formed the
ideological context for Labour's election to power in 1945. It re-located the
use of treatment and associated reform measures in a consensual national project
of "social responsibility" - by which criminologists and others were asked to
work in defence of the exisjng economic and social formation.
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The Conservatives' attempt to forge a national consensus in which the
"whole society"was "inobilised" against crime was as metaphysical in the end
as Radzinowicz's plea for a "climate of social responsibility". Neither
conception added anything pactica11y to existing social democratic policy in
the crime field: they merely offered out two new accounts of what the
professionals in the penal system and in social work were already doing
(i.e. acting as agents of the whole society, personifying social responsibility).
Crucially, however, the account which was offered in these versions did serve
to disconnect liberal professionals from any residual notion of social
reconstruction of the early 1940's variety. Professional intervention into
problem families, for instance, was increasingly seen as a permanent feature
of all "complex", "modern", "mass", societies, and no longer a temporary
intervention made necessary by the disturbances of the wartime period. Social
work as a whole was increasingly spoken of as a "profession" that would have
a permanence and functions in modern society equivalent to that of the police
and the legal profession (where in early social democratic accounts the
social worker was clearly seen as a State agent whose skills were required in
order th fit troubled and deprived people for the project of social reconstruction,
and therefore a State agent whose functions ought to "wither away" subsequent
to the full achievement of a reconstructed social democracy).
The favourite "social worker" for the reform Conservative was probably
the Probation Officer, formally a servant of the court and secure in his (or her)
clear definition of task: the authoritative supervision of young people
and of adults released from prison and the prevention of recidivism. Social
work was seen as a stern and paternalistic occupation, practised by those
with requisite Christianity and patience, on behalf of the conforming adult
(bourgeois) population.
The space which was opened out by Conservative reformism during this period
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was a faithful reflection of the imagery of social order and deviance portrayed
in the mass media accounts of the time (and especially the weekly work in
Dixon of Dock Green). The fundamental task of the State was to provide
resources for treating and rehabilitating individuals of deprived backgrounds
and environments. Paternalistic police liaison officers and probation officers
would make contact with troubled youth and provide a benevolent form of
correction. Welfare officers and social workers in prison and in borstal
would talk through the personal and social problems of other adult and
youthful offenders. But, in the background, the legal apparatus and coercive
institutions of the mental hospitals and prison system would continue to
receive the support of the State, in order that the minority of more
committedly anti-social or more pathological of offenders could be segregated
off from the mass of inadequate and basically petty offenders. The order
of the people's capitalism would be preserved by a penal strategy which
emphasised the gentle correction of the majority of deviants from the new
order, and the firm segregation and punishment of the minority of rebels
against the form of reconstructed social democracy.
This conception of the "war against crime" won real support only
amongst certain kinds of social worker, notably in the probation service.
It was not successful in mobilising thousands of patriotic young crusaders
against crime, and neither did it become anything more than occupational
ideology (a part of the job) for many other social workers, youth workers and
teachers. It was therefore an extremely precarious form of ideology, in
making the "war against crime" dependent for its (professional) legitimacy
on the continuing neutrality of professionals in the broader political debates
about the moral character and economic viability of the "People's Capitalism".
We will see in Chapter Three that the legitimacy of this people' s capitalism
was put under increasing moral challenge in the early 1960's by the visible
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appearance of corruption and other acts of deviance within the ruling class
party itself and also by the very first hints that the Keynesian post-war
boom was running out of time. The assumptions which were to have bound
liberal professionals and the mass of the population alike to the defence
of the Conservatives' new order were beginning to be challenged by events.
The election of Harold Wilson's government in 1964 and the "Mods and Rockers"
events at Hastings, Brighton, Margate in 1962-5 were about to signal an end
to the optimistic form of consensus liberalism that had characterised the
penal and social policies of the 1950's Conservative Governments.
2.4. An Essay on the Politics of Capital Punishment
"Considering punishment as the result of the criminal 's own
will is only a metaphysical expression of the old jus talionis.
What a state of society is it which knows no better instrument
for its own defence than a hangman?"
(Karl Marx, New York Daily Tribune, 18 February 1853)
Before leaving the liberalism of the 1950's for other "terrains", however,
we need to discuss its most fundamental achievement, the partial abolition
of capital punishment in 1957. What follows is actually a separate essay on
homicide and the politics of capitalist punishment. We will undoubtedly
repeat some of the arguments already advanced in this thesis. But at the
sane time, hopefully, we will deepen some of these arguments and also open out
other perspectives. We want to begin by considering the conventional accounts
of the campaign leading up to the 1957 Homicide Act.
LLThe Conventional Accounts of Abolition
Both of the major histories of the campaign (Christoph, 1962; Tuttle, 1961),
are concerned to stress the bipartisan, "consensual" and "humanitarian" nature
of the goal of abolition. 13
 It is certainly true that one important feature of
- 10]. -
the campaign was the extent to which parliamentary political allegiances
(and the routinely held party-political views of ordinary voters) were
apparently contradicted in votes and speeches that took place on particular
items of abolitionist legislation. Liberal Conservatives voted and agitated
with Labour members for abolition during the debates around the 1948 Criminal
Justice Act, and around the "Silverman Bill" of 1956; and also quite significant
numbers of Labour M.P's went into the "No'4 lobbies with extreme right wing
Tories to oppose abolition. One of the main speakers against abolition in
1948 was Moss Turner-Samuels, Labour M.P. for Gloucester, and also a barrister,
and in 1956 one of the most hysterical retentionists was D.G. Logan, Labour M.P.
for Liverpool (Central); whilst the major speakers in support of Sydney Silverman
in 1956 included H. Montgomery Hyde, Ulster Unionist M.P. for Belfast North,
also a barrister; and Sir Beverley Baxter, Conservative M.P. for Southgate,
previously a newspaper editor (who admitted in debate to a sense of guilt at
having played on the publi&s interest in murder in his earlier work in
journalism).
However, although the "crusade'4 against capital punishment was eventually
won with the help of Conservative (and Liberal) members of parliament, the
prime support for the abolition movement came from the Labour side; and was
given vigour by the general radicalisation of the war-time period. Both
Christoph and Tuttle note that there was increase in abolitionist activity in
the immediate aftermath of the war and around the 1945 election. "Great
expectations" were widely held that the first Criminal Justice Bill of the new
Labour Government would include an abolition clause.
had not Labour appointed the 1929 Select Committee (on
Capital S
 Punishment) and provided the majority that recommended
an experimental suspension of capital punishment? Had not the
Party's annual conference in 1934 passed an abolition motion,
and the bulk of Labour M.P's including a future Home Secretary
and nine other future Ministers, supported a private member's
motion in 1938 urging the Government to add an abolition clause
to the Criminal Justice Bill of that year? The portents seemed
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highly favourable, and the impression prevailed in abolitionist
circles that success was finally in sight."
(Christoph, 1962, p.35)
Tuttle observed, however, that when the Government was quizzed (in the
Con]lnons) by ILP's who wanted to ascertain the attitude of the new Government
to capital punishment, the "questions were ... usually evaded". (Tuttle,
1961, p.55)
When eventually the Government was compelled to express an opinion,
through the Home Secretary of the period, J. Chuter Ede, it was that the "time
for suspension" had not come. It was also clear that the Government intended
no measures to hasten the time.
For this pusillanimity the abolitionist social democrats themselves
were partly to blame. The reformist campaign of the late 1940 's was conducted
within a very narrow and traditional political circle, with no attempt to
broaden the base for a demand for abolition into the ranks of the Labour
movement, or to take advantage of the general democratic forces that had
been unleashed during the war. Tuttle observed that
most of (the attempts to educate public opinion) resembled
those in use in the 1930's. Pamphlets were again popular, but
no new ones were printed by the National Council (for the abolition
of the Death Penalty) the first year after the Second World War,
partly because of the lack of new information, partly because a
stock of pamphlets by Roy Calvert and John Paton were still
available, and particularly because increased printing costs were
still an obstacle to an organisation that was usually short of
funds ... (but) both the NCADP and the Howard League for Penal
Reform increased their propagandistic activities from 1946 to
1948, publishing and distributing several new and revised
pamphlets on abolition ... (This) bore fruit in a voluminous
correspondence in The Times."
(Tuttle, 1961, pp.56-57)
So there was no attempt in the 1940's or 1950's to construct a popular
penal politics of the left, 14 and abolitionists relied on existing forms of
pressure group activity and hoped in vain for enlightened leadership on the
part of the Labour Government, initially, and then from the reforming Conservative
administrations after 1955.
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Both Christoph and Tuttle agree that any intentions that the Labour
Government may have had to introduce an abolition clause in its Criminal
Justice Bill were probably affected by "a series of rather unusual and shocking
(murder) crimes" which occurred in the autumn of 1947 and the spring of 1948.
Two were referenced by Chris toph, who thought the heightened attention given
these in certain newspapers was "factual", in the sense that whilst "the
press can 1ect, neglect, highlight or embellish and play upon certain
emotions ... it cannot very well control the types of murder that occur".
(Christoph 1962, p.45)
"In one case, repeatedly brought up by opponents of abolition
in both Houses, a ship's steward assaulted and murdered a young
actress and pushed her body through a porthole into shark-infested
water ... Just a month before the vote in the Commons, a police
constable was murdered by a youth in London, and in the week
following the front pages of the Evening Standard, the Evening News,
the Daily Graphic, and the Sunday Pictorial, featured little else
'Kill the Killer' thundered the Daily Express, while the News of
the World and the Sunday Dispatch saw in the murder new evidence
of an unparalleled wave of gangsterism sweeping the island."
(Ibid.)
The ideological pressure of the popular media contributed further to a
weakening of resolve on the part of Home Secretary Chuter Ede and his
political support in the Home Office.
This combination of unwillingness to take a political lead on the question
of the law and crime, coupled with a fearful sensitivity towards the
ideological power of the popular media, has been characteristic of Labour
leaderships generally in this field, who have tended to feel that crime cannot
ever be "an issue for the left" 	 It was a combination that was challenged,
repeatedly, by Sydney Silverman, M.P., and others, throughout the early 1950's,
initially with a proposal to amend the Criminal Justice Bill in 1948 to include
provision for the experimental suspension of capital punishment for five years.
The debate over this amendment (for a full day on 15 April 1948) resulted in a
vote for abolition, by 245 votes to 222, a result which was apparently greeted
with "jubilation" in the House of Commons, a jubilàtL
	
which was explained
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by Richard Crossmari, the new Parliamentary correspondent of the New Statesman,
as resulting from the fact that
"for once the machine had been defeated by conscience; and a
long-standing Party pledge had been fulfilled despite the
dictates of expediency ... The violence of the jubilation
revealed a frustration of a Party which longs to be able to
choose between right and wrong and is constrained time after
time to make do with the lesser evil."
(New Statesman (35) 24 April 1948) 16
This particular result was rejected, as expected, by the hereditary
and overwhelmingly Conservative House of Lords on 2 June (by 181 votes to 28);
and the popular press trumpeted their view that the Lords were "more
realistically aware of the people's views than are their elected representatives".
(London Evening News, 3 June 1948). In the absence of any serious attempt to
pu1arise and politicise the Labour Party's crime policies, even feudal Lords
appeared, indeed, to have a more effective relationship to "the people".
The defeat of the Silverman amendment in the Lords signalled the beginnings
of a period of seven years of parliamentary trench-warfare oriented towards
the partial abolition of capital punishment. A political "space" was opened
to the right of the pure "abolitionists", but well to the left of fundamentalist
retentionists, within which reforming, Butlerite Tories and abolitionist social
democrats worked together, in search of a "formula" which would ease progress
towards abolition, without recourse either to radical programmes of popular
politicisation or to abolition of'the second chamber. A characteristic
feature of these compromise measures was their continuing concern with the
retention of capital punishment for the murder of State employees (police,
prison officers etc.) in the course of their duties, and also a rhetorical
concern with the preservation of the deterrent effects of t'law1. We shall
return to these themes later.
The compromise clause proposed by the Labour Leadership in 1948 (for
inclusion in the Criminal Justice Bill) was one in which life imprisonment was
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proposed as an alternative to capital punishment in all cases, except those
in which the murder had been committed in the course of other crimes. These
included murders committed during the act of resisting arrest or escaping
from custody, during detention in prison (where the person murdered was a prison
officer); murders involving the "systematic administration" of poison, or
murders committed by a person who had murdered before. There was, in other
words, an attempt to distinguish between, or to classify,	 or degrees of
murder. Previous attempts at such classification had all been shown to
contain considerable flaws, and this was no exception. 17 The source of the
Labour Government's compromise draft is unclear, and the rationale for the
distinctions that were made is also unclear: Christoph notes that the Government
produced the draft less than one week after the vote in the House of Lords,
and he suggests that the discussion of the draft in the meeting o the
Parliamentary Labour Party was peremptory and instrumental, and dominated by
the Home Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the Leader of the
House (Chuter Ede, Stafford Cripps and Herbert Morrison). This compromise
abolition clause was also defeated in the Lords; and with no time left in
the Pr2i&71entary session, the Government was forced to bring the Criminal
JuistLce U1 to the. Cn s' ithout any reference to abolition. Chuter Ede
pleaded for the House's acceptance of this, and promised that the Government
would continue to explore the question in the hope of raising it again "as a
separate issue". A "tired" House of Commons voted in favour of the House of
Lords deletion of the compromise clause by 215 to 34. The Government was
defeated in 1951, and no signs of any further initiative occurred until 1953
(in the meantime, as Arthur Koestler continued to remind the readership of
the Observer, executions continued - to the tune of 85 people hung in
British jails between 1949 and 1953).
The abolitionist campaign was reactivated by two particularly contentious
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executions that were carried out in that year. On 27 January, Derek Bentley,
aged 19, was executed in Wandsworth Prison for his part in the death of a
policeman after a break-in at a London warehouse. His 18 year old companion,
Christopher Craig, who had fired the shot, in the meantime began a sentence
for life imprisonment, as he was below the legal age for hanging. Bentley
was the victim of the doctrine of "constructive malice" in law (later to
be abolished, in the 1957 Act) whereby "a party to a common purpose must
assume common responsibility for anything that occurs in the course of pursuing
that purpose' s . (Christoph, 1962, p.98). Bentley had previously been rejected
by the Armed Forces as a 'Grade 4 Mentally Deficient', and the jury in his
case, whilst finding Bentley guilty of the charge of capital murder
recommended mercy for him, with the apparent approval of the Presiding Judge.
The Home Secretary, Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, however, refused to grant a
reprieve, and Bentley was duly executed. Many commentators at the time thought
it likely that Bentley would have been reprieved, had his victim not been a
policeman: there is indeed a suggestion that Bentley would have been reprieved
under the Labour Government prior to 1948, when the police were of more
ambiguous status in popular, social democratic politics.
The Bentley-Craig case was quickly followed by the bringing to trial of
J.R.H. Christie for the murders of six women (including his own wife) whose
bodies had been discovered buried, in the house and garden of 10 Rillington Place,
in Notting Hill. The reasons for the public unease excited by this development
are now well known: on 9 March 1950, Timothy Evans (who occupied the upstairs
apartment in Christie 's house during the immediate post-war period) had been
executed for the murder of his child (to which he had 'confessed' during a
voluntary visit to the police station). He was alleged also to have confessed
to the murder of his wife. At his trial, Evans, himself a "subnormal", withdrew
his confession, and accused Christie of the murder. Evans' evidence was
inconsistent (though so was that of the police), and he was found guilty,
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refused a reprieve by Chuter Ede, and executed. The confession of Christie
in 1953 after the unearthing of six bodies led to the first trial in Britain
for "mass murder" for many years, and Christie, found by the jury to be
guilty and responsible, was sentenced to death and hung on 3uly 15.
The anxieties surrounding these cases were fuelled by the publication in
September 1953 of the Report of the Royal Commission into Capital Punishment,
under the Chairmanship of Ernest Gower, a civil servant of some considerable
experience on government commissions under both Labour and Conservative
Governments. The Report has since been described "as one of the great social
documents of our age". (Morris and Blom-Cooper, 1964, p.v), and it certainly
recommended sweeping changes in the law of murder in order to extend the
possibility of a legal defence on grounds of reduced responsibility (a
recommendation that was probably made more understandable, popularly, by the
circumstances surrounding the findings in the case of Bentley and Evans); the
abolition of the doctrine of constructive malice; and also the Report
recommended that the jury in murder cas.es should be given the power to take
"extenuating circumstances" into account in such a way as to recommend the
sabstitution of a life imprisonment sentence for capital punishment. The
Report received mixed reactions in the mass media, which seem to have found it
too technical to be "newsworthy", but it did help to sustain the political
campaign against capital punishment that had been reactivated by the executions
of 1953. The House of Lords debated the Report in December 1953, and the
House of Commons gave it a full reading in February 1955. An amendment (the
first of many during 1955-7) was put by Sydney Silverman, calling for the
suspension of capital punishment, but was rejected by 245 votes to 214.
The rejection of this vote was followed by the 1955 General Election in
May, which resulted in the entry into parliament of several more young M.P.'s
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influenced by the "progressive conservatism" of R.A. Butler and lain MacLeod.
It was also followed by the trial during May and June of Mrs. Ruth Ellis, a
divorcee and mother of two children, for murdering her lover outside a
Hampstead pub. Like the trials of 1953, the Ellis case was quite complex,
but unlike the earlier cases, it had several of the requirements of "good
copy" - "an attractive blond murderess, sexual motives, a woman on trial for
her life' 1 (Christoph, 1963, p.105). The defence rested its case on the
difficult legal argument that Mrs. Ellis had acted ' without malice and under
extreme 'provocation' . She had been pregnant but three days before the murder
she had been struck by her lover in the abdomen and had miscarried as a result.
Despite these defence efforts, the Judge claimed that the evidence was
insufficient for a reduction of the charge to manslaughter, and despite
extensive appeals from a very wide variety of organisations and individuals,
the Home Secretary, Major Lloyd George, refused a reprieve, and Ruth Ellis was
hung in Holloway Prison on July 13, with some 1,000 people praying and carrying
out a vigil outside the gates.
The events of 1955 culminated in the establishment of the National
Canipaign for the Abolition of Capital Punishment, formed out of the initiatives
of the radical publisher, Victor Gollancz, Arthur Koestler (who was to write
a gruesome book of his own on the actual procedures for hanging and their
unreliability and inhumanity) and Canon Collins, of St. Paul's Cathedral. This
was set up with the intention of mounting a short, passionate and successful
crusade against capital punishment. The Campaign' s Executive Committee was
made up of collanz, Koestler, Canon Collins, Gerald Gardiner (a Labour Party
barrister, and Treasurer of the Howard League) and one M.P. from each of the
parties, and had the intention of obtaining support from a large number of
"prominent and respected Britons". Public meetings were held, local
committees established, and 16,000 "active supporters" signed up, and pledged
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to activity outside prisons, and vigils in public places, in the event of
any further executions. In the event, no executions were to occur before
the next major development - the passage of the Homicide Act of 1957; and the
bulk of the National Campaign's activities were concerned with giving support
to the abolitionist efforts of individual M.P's in the House of Commons,
leading up to that Act.
In the event, the Homicide Act was passed, according to the subsequent
assessments, as a result of reform-minded Conservatives voting for a partial
abolition of capital punishment, whilst being specifically against total
abolition. The arguments for partial abolition had a general and a specific
character. In general terms, they derived from the Royal Commission of 1953
which, whilst concluding that it was not possible to establish "degrees of
murder" (in order to distinguish between cases which should be punishable by
death, and those which should not) had also asserted that the outstanding
defect of the law of murder in Britain was that it provided only one single
punishment for an offence in which individual defendants characteristically
possessed widely varying degrees of culpability. (Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment, 1953, p.25ff)
A cific version of this argument was expressed in the demand for the
introduction of the doctrine of "diminished responsibility" that was contained
in a pamphlet published by the Inns of Court Conservative and Unionist Society,
published in January 1956. Reporting on the deliberations of a committee
chaired by a former Attorney-General, Sir Lionel Heald, under the title
Murder : some suggestions for the reform of the law relating to murder in England,
this pamphlet
"advanced the view that no effective decision on the question
of capital punishment was possible until the law of murder
itself was reformed, and proceeded to analyse certain
'anomalies and anachronisms' in the law with a view to their
reform. It urged the Government to retain capital punishment,
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but to accept many of the Royal Commission's recommendations on
the subjects of constructive malice, provocation, and diminished
responsibility, reserving the right to permit certain exceptions
to the Commission's sweeping proposals".
(Christoph, 1962, p.l29) 18
The Heald Report excited little comment at the time of publication.
Mass media and popular attention was more directed towards the fate of the
private member's Bill successfully brought by Sydney Silverman in 1956,
reactivating his earlier proposal for complete abolition for an experimental
period of five years. This passed its Third Reading in the Commons by the almost
unprecedented majority of 238 votes to 95, but it was also realised that it
would be rejected in the Lords (as it was - in July), and once again the
constitutional issue of the relationship of that (unelected) Chamber to the
elected House of Commons would be starkly posed.
For all that it was largely ignored at the time, the Heald Report did
contain a draft of the first part of the Bill which the Government eventually
introduced as a solution to the impasse in the Lords. The pragmatic provision
was mainly that the courts would be given massive discretion in deciding on
whether a person accused of murder could be deemed to be fully responsible or
whether there was evidence of Heald's concept of diminished responsibility19
and that, where he or she could not be seen as responsible, the courts should
show their mercy. Arthur Koestler was amongst the contemporary commentators to
note the traditionally pragmatic "conservative" stratagem of using the courts
for the exercise of mercy as well as the imposition of terror. (Koestler, 1956).
The new doctrine of diminished responsibility was spelt out in the first part
of a Bill (defining 'non-capital" murders) which also specifically retained
capital punishment for
(a)any murder done in the course of furtherance of theft:
(b)any murder by shooting or by causing an explosion:
(c)any murder done in the course or for the purpose of resisting
or avoiding or preventing a legal arrest, or of effecting or
assisting an escape or rescue from legal custody:
- 111 -
(d)any murder of a police officer acting in the execution
of his duty or of a person assisting a police officer
so acting:
(e)in the case of a person who was a prisoner at the time
when he did or was a party to the murder, any murder
of a prison officer acting in the execution of his duty
or of a person assisting a prison officer so acting."
(Homicide Act 1957 section 5,6)
The "legislative strategy" was enormously successful. Reforming
conservatives in the Commons, in particular, proclaimed that the new Bill was
"considerably more than half a loaf". Although Sydney Silverman was quick
to point out that the Bill was incoherent, because the two parts were not
"organically connectedlI20 and although he, Anthony Greenwood, Leslie Hale,
Alice Bacon, Reginald Paget and other Labour M.P '5 laid down amendment after
amendment in the attempt to prevent the retention of any concept of capital
murder, they realised they had been outmanoeuvred.
By the time of the Committee stage, however, what Christoph called "the
defeat of the abolitionists" had "turned into a rout" (Christoph, 1962, p.161)
and on February 6, 1957, the Bill was passed its Third Reading by 217 votes to
131. In March 1957, the Bill was debated, rather rapidly, in the House of
Lords, and despite last-ditch criticism from Viscount Templewood and others,
the Bill was passed without a division of the House.
This "defeat of the abolitionists" was nonetheless, simultaneously, the
crucial breach in the State's use of capital punishment. The vast majority of
murders committed actually fell into the non-capital category (because they
occurred in family or friendship situations under provocation or in other
mitigating circumstances) : in 1969, a Home Office Study put the figure at 84
per cent (1691 cases) of all the 2025 murders and manslaughters in England and
Wales between 1957 and 1968 (Gibson and Klein, 1969, Table 9). So the
restriction on the use of capital punishment Legislated in 1957 was quite
considerable. What was more, the actual passage of the Act reduced the necessity
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of further ideological work. Only eight years later, in November 1965,
subsequent to the election of a Labour Government in 1964, t1-Roya1 Assent
was given to the Murder (ltholition of Capital Punishment) Act (again a
private member's Bill brought by Sydney Silverman) in which capital punishment
was abolished for an experimental period of five years. In the debate on
the second reading of the Bill on 21 December 1964, Sydney Silverman was able
to argue with only token resistance that (the House) was not being invited
"to debate all the pros and cons of the preservation or
abolition of the death penalty for murder. That battle-
a long, grim, sometimes dreary, sometimes exciting
battle - was won in 1957 in the Homicide Act .... the only
question remaining for Parliament to decide - is whether
we shall abolish or retain not the abolition of the death
penalty for murder, but the exceptions to that abolition
which were made in the Homicide Act 1957, and since there
is scarcely anybody who has a good word to say for these
exceptions, the answer to the question which is presently
before Parliament ought not to be difficult".
(Hansard Vol.704 (1964-5) col.87l)
The second reading of the Bill was approved by 355 votes to 170, and
the amendments made by the Lords by general acclamation. Four years later
(in December 1969) (by the device of "affirmative resolution in both Houses
of Parliament"), the 1965 Act was made permanent.
.4(b)The Inevitability of Liberal Reform
We have indicated that the two standard accounts of the campaign against
capital punishment explain the campaign's success primarily in terms of the
indestructible advance of "liberalism" and, in particular its advance into
the ranks of the parliamentary Conservative Party. The passage of the
Homicide Act in 1957 was through a heavily Conservative Parliament: the
Conservative Party had won 345 seats in the 1955 General Election and had a
majority of 60 over all other parties. 48 Conservative M.P's had voted for the
- 113 -
experimental period of abolition after the Third Reading of Sydney Silverman's
Bill in July 1956, and an even larger number voted for the compromise Bill
which was passed as the 1957 Act.
The overall implications of Christoph and Tuttle's accounts is that
pressure group activity of the kind engaged in by the abolitionists can be
successful in persuading Parliament of the social benefits and/or moral
correctness of specific forms of social change. Specifically, they can be
successful in changing the minds and parliamentary votes even of Parliaments
with a large Conservative majority. By extension, accounts of this kind
suggest that further liberalisation is the more or less inevitable future of
parliamentary democracy: campaigns against the use of prison with juveniles,
against detention centres and against the uncontrolled use of disciplinary
punishments in prison, are examples of areas in which liberal progress of
this kind have been subsequently discussed. The belief in inevitable
liberalisation is almost general in the post-war writing of criminologists.
All that is required for progress to occur is for radical efforts and
initiative to be realistic and pragmatic, and to do most work in the
consensual space to the right of committed social democracy and to the left
of traditional Conservatism.
There are two closely connected problems with this kind of account.
Firstly, the inevitable advance of "liberalism" in "parliamentary democracies"
generally does appear to have stopped, and in some instances to have reversed -
and this situation does not appear to have resulted from any departure from
pragmatism or realism on the part of Labour Party social-democrats or their
equivalents in other countries. In the United State , there has
recently been a significant return in some States to the use of capital
punishment, encouraged initially by the ruling of the Supreme Court in July 1976
that capital punishment is "not a punishment which may never be applied".
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Gary Gilmore became the first person to be executed for almost ten years
in the U.S. when he was shot by a firing squad in Utah penitentiary on
17 January 1977, and in March 1979 John Spenkelink, who had been under
sentence of death for six years, became the first convicted murderer to be
executed 'invo1untari1y" in the United States since 1967, when he went to
the electric chair in Starke, Florida. In Canada in 1978, when the Liberal
Government, in power since 1968, was in danger of losing the upcoming General
Election, members of the Cabinet proposed inserting the reintroduction of
capital punishment in the Party Manifesto as a potential new source of
Liberal votes. 22 The current return of the Liberal Party to Government in
that country in no way guarantees the impossthility of the use of "law and
order" as a partisan form of politics there. (cf. Taylor, 1980). In Britain,
campaigns by the Scottish Conservative Party, the Police Federation and the
judiciary were successful in 1979 in forcing the first parliamentary vote on
capital punishment for a decade, albeit the vote (on 19 July) was (surprisingly)
lost by the clear margin of 119 votes (362 to 243).
We shall discuss the rise of the radical Right and its work on criminology
and "law and order" in Chapter 6. For the moment, we want to show how the
existing accounts of the abolition of capital punishment, like liberal accounts
of penal reform in general, are flawed by an inadequate theory of Conservative
politics in general (in other words, they have no conception of Conservatism
as a class ideology) and by a failure to theorise the character of the
reformist Conservatism of the 1950's as a particular, necessary, strategic
compromise on the part of the ruling class party.
The second problem with the conventional accounts of abolition is their
liberal assumption that abolition of capital punishment is a rational
reformist target and that any opposition to abolition must derive from
irrational or else irretrievably reactionary sources. So supporters of capital
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punishment are referred to as "backwoodsmen" or as anachronistic traditionalists,
whom time has passed by and who are no longer significant in modern
"enlightened" times. Alternatively, supporters of capital punishment are
given the credit of believing that the threat of such punishment actually
deters potential murderers, and demonstrations are then provided to show that
the empirical support for theories of deterrence is either contradictory or
non-existent. (cf. inter alia, Beyleveld, Bottoms, and Wiles, 1979) 21
What these rationalistic commentators ignore, however, is the fact that all
such "rational" enlightened theories are judged by the mass of people according
to their own lived experience (and not, for example, in relation to particular
liberal notions as to ideal relations of punishment and offence) . The
experiences of living in British class society have very different ideological
effects and meanings at each level of that structure; and, as we will try
to show later, the experience of the working-class in that structure is one
that may encourage support, for "rational" reasons ,for some form of capital
punishment. There has indeed been a "respectable" tradition of support for
capital punishment throughout the twentieth century in some sections of the
Fabian Society. These positions are not shown to be "wrong" merely by being
labelled irrational (by reference to some sets of statistics) or unenlightened
(by reference to an abstract penal philosophy or idealist jurisprudence)
Both of the major assumptions in the standard accounts of abolition
(of inevitable and continuing liberalisation and of abolition as an
intrinsically desirable or rational principle) have been put into question,
we would argue, by the recent resurrection of forms of right-wing Conservative
politics, to the right of the reformists of the 1950's, and by the success
of New Right politicians in winning support within working-class populations,
often through the use of "law and order" politics. It is apparent that
liberals and socialists alike need a better understanding of the character
of both reformist and real Conservatism as particular versions of ruling class
politics.
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c) RefomiiConservatism and Capital Punishment
Tory acceptance of "welfarism" and of Keynesian interventions into the
economy itself during the 1950's was always qualified and conditional. The
expansion of welfare expenditure - which was necessary politically in order
to enter onto social democratic ground electorally - was always carefully
controlled, and the increase in public expenditure of the 1940's was slowed.
Measures of denationalisation of road haulage and of some steel enterprises
were undertaken, and no major interventions by the State into the economy
were allowed (even though some Conservatives felt that a more corporatist
direction was required in order to ensure that proper capital investment
occurred to provide a secure industrial base for the future). The "Butskellism"
of Macmillan's Governments lay essentially in its continuing provision of
the health, education and welfare services created during the 1945-51
Government, and in support given to State professionals in these services
as part of the process of creating a "caring" benevolent society. Butskellism
thffered from Its Labour parther in the 1950's consensus in that it did not
nurture even a limited notion of the reconstruction of the unequal relations
which had made the creation of the Welfare State an absolute necessity.
Butskellism, or rE iist Conservatism, was therefore an ideology of "mitigation".
That is, it spoke to the mitigation of the worst effects of inequality of
life chances in class society through the provision of State benevolence.
In the penal policy field, Butskellism worked from exactly the same logic
to mitigate the most inhuman and unjust aspects of traditional penal discipline,
and it did so, specifically, by constructing mitigating or exceptional
circumstances in which the traditional rigours of deterrent and retributive
forms of punishment should not apply.
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The passage of the Homicide Bill was a perfect exemplary instance of
this form of Conservative politics "at work". Part One of the Bill, deriving
from the Heald Report, was in its very essence a plea for mitigation of
capital punishment, a recognition of the "abnormal" circumstances into which
people could fall as a result of personal or family pressures. People who
fell foul of such pressures were not necessarily people who could or would
not "normally" behave "responsibly": they were victims of circumstances.
Provided that this was recognised, and provided also that the restriction of
capital punishment was not extended to the detriment of the State itself
(in removing the "defences" of State officials) no fundamental dangerto existing
class relations was involved in partial abolition. The two parts of the Bill
may have been thought of as logically or "organically unconnected" by Sydney
Silverman but they were excellently suited to the conjunctural problem of the
moment, of finding a pragmatic means to abolition without undermining the
Authority of State. Or, putting it another way, it was accepted that the
defence of persons and of property under a reformed "people's capitalism"
depended on the effectiveness of State interventions in providing the conditions
in which "affluence" was a possibility for all, and in providing a general
deterrent to predatoriness, and not on the use of terrible and anachronistic
ritual punishment. The "end point of social control" could be shifted from
the gallows to the prison cell without any real or ideological problems for the
reproduction of popular support for capitalist economy. The Homicide Act was
indeed a perfect example of what we might call "mixed economy penology".
To recognise that mitigation is the core element of reform Conservatism
and that it is limited and conditional is also to recognise that the abolition
of capital punishment and measures of penal reform are contingent on the general
situation confronting the ruling class and its political party. We should
remember that the British ruling class was much less hasty in its acceptance
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of abolition than other ruling classes. Where abolition was only initiated
in Britain in 1957, it had already been legislated in full in Portugal in 1867,
in Holland in 1870, in Norway in 1905, in Sweden in 1921, in Switzerland in
1942, in Italy in 1948, and in Germany in 1949. Most Latin American countries
had abolished capital punishment in the early years of the twentieth century,
and apart from Britain, only Canada and some 1merican and Australian States
were using capital punishment in the 1950's. (Roiph, 1961, pp.109-110). The
difficulties involved in governing an old class society like Britain are such
as to make any move in the reduction in the severity of traditional forms of
social control much more tentative, and also much more tenuous and unstable,
than in societies that are not so fundamentally divided by class.
The particular achievements of the reformists at the head of the Tory
Party was that they rescued the ruling-class party from the electoral oblivion
it had confronted in 1945 and re-established the Tory Party as a party of
"the people". Disraeli's conception of Conservatism as the political
articulation of universal social interests (set against the sectional politics
of Liberals and, later, the Labour Party) was reactivated through the support
given to continuing provision of health, education and welfare by the State,
and by the ideological work done equating Conservative Government with general
economic affluence and egalitarianism.Refoimist Conservatism rested its defence
of class inequality on the attempt to deny the continuing significance of such
inequalities in a general climate of economic plenty. It was an economic
appeal which gradually also demanded the reform of political and legal
institutions (like capital punishment) which self-evidently had originated in
earlier more unequal and repressive moments in the history of British class
relations. Molition became a political necessity, especially, in the aftermath
of the executions of Derek Bentley, Timothy Evans and Ruth Ellis, in
circumstances that demanded clemency on the part of any genuinely humanitarian
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governing party. So the partial abolition of capital punishment in 1957
arose because of the necessary strategic conversion of the Tory Party
leadership to policies of government by consent rather than by terror.
.4(d) Real Conservatism and Capital Punishment
Support for such consensual reformism was far from unanimous in the
Conservative Party in 1957; and the abolition of capital punishment to all
homicides in 1965 was overwhelmingly opposed by Conservative Party Annual
Conference delegates •22 There have been several attempts since 1965 by the
Police Federation, the Prison Officers Association and by sections of the
Magistracy and judiciary to force the reintroduction of capital punishment onto
the parliamentary agenda. These initiatives intensified throughout the 1970's.
In 1971, seven of the fifty motions on "Freedom under the Lawt submitted
to the Conservative Party conference at Brighton called specifically for the
reintroduction of capital punishment, whilst another ten called for "stricter
penalties". Throughout 1971 and 1972, after the murder in Blackpooi of
Detective Sergeant Richardson by Frederick John Sewell after a jewel robbery,
and the murder of Detective Constable Ian Coward in Reading by two parolees,
the campaign for the restoration of capital punishment escalated considerably.
By 1976, the Conservative annual conference was dealing with 26 motions calling
for restoration, and a total of 71 motions on what was now less ambiguously
categorised as "law and order '. In April 1978, the Scottish Conservative
Party published a report, Crime and its Remedies, produced by an Advisory
Committee on Crime set up by the Sha&w Secretary of State for Scotland,
Mr. Teddy Taylor, which included the recommendation that
"Capital Punishment:
... Parliament is gravely out of step with public opinion
on this issue. If Capital Punishment is not restored
	 23then strong alternatives must be instituted". (p.7)
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In 1978, at the Tories' national conference in Blackpool, the majority of
speakers were calling for restoration, arid a motion calling for a free vote
in the House of Commons was overwhelmingly passed. This commitment was repeated
by Margaret Thatcher in several speeches during the 1979 General Election, arid
also demanded by the Police Federation in an open letter on "Law and Order
that was published in the national press. As we have seen, that vote was held,
on 19 July 1979, but the proposal for the reintroduction of capital punishment
was defeated.
The campaign for reintroduction (and the subsequent free vote) occurred
in the context of general "shifts to the Right" in many Western societies,
occasioned by the successful marketing of coercive penal and social policies,
by Right wing political parties, as a "solution" to the upcoming recession.
Capital punishment was surfacing throughout "the west" as a short-hand, abrupt
response to popular anxieties and widespread fears of disorder - existential
fears which had a real basis in the declining economic situation and social
environment. In the U.S., the issue was raised by individual populist
politicians in all parties, 24 and in Canada it was almost raised in 1979 as the
official policy of a Liberal Government standing for re-election. But in
Britain the issue surfaced, as we believe it must, almost exclusively through
the organised political party of the ruling class. Moreover, it was an issue,
unlike no other, that threatened to display in an open fashion the distance
that separates reform conservatism as a class politics from real conservatism, as
Margaret Thatcher voted for reintroduction whilst her Home Secretary, William
Whitelaw, opened the debate for the abolitionists.
We will discuss the overall significance of the law and order issue
in the rhetoric of Thatcherism at the beginning of Chapter Five, and we
will be concerned there to stress the ideological function of "law and
order" in displacing attention from other more fundamental features of the
crisis in western capitalist societies. But there is a danger in seeing
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Conservative crime policy as ideoloqical only in this "mystificatory" sense
(i.e. as a deceit, masking the reality of the crisis and its origins).
In particular, we believe that accounts of this kind run the risk of
underestimating the utopian core of Conservatism. Many "real" traditional
Conservatives do believe, fundamentally, in the possibility of institutionalising
inequality - not only as an efficient and workable system of production, but
also as a moral way of life, built around the mutual respect of the propertied
and the propertyless. Hierarchy is predicated, in this perspective, upon the
right of those born to rule to do so. Especially in England, even the
riouveaux-riches have to defer to such a hierarchy, for the moral qualities of
such individuals are thought in "real" conservatism to be unavoidably inferior,
and to be likely, in time, to bring about some fall from Grace. These
"kinds of people" are also likely, therefore, it is thought, to be more tolerant
and permissive on questions of civil disobedience and crime than the ruling
class proper.
In other words, it is only in reform Conservatism that there is real
tolerance for crime, or, putting the point more sociologically, it is only
amongst Butskellite Conservatives that there is any recognition of crime (and/or
other social frictions) as a normal (understandable) product of the stresses and
strains of a complex advanced, and changing, division of labour. Amongst real,
utopian Conservatives, crime is never normal. In real Conservatism, crime is
a-moral behaviour, resulting from insufficient (rather than inappropriate)
social control; and as such it can be combatted through the continual
justification of conforming behaviour as morality, and through the attempt to
deter nonconforming behaviour by terror. The function of capital punishment in
deterring "murder" is, in this perspective, ideological rather than empirical:
that is, the question of whether capital punishment can actually be shown to
deter, in a display of statistics, is substantially irrelevant. What really
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counts is the existence of capital punishment as the "end point" of a system
of discipline. That such a discipline appears to be "in place" and ready for
use, and that it is underwritten by the terrible image of the gallows, may be
its most important feature. This view may take the form of arguments about
deterrence, as it did in the speech made by Major Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, M.P.23
in the Parliamentary debate on the Criminal Justice Bill of 1948, but the form
of the argument is less important than its substantive reference to the
maintenance of social discipline.
"with regard (to the question whether or not it is a deterrent),
I feel that one has to try to apply one's knowledge of human
nature to the human nature that is affected by this matter.
Again, the only reason I give the House my own experience is that
I was brought up professionally in Liverpool police court and
North Country assizes. For the first five or ten working years
of my life, I came into contact at short intervals with the
criminal population of Lancashire. I got a chance - I may be
wrong, and I admit at once the possibility of error - of trying
to form my view of these people, and especially - because they
were the vast majority of the cases - of house breakers,
pavilion breakers, and burglars
I believe, as strongly as I can hold a belief, that with the
ordinary run of these fellows, the thing that keeps them from
giving an old lady a crack over the head, or prevents them from
using violence when it is di.fficui.t to get away, is the fear that
if they go too far then "the 8 o' clock walk may await them."
(Hansard (449) 14 April 1948 cols.l080-l081)
But the discipline problem, for real conservatives, is not portrayed
simply as the problem of controlling "the ordinary run" of the criminal
population or the working class in general. It is a matter of keeping human
nature itself under control (via the maintenance of appropriate moral
traditions and respect for the Authority of Law). The authors of Policing the
Crisis put this well
"The conservative explanation of crime lays fundamental stress
on the primitiveness of crime, and the state of mind leading
up to it. It is predicted on the eternal struggle between Good
and Evil. Human nature is fundamentally nasty, brutish and vile.
But the seed of Good is planted in us all. It requires, of
course, eternal vigilance on the part both of society and of
conscience ... The criminal, however, has chosen not to fight
the good fight. He has embraced Evil. This puts him outside
the human community, makes him something "less than human",
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something pre-human, uncivilised. That is his choice, but
the wages of choosing Evil are heavy. The criminal represents
a threat to us all, both to our physical safety, our moral
duty and our social code. We must be protected against him.
And a clear warning must be delivered to all others who for
the sake of gain, impulse or base motive are tempted to follow
him in this path, to unrighteousness. There is a sort of
calculus - both divine and utilitarian - by which the greater
the crime, the more severe the punishment."
(Hall et al, 1978, p.l68)
But the theological importance of capital punishment is also underpinned,
for real Conservatives, by the secular importance of capital punishment in
symbolising the essential continuity of traditions of Government in England.
In making this connection, real Conservatives rarely avoid making reference to
the donning of the black cap by the sentencing judge, the "8 o' 	 walk"25,
the final request and other symbolic rituals that have preceded the use of the
rope in English jails. These rituals date from the eighteenth century, and
in particular from the public trials and executions which were instituted (at
the time of a massive expansion in the number of capital offences) in order to
try and check the growth of offences by the masses against the property of
the gentry. E.P. Thompson's lengthy analysis of the notorious Black Act of
1723 (Thompson, 1975) shows how the gallows were used (in the absence of a
regular police force) as a means of protecting the King's deer against poaching,
and Douglas Bay has shown how hanging was prescribed by other eighteenth
century Acts for the stealing of shipwrecked goods, linen, and tools; for
"food riots" and for "enclosure riots" (collective attempts of the unpropertied
to protest against the movement of profitable grain by millers, and against
the expropriation of the "common" by the landed gentry) . Given the dramatic
growth of banks in which to deposit the profits of mercantile, industrial and
agricultural enterprises, capital punishment was also prescribed for forgeries
and frauds of all kind. In the aftermath of a "Glorious Revolution which
established the freedom not of men, but of men of property", the number of
capital statutes increased from about 50 to over 200, in the years between 1688
and 1820. Hay concludes that capital punishment was an instrument "for
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enforcing the division of property by terror". (Hay, 1975, pp.18, 21). But
the key fact to note, in understanding the social functions of capital
punishment in the defence of the rule and property of the gentry, is that the
actual number of executions carried out was not so great as the extension in
legal provision might have suggested. There was no significant increase in
executions after 1750 (when both the size of the population and the general
level of trade were rapidly on the increase) . "Roughly half of those condemned
to death during the eighteenth century did not go to the gallows, but were
transported or imprisoned" (Ibid, p.43). This might be thought to have resulted
for some conflict of interest between gentry and judiciary, but Hay's research
reveals that "the men who controlled Parliament were precisely those who
usually brought their influence to bear in requesting pardons for condemned
convicts from the judges and the King". (Ibid, p.23) . There were at least
three functions attaching to the widespread use of the power of pardon and
the Royal prerogative of mercy.
Firstly, it allowed for the "claim of class". The pardon allowed the
bench to recognise poverty, when necessary, as an excuse, even though the law
itself did not ... " (and also) it allowed the courts to distinguish "a good
many respectable villains" from the many "errant son(s) of the rich who tried
(their) hand at highway robbery to pay gambling debts". To have these young
gentry hung "would have made too great a carnage in the better circles". (Ibid,
pp.44, 45). And the pardon could be used in response to pleas made within the
"links of patronage and obligation" which were the very stuff of English social
structuze in the eighteenth century.
The pardon also had an important role to play in what Hay calls the
"ideology of mercy". Since the pardon, and especially the Royal pardon, was
usually the result of bargaining processes that were hidden from the masses,
the prerogative of mercy could "be presented as ... altogether mysterious,
- 125 -
sacred, ... and absolute". They were "acts of grace rather than favours to
interests", obtained, in the great majority of cases, by gentlemen on behalf
of labourers". Crucially,
"it was an important self-justification of the ruling class that
once the poor had been chastised sufficiently to protect property,
it was the duty of the gentleman to protect 'his' people".
(Ibid, p.47)
Finally, it was the "peculiar genius" of the (eighteenth century)
extension of pardons and mercy that it allowed "the principal instrument of
legal terror" - the gallows - to be put "directly in the hands of those who hold
power" (Ibid, p.48) - the gentry and the aristocracy, who were, after all, the
magistrates and the jury in each English locality in the eighteenth century.
No large army and no police force were required if the criminal law worked to
allow pleas for mercy as well as always threatening death. "Benevolence
was not a simple positive act: it contained within it the ever present threat
of malice ... When patronage failed, force could be invoked, but when coercion
inflamed men's minds, at a crucial moment mercy could calm them." (Ibid, p.62).
So benevolence and coercion coexisted in the prerogative of mercy
controlled and exercised directly by the ruling class itself. The norms of
deference to class privilege that have been widely observed in the British
working class may not have their origins exactly here (in the possibility of
escape from the gallows) so much as they lie in the legacy of feudalism itself.
/the	 /the
But it is clear from literature that work done in theeLghteenth century in
creating alliances between the gentry and artisans was vitally important in
producing an obedience and deference in the early industrial working class.
The advance of industrial capital in the nineteenth century and the
resulting transformation of the class structure of England brought about a
fundamental change in the nature of the rule of the ruling class, as well as in
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the nature of the ruling class itself. The "freeing" of men from their feudal
subjugation to the landed aristocracy, in order that they could sell their
labour to emergent industrial capitalists, necessitated a transformation of the
way in which men were understood philosophically and legally. They had to be
seen as free nn, men who could strike a contract (to work) in exchange for a
reward they could respect and use (a wage) . The pre-industrial images of men
possessed by Evil (by the devil or by demons) and of women (who were witches)
were challenged and replaced by an articulate philosophy in which mature men and some
women could exercise free will without the threat of demonic possession. These
nature men and women were even "entitled" to the "right" to be appropriately
punished for their misdeeds. Philosophical justifications were advanced for the
right of free men to be hung, as much for their right to the fruits of their
labour. The gallows and the labour market alike were signals of men's
freedoms rather than their subjugation.
Pure classicism also required that there should be some form of capital
punishment, in order that the State could attempt to deter men and women from
murder, when it might otherwise be rational as a solution to an individual's
economic or other problems. In this respect, capital punishment was the
institutional weapon of the State, defending all citizens from the potential
predatory activity of others. But classicism also required that punishments
should never be disproportionate to the original offence; and, in consequence,
many of the capital statutes (e.g. over sheep-stealing) which had been created
in the eighteenth century in order to "enforce the division of property by terror"
fell into disuse, by virtue of being extraordinarily cruel and unjust according
to utilitarian judgements. Later in the nineteenth-century, the advances of
medical and social science were to identify particular segments of the population
(like the young, the old and the mentally ill) who could not be accor the full
ability to form freely-willed decisions. But the modifications and challenges
made to eighteenth-century Conservatism by classical penal philosophy, by neo-
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classical revisionism and the positivism of certain academic experts has had
very little impact on either the law itself or on popular and commonsensical
criminology. In part because it was not effectively challenged by the social
reconstruction of the 1940's, a strong tradition of deference to the ruling-class
and to the traditional instruments of its rule remains within the English working
class, which could well act as a support to any ruling class attempt to construct
social order via the reimposition of traditional hierarchy and coercive systems
of laws.
In the 1950's, this particular form of ruling class politics was no
longer thought to be a possible option for the Conservative Party. The utopian
vision of real Conservatives (of a tightly controlled hierarchical society
dominated by a moral consensus around the values of the traditional gentry) was
thought to have been destroyed by the unremitting advance of social democracy.
The partial abolition of capital punishment was therefore an expression of the
Conservative Party's loss of faith in the possibility of a moral Utopia.
Some observers anticipated that the return of the Conservative Party to
Covernment under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher in May 1979 might have
involved a return to a moral conservatism of this kind we have described, and
these same observers speculated on the possible reintroduction of capital punishment,
especially given the personal support which Margaret Thatcher promised in the
promised free vote in Parliament. On the last point, observers were quite
extraordinarily wrong, as the vote against the reintroduction of capital punishment
was actually more conclusive than all previous parliamentary votes. There have
certainly been some signs of themes of "remoralisation" in official Tory justice
policy, especially in relation to youth, but the rhetorics have not hinted at the
reintroduction of the traditional relations of the classes. Instead, the
rhetorics have taken the form of an "authoritarian populism" identifying (and
conflating) a series of folk devils (from muggers and vandals to secondary pickets
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and "welfare scroungers") as predators on "the people". The ideology of
authoritarian populism is not articulated as an attempt to institute some
earlier historical social formation, especially of the pre-industrial period:
it is used as a support for a reconstruction of British society into a "social
sarket economy", constructed around small business rather than large industrial
enterprises. It is an ideology which does not require the reintroduction of
terror at the core of the penal apparatus, albeit it may at some time need to
generate popular support for severe measures of imprisonment and containment for
strikers and other enemies of the Thatcherite programxne. So "Thatcherism"
itself does not need the reintroduction of capital punishment. It is when
Thatcherism fails that the Conservative Party could turn to its more traditional
soral appeals to hierarchy, underpinned by the use of the instruments of terror.
Social Democracy and Homicide
we have already "puzzled" over the absence of an abolitionist clause
in the Criminal Justice Act of 1948. In general terms, we attributed this
particular failure on Labour' s part to the restricted character of the strategies
adopted by the abolitionist pressure group, to the campaigns waged against
abolition in the popular press and also, finally, to the overall loss of direction
within the Labour Government in that year.
There is no doubt, however, that other anxieties were involved within the
organised party of "social-democracy". In particular, there was, in the 1940's,
a widespread fear that "the violence" to which men had been trained in the war was
spilling over into "the peace". According to the official statistics, indeed,
crimes of violence against the person were increasing throughout the later 1940's -
initially against the trend of the statistics as a whole. 26 So where the
post-war anxiety did not focus on youthful behaviour or on economic offences, it
focussed on violence and murder. Our argument is that this anxiety had a specific
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nantng for Labour Party social democrats.
Ian
It was anxiety caught by George Orwell, as early as 1946, in an article
on "The Decline of the English Murder", published in Tribune. In this piece,
Orwell contrasted the characteristics of nine famous murder cases in which he
called "our great period of murder" (1850-1925) - all of which were essentially
domestic - with some of the murders given headline treatment in the immediate
post-war period. In the earlier, pre-World War II period, Orwell observes, there
was a common pattern
" ... one can construct what would be, from the News of the World
readers' point of view, the perfect murder. The murderer should
be a little man of the professional class - a dentist or a solicitor,
say - living an intensely respectable life somewhere in the suburbs,
and preferably in a semi-detached house, which will allow the
neighbours to hear suspicious sounds through the wall. He should
be either chairman of the local Conservative Party branch, or a
leading Nonconformist and strong Temperance advocate. He should
go astray through cherishing a guilty passion for his secretary
or the wife of a rival professional man, and should only bring himself
to the point of murder after long and terrible wrestles with his
conscience. Having decided on murder, he should plan it all with
the utmost cunning, and only slip up over some tiny unforeseeable
detail. The means chosen, should, of course, be poison. In the
last analysis, he should commit murder because this seems to him
less disgraceful and less damaging to his career, than being detected
in adultery."
(Orwell, 1965, p.11)
The murders "in the newspapers" in the middle to late 1940's appeared
however to be of a different character. By no means all the murders reported
and discussed were of the traditional domestic type (with a significant number
of murders being associated with dance-halls) and in some only a brief
accjuaintanceship between the eventual victim and the murderer, with no evidence
as to the feelings existing between them. In the Cleft Chin Murder, discussed by
Orwell, the killer was an American, and his victim an English waitress attracted
to him (according to accounts) by her viewing of American gangster films, and
by visions of becoming a "gang moll". This was certainly a new kind of murder
for England, and Orwell speculates that
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the girl 's case has a certain amount of psychological
interest ... this murder probably captured the headlines
because it provides distractions amid the doodle bugs and
the anxieties of the Battle of France .... U
but then rather nostalgically concludes that
"it is difficult to believe that this case will be so
long remembered as the old domestic poisoning dramas,
product of a stable society where the all pervading
hypocrisy did at least ensure that crimes as serious as
murder should have strong emotions behind them."
(Orwell, 1965, p.13)
Caught in the conclusion of Orwell's piece, in particular, is an anxious
anticipation which was later to become more common in social-democratic circles.
It seemed that the legislative attack on inequality mounted by the Labour Government
in the immediate post-war period was not producing a simple and immediate benefit
in social order. In some areas of life, indeed, there appeared to be an increase
in social tension, as well as the emergence of behaviours unfamiliar during the
"stable" (though class ridden, and inequal) society of the pre-war period. These
developments were unwelcome in the particular sense of being inexplicable within
the social democratic frame of reference. The murders spoken of by Orwell were
"un-English" in that they were occasioned, it was thought, by the influence of
American culture in Britain and in that there were no detectable relation between
the murder and the jealousies and emnities of class. The sense grew up of the
presence of a violence which was not understandable in straightforwardly social
democratic terms. Most of the citizens of social democracy were still to be
understood as products of their environment, but some came to be seen as
abnormal,different, and psychopathic. Almost by definition, murders
committed in public territories (like the dance hall or in the streel, outside
of the familiar contexts of family and class relations, were seen as the actions
of psychopathic individuals. In this way, Labour writers could, of course, clear
"social reconstruction" of any suggestion that it was the cause of the violence
that was being increasingly reported to the police. But recognition of the
presence of
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psychopath had other consequences. The argument was pursued most mercilessly
of all by George Bernard Shaw in a famous letter to The Times (5 December 1947)
in which he argued that
"Dangerous insanity, instead of exempting from liquidation,
should be one of the strongest grounds for ft."
This was no new position for George Bernard Shaw, no grudging conclusion
arrived at as a consequence of the unexpected continuation of reported violent
crime after the war. Shaw's arguments had been arrived at earlier (in the early
1920's) in a series of essays he had written on crime, imprisonment, insanity and
capital punishment. In one of these pieces, written during 1920-1, written under
the title "Crude Criminology", Shaw' s fundamentally Victorian and Darwinian
view of the human race is made quite explicit
"Everyone who ha any extensive experience of domesticated
animals, human or other, knows that there are negatively
bad specimens who have no consciences, and positively bad
ones who are incurably ferocious • The negative ones are
often very agreeable and even charming companions, but
they beg, borrow, steal, defraud, and seduce almost by
reflex action: they cannot resist the most trifling
temptation. They are indulged and spared to the extreme
limit of endurance; but in the end they have to be
deprived of their liberty in some way. The positive
ones enjoy no such tolerance. Unless they are physically
restrained they break people 's bones, knock out their eyes,
rupture their organs, or kill them."
(G.B. Shaw, 1932, p.189)
Shaw's conclusions were faithful to the underlying Darwinianism of
nineteenth century Fabianism as argued originally by Sidney Webb. Writing
in 1891, Webb had argued that competition between communities rather than
between individuals within communities had now become "the main field of natural
selection". (Webb, 1896, quoted in Stedman Jones 1971, p.352). "In such a
situation it was vital that the community should fortify the strong rather than
succour the weak" (Stedman Jones, op. cit.). The weak populations in question in
the nineteenth century were the "casual poor". The Fabians formed a common front
with the imperialists like Lord Roseberry in the lS9Ots in advocating a national
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policy to raise the level of fitness of the British race, in order to eliminate
this population of the "casual poor", unfit for the competitive struggle with
the other imperialist nations. Both H.G. Wells and Shaw were later to extend
the line of argument further and to argue for "sterilisation of the failures".
(Stedman Jones, 1971, p.353). In this respect, capital punishment, for Shaw,
was simply another eugenic device, a welcome additional weapon in the elimination
of the inadequate.
Shaw's insistence on the presence in any human population of "negative
bad specimens" and "positively bad ones" was substantially the explanation of
murder and violence arrived at by Labour Party social democrats in favour of the
retention of capital punishment during the 1940 's and even later, during the
debates on abolition. There was an increasing tendency amongst Labour
politicians and social democratically-minded academics, like the psychiatrist
J.D.W. Pearce, to explain the increases in crime and delinquency after 1949 as
being the result of the unexplained appearance of a number of psychopathic
individuals in the general population. The "retentionist" social democratic
became in this sense an adherent of genetic and psychiatric explanations of
homicide and violence. Even the liberal abolitionist literature, of course, was
at pains to stress the abnormality of murder and almost invariably discussed
murder as "the crime of crimes" which by definition was unrelated to other crime
or to ordinary existence. So in both retentionist and abolitionist accounts of
homicide, murder was unconnected with the quality of the social relations
constructed or allowed by social democratic reconstruction. It was a matter
of individual psychopathy alone, and individuals who were found to have
committed homicides should either be eliminated or alternatively subjected to
long term incapacitation.
The specifically Fabian influence in Labour Party thinking may have had
an influence,then, in counselling the Labour leadership against a wholesale
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coninitment to hlabolitionF and to penal reform generally. It may have been
confirmed also by the particular form of populism that exists in the Labour
Party tradition. The Labour Party is by origin a party of the mass, and it still
attracts the votes of the mass of working people in this country. For all that
the party is now run at local and national level by the middle class (Hindess 1971)
it still retains a close contact with popular fears and anxieties, aspirations
and belie and, however reactionary or irrational such beliefs may sometimes be,
they are sometimes still voiced by Labour M.P's speaking for "ordinary people".
This was certainly the claim made, for example, by D.G. Logan, M.P. opposing
abolition in the capital punishment debates of 1956. Other Labour spokesmen
over the years have found ways of reflecting, or accommodating to, this popular
conservatism of the class, 27 in the recognition that their own careers within
the Party depended on doing so, and perhaps in recognition also of the need for
the Party to have a continuing base in the class, in order that the class could
later be mobilised in the interests of the Nation (and in support of Labour
Governments).
One aspect of this populism is an apparently contradictory perspective on
violence. Many commentators on working class community have shown how fighting
by adolescents in the street is a normal part of socialisation, and how it is
linked, in areas like the East End of London to longstanding boxing traditions
(encouraged and sustained by local youth clubs) . (Downes 1966, Robins and Cohen 1978).
Certain forms of violence are also thought legitimate in confrontations with
the police (Common 1938, Jackson, 1968), and in some areas, even the violent
tactics of local "hardmen" involved in organised crime have received a degree of
community support within the class (Pearson, 1973, c.l) 28
But studies of working class communities have also shown that there is
widespread fear of other forms of violence in the class, and in particular, to
the penetration of property vandalism and interpersonal violence on the tihome
territories" of the class (housing estates and inner city areas) . Much of this
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violence was routinely attributed in the 1950's and 1960's either to "criminal
families" or to "weirdoes" ("headcases") •29 By the same logic, we would argue,
working class populations in prison have always assigned some of their number
to the "psycho" category (as being likely to provide trouble for unpredictable
reasons) (Morris and Morris, 1963, c.XI), whilst working class boys in Borstals
or other institutions have always identified some of their companions as "nutters"
(Taylor, 1971; Walter, 1978)	 Labels of this kind are obviously evolved and
applied in the attempt to identify and segregate individuals who are thought
likely to disturb the orderliness of working class existence (in "the community"
or in institutions), an existence which is also constantly threatened with the
disorder of economic boom and slump. So there are very different reactions in
working class community to police interventions into traditional activities
of ordinary working class kids, on the one hand, and vis-a-vis nutters, on the
other. Much of the "violence" of the post-war period, whether directly
experienced by the class (e.g. in the form of soccer hooliganism) or reported
through the mass media, has been understood in the class of the latter variety.
Speaking to a House of Commons Committee on the reform of the Children and Young
Persons legislation in 1975, Arthur Lewis, M.P., caught the common sentiment
of dislocation well when he declared
"I was born and bred working class, and lived working class.
I know that in my day we had truancy, yes, limited; we never
had pupils pulling out knives and threatening teachers; and bricks
thrown at young women teachers; this never went on. I come from
the toughest area and they never took advantage, even the crooks
and the thugs, of the old women, the disabled and the sick, as
they do now."
(H.C.534-ii, 1976, p.252)
Jeremy Seabrook, amongst others, has spoken of this sentiment as a "bewilderment"
at the actual effect of "social reconstruction" on working class community
(Seatrook, 1978, psim), and it was this bewilderment, we would argue, that was
glimpsed by George Orwell in writing of the decline of the English murder.
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To speak of popular support for capital punishment, in this context, as
arising out of an alleged deterrent function is really to miss the point.
Capital punishment for homicide (and also prison sentences for the violent)
are more akin to "metaphors" for the need for the restoration of lost qualities
of civil order and interpersonal trust in the economic disorder of working class
life. They are State measures which receive support for their potential ability
to segregate disturbed and disturbing individuals out of the community.
Literally they are valued for their ability to "incapacitate" the violent,
troublesome, and dangerous individuals in working class community. Inasmuch as
penal reformers and abolitionists of the liberal centre or the left have tended
to speak of questions of penal punishment in abstractly moralistic terms, they
have failed to grasp the class significance of the field. Right wing Labour
politicians, who have "colluded" in this populism, have actually had a better
sense of this class significance, but they have at the same time colluded in
economic and social policies which reproduce the desperate social relationships
within which such populism "makes sense". The breaking of this link between
populism and capitalist economics must be a central part of the programme of
any future, popular socialist movement.
4(f) Homicide, Non-natural Death and Ideology
Widespread popular support for capital punishment for murder has been
reported in nearly all societies, however, and not just in modern class
societies. So we want here to take a further excursion away from our
chronological account of criminology to examine the character of this most
popular of all criminological demands of the people in some more detail. Any
realistic alternative to "social democratic criminology" will clearly have to
confront the question of homicide and its punishment, no matter how much it may
want first to clarify some of the ideological confusions in the area. For homicide,
as we have said, has almost universally been seen as the "crime of crimes" - as the
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most serious of all possible forms of offence against other human beings. This
obyiously has to do with its finality. Morris and Blom-Cooper have observed
The irrevocability of death is a psychological problem
with which man has wrestled since the beginning of time
(and thus) around the notion of death a whole series of
institutional beliefs and practices have arisen creating a
sense of social balance. in which the realisation of mortality is
incorporated into the fabric of human experience; only thus is
death made tolerable."
(Morris and Blom-Cooper, 1964, p.271)
The inevitable fact of death, in other words, has always been an
existential problem for individuals living in all cultures, and a variety of
rituals and practices has grown up to minimise the finality of dea)th (like the
family plot in cemeteries in contemporary Europe and North America, symbolising
family continuity and stability). But we must add that individuals also die
"early" and "non-naturally" from accidents, violence, or illness, in all known
cultures. In pre-industrial societies, the caus of such death ta&.e ranged,
and still dc range, from feuds between kinship groups to plagues, famines and
starvation. In industrial society, "non-natural" death is more likely to result
from wars (which have been much more devastating of human life than their
pre-industrial equivalents), from accidents resulting from the use of modern
forms of transport (especially from the car), and from various illnesses and
diseases that are associated with forms of living under "modern industrial society",
most of which have actually been increasing, in England and Wales at least,
throughout the post-war period.
One of the most rapidly increasing causes of death in England and Wales
in the post-war period is cancer, increasing at about one per cent a year for
all types of cancer. The greatest contribution to this increase is from
cancer of the lung
"over the past 25 years there has been a more than three-fold
increase in the male and a slightly less than three-fold
increase in the female death rate. The increase in the total
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male cancer rate appears to be almost entirely due to the
'explosion' of lung cancer, which now accounts for about
40 per cent of cancer deaths .... It can hardly be doubted
that the increase in lung cancer mortality reflects a true
increase in disease incidence associated with cigarette
smoking
(Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, 1978a, pp.19-20)
Another major cause of death which was increasing relative to the total
number of deaths was circulatory disease, accounting in 1973 for about 10 per
cent of all deaths of people aged 30 and just under 30 per cent of all deaths of
people aged 70. "Heart diseases", or "coronary thrombosis" and the other
diseases in this category of death increased by an average of 6,015 people per
year between 1951-3 and 1971-3 (Office of Population Censuses and Surveys,
1978a, figures 1.5 and 2.1). Some slight reduction in these rates of increase
amongst males has been detected in some recent investigations, but, as with the
cancer rates, the decreases among males have been offset by increases in
mortality due to these two causes among women.
Both of these causes of death are conventionally put down to the "stress
of modern life'. Smoking is seen as an understandable form of drug-taking,
aiding the pursuit of work and productivity; whilst stress is seen as an
inevitable feature of the "pace' of modern existence. This essentially liberal
explanation of the "habits" which result in thousands of non-natural deaths fails,
however, to speak of the social relations within which stress and productive
pressures are embedded, and indeed demanded (which, ultimately, are not the social
relations necessitated by industrial production, but the social relations in which
industrial production are made competitive). In this respect, liberal accounts
have tended in the past to normalise practices like heavy smoking and also the
stressful, competitive individual, by making it seem as if they are inevitable.
Recent moves in some industrial countries to curb smoking, and to encourage
awareness of health and fitness, have been accompanied by a political concern to
reduce the amounts of time lost at work through illnesses, but to the dismay of
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the medical profession, these initiatives have been decidedly unsuccessful in
their impact on traditional working class populations, who appear to have
continued smoking, and to lead "stressfu.l existences' s at work and at home.
The liberal account is forgetful of the possibility that different classes in
the population may make sense of their use of cigarettes, and the necessities
of their life in very different ways. Members of the liberal middle class"
(like doctors themselves), realising as they have the connection between smoking
and cancer, and respiratory disease, may "choose to quit" and realising the
relationship between "life-styles" and heart disease, they may start to "jog"
and also to change their life style. Members of the "traditional" working class
on the other hand, working in heavy industry for example on piece-work, or in
shifts, may find such a transformation impossible, and, more likely, they may
not even see the possibility for themselves of personal independence of
environment. (Smoking and stress may simply be thought of as "part of life").
Accidents of the kind that occur in industry are probably not thought of
in quite the same fashion (there is evidence of considerable anger amongst
working people at the standards of safety in the modern factory, and other
workplaces). In 1969, only 3.79 per cent of the 250,000 factories in Britain
had safety committees, and 80 per cent had no safety service of any kind
(Kinnersly 1973, pp.13-14). Moreover, the routine (unaccidental) pursuit of
working class occupations in Britain produces death from T.B. some three times
more often for miners, and four times more often for kitchen workers, than for
the average member of the British population; and in nearly the same proportions
for bronchitis. Amongst the least risky occupations in this respect are those
of management (except for personnel management), M.P's, judges, solicitors
and (most of all) clergymen. (Kinnersly 1973, p.9).
Accidents in the home, and accidents caused by traffic accidents, are not the
subject of much public critical comment (they are not thought of as avoidable or
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as preventable, even though many of the accidents may result from architectural
or engineering failures, or simply from features of the living space that is
provided in housing or from features of road design or provision in modern
industrial societies that are not inevitable, and could be changed by political
and economic initiatives) . Whatever the form and context, "accidents", even
when they involve sudden death, seem to invoke a set of normalising assumptions,
whereby blame and fault are substantially dismissed and meaning given to the
event("It could have happened to anyone", or, more theologically, "It must
have been God's Will")
So a variety of devices have been generated culturally with which people
can make sense of and even risk the most prevalent forms of "non-natural" death.
Early death becomes a hazard, or a chance, to which we are all more or less
susceptible: there is a balance of possibilities which if it is ever thought of,
is simply "there". It is obviously crucial in understanding this to remind
ourselves of the vital division between the public and private spheres of life
in capitalist societies. A first principle of nineteenth century classical
philosophy and of much of the related legal precedents is the need to protect
the private individual (the "possessive individual") from unwarranted interference
of the State. So, by a lengthy process of argument, classical philosophers and
ndern conimonsense come to concur in seeing fatalities resulting from car accidents,
from industrial injury and from self-induced health risks as substantially
ivate matters (an individual's choice), unaffected by the moral condition of
the public domain. Unlike homicide, these other causes of death are thought to
be 'obviously' the result of individual risk-taking.
This is not to say that this sense of there being a balance of
possibilities eliminates the insecurity from existence. Indeed, we would want to
argue that the existential insecurities of man, vis-a-vis death, are substantially
tied in with the other crucial insecurities of an existential order (especially
those to do with sexuality, to which we shall turn in Chapter Four), but also
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the insecurities of a secular kind (in particular, the fear of war which has
dominated the minds of men throughout the twentieth century, and which has been
magnified to the point of being "unthinkable" by the advent of the nuclear bomb).
We would also want to "think" the relationship between the insecurities connected
with death to the insecurities connected with the propensity of modern (capitalist)
political economy to crises of boom and siump, with devastating effects on people's
sense of stability and continuity, and on their living standards, and the other
insecurities of political and social experience (especially in societies which
are organised around competition between individuals). We would certainly reject
the notion that these insecurities have been abolished by social-democratic
interventions in the economy and into the organisation of civil society in the
post-war period: and we would reject the contemporary conservative mythology
that problems of a competitively individualistic, late capitalist society (with
declining rates of profit, high inflation and high unemployment) can be resolved
by attempting to reconstruct the moral hierarchies of earlier historical periods.
It is probably true however that there is a level at which the connections
between anxieties over mortality and other forms of insecurity are "bracketed"
in most people's minds, and a "practical" balance achieved. The point about
murder, though, is that it
"disturbs (this) balance. It accelerates the inevitable in a way
which profoundly unsettles the delicate equilibrium which social
institutional devices have achieved, and arouses in individuals
the most deep-seated unconscious fears and anxieties".
(Morris & Blom-Cooper, 1964, p.271)
The attempts made by Labour Party populists or by Conservatives to retain
capital punishment in the 1950's were often phrased in terms of the deterrent
functions of the punishment; and some of the campaigns conducted for the
restoration of capital punishment by the. police have involved attempts by the
police or by their lawyers to have convicted murderers assert in court that they
would have been deterred from their offence if capital punishment had existed
(cf. Taylor,1979a). But the use of the notion of deterrence A here is metaphorical.
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capital punishment, in this view, is actually part of an institutional fabric
that has been created in order to minimise the possibility of the unexpected,
although obviously possible, non-natural death. It also "makes sense" of
murder in a way in which the long-term imprisonment of the offender does not,
because it demands a sacrifice from the offender that is equal to that of his
or her victim; at least, it gives a sense of justice to an otherwise unequal
and devastating event. "Retribution" "makes sense" existentially in that no one
person is allowed to gain any time in which to live, over someone who has
unexpectedly and unnaturally lost "their" time to live.
Whilst there is a sense in which this "logic" is independent of any
particular political and economic "conjuncture", we would argue that capital
punishment can become a symbolic category into which the particular and various
insecurities of existence are channelled, and that this occurs more readily at
some times than others. Studies of public support for capital punishment in
the USA, for instance, revealed that support declined from 68 per cent of the
population polled in 1953 to 42 per cent in 1966. Five years later, in the
aftermath of the "long hot summers", the Vietnam Peace Movement, and the "student
revolt" as well as the emergence of a public concern with "street crime", support
for capital punishment in the USA was increasing again, to 49 per cent of the
population polled. (Gallup Opinion Index, Dec. 1971, Report number 78). In
Britain, in 1979 (despite a consistently low homicide rate), 53 per cent of
people questioned by National Opinion Polls favoured the re-introduction of
capital punishment for "all types of murder", and 84 per cent of people questioned
favour its re-introduction for murder by terrorists. (British Public Opinion
1(2) (Spring 1980))
The insecurity to which capital punishment is seen as some answer is a
broad-based insecurity of an existential, political, and economic kind. It is
not dependent, as our discussion of homicide in England and Wales in Appendix One
- 142 -
makes clear, on any unambiguous increase in the rate of homicide: support for
capital punishment has become in these circumstances relatively independent
of a specific fear of being the victim of a homicide. The anxieties that are
touched by the capital punishment lobby may indeed be fuelled by a generalised
sense that exists amongst some of the citizens of late capitalist society of
being unprotected by the state from a variety of new dangers and threats.
Capital punishment may be a symbol of continuity, therefore, with what some
citizens would see as more Ystraightforwarau, or more well-protected, times.
And as we have already suggested, this feeling is likely to be at its most intense
in the class which has experienced the greatest amount of cultural and social
dislocation in the post-war period, the working class.
As we have said, these anxieties are irrational, as a measure of
likelihood of being a homicide victim (especially when the statistics relating
to other forms of non-natural death are recited). But the other forms of non-
natural death have been normalised: motor accidents, cancer and heart disease
are thought of as arbitrary hazards, unconnected with the moral order of society
(where homicide is so connected)
Mo political philosophy can eliminate the existential fact of death: and
it nay be the case that the best" philosophies are those that confront its
inevitability in an open manner, rather than suppressing or forgetting the fact
of death. But in the West especially, liberal social and political philosophies
accommodate only to popular fear of death by forgetting it and they also
accommodate to the social systems which produce unnatural death unnecessarily.
Western capitalist societies do increasingly produce the stress and life-styles
which have been associated with a vast scale of diseases and early deaths, and
they annually produce thousands of deaths at speed on motorways and in crowded,
competitive and harassing urban centres. Moreover, it is precisely in those
western societies in which competitive life-styles and profit consciousness have
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been least modified by State interventions to restrict the anarchy of the
market that there is most interpersonal violence and homicide. what other
explanation is there for the most unexplained, but also most wellknown, fact
about America, as against other western societies, namely its disproportionate
and continuing homicide rate? In 1971, the number of officially known murders
at roughly 90 per 1 million population in the United States, was more than ten
times the number in the United Kingdom, where there were 459 official victims
of murder (9.4 per million inhabitants) in the same year (Gibson, 1975). Students
are American homicide are unamimous in seeing homicide as overwhelmingly
committed by male blacks (Wolfgang, 1961), in the most deprived areas of American
cities. It is a crime committed by, and usually, against the race that has been
the core constituent of the underclass in American society since the days of slavery,
and whose full participation within the wider society has never actually been
generated by Keynesian welfare measures or by a broad acceptance of multi-racial
democracy. 31 Quite the contrary, it is an underclass that has had to live for
years with levels of unemployment and relative deprivation that would not have
been tolerated by the organised working class movement in Britain. 	 So (as
also in Hong Kong and many Latin American societies) it is a crime committed
in the course of street thefts, in the search for mind-bending drugs or actually
under the influence of alcohol or drugs: it is a crime of desperation, produced
by desperate and demoralising conditions in which the most "developed" of
modern capitalist societies asks its underclass to live. It is a crime of free
market societies.
This is another way of re-establishing the fact of homicide being a social
rather than a psychopathological phenomenon; and of homicide being a normal
response to pathological circumstance. But "homicide" and "violence" are topics
which are now discussed by social democrats primarily the other way round: they
are topics constructed by the a-typical murder and by extreme instances of
vience, particularly by the mentally ill or the "dangerous offender".
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Acceptance of the ideological work of the judiciary and police, and sections
of the mass media, undertaken around the cases of Myra Hindley and Ian Brady,
Reginald Christie, Graham Young, and Donald Neilson (the "Black Panther")32
asif they were characteristic of British homicide 33
 has resulted in the homicide
question being defined as a technical field for the forensic expert (for
detection) and the judiciary (for long-term sentencing) . There is a need for
a "socialist forensics" in which homicide and violence are firmly re-located
in the contradictions of family existence and of li leisur&' in the continuing
relations of inequality, in which these fundamental crimes against other human
beings routinely and regularly occur. There is also self-evidently a need for
the kind of a socialist transformation of the economic base of society to attack
the social divisions to which capital punishment may appear as a "rational"
defensive response. And, finally, although it is obviously much more elusive,
there is a need for a socialist ethic which places the highest respect on the
isportance of human life (for all humankind), but which does not pretend,
like bourgeois ethics, that death can be avoided.
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CHAPTER TWO
Footnotes
1. We have in mind Thorstein Sellin's insistence, in an article of 1965
that the eventual abolition of capital punishment was "inevitable".
(Sellin, 1965): a statement of faith we scrutinise later in this chapter.
2. One of the significant silences in both social-democratic ideology and
in professional journalism during the 1950's was the speed at which other
national economies (like those of West Germany, Japan, and North America)
were outpacing the post-war recovery in Britain (despite their
relatively anti-social democratic political posture). A generalised
international boom was occurring in those capitalist societies which
were most responsive to the recharging of the American economy.
3. See, in particular, the debates in the first journal of the British New
Left, Universities and Left Review, stemming from a piece entitled
"A Sense of Classlessness" by Stuart Hall (ULR 5, 1959), with replies
from Ralph Samuel and E.P. Thompson (tJLR 6, Spring 1959).
4. The introductuion of council house estates into previously suburban and
middle-class areas (in a characteristically social democratic attempt to
smooth the contours of class) left the origins of class (in the production
process) untouched, and thereby did nothing in themselves to challenge
the fundamental differences in the class structure occupied by residents
of areas of "social mix".
5. Despite the obvious fact that the Labour Government had by 1948 decided
to "consolidate" its achievements, and despite the loss of impetus of the
movement towards Social Reconstruction, the Labour Party still had an
enormous popular base at the end of the 1950 's. Even when it lost the
1951 Election, it managed to achieve its highest poil ever (of 13,948,605
votes, or 48.8 per cent of the votes cast). So the decline in popular
support during the 1950's was very rapid, and clearly an artifact of the
economic boom and the way it was managed and presented by the Conservatives.
6. Cf. our discussion of women and the family at the beginning of Chapter Four.
7. For a penetrating discussion of the role of Picture Post (of 1938-1957)
in the construction of "social democracy" during the war and immediately
afterwards, see Hall 1972.
Hall observes how the prime objective of the photographic reportage
in the Picture Post was
"to present people to themselves in wholly recognizable terms:
terms which acknowledged their commonness, their variety, their
individuality, their representativeness, which find them
'intensely interesting'. People here do not require to be
surprised off-guard, caught in candid poses, imitate themselves
for the camera, perform or pull faces .... The Picture Post camera
finds them interesting enough in the detail of their routine
everyday life."
(Hall, 1972, p.83)
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The routine everyday life celebrated by the Picture Post was indeed
the routine patriotic-populism and cheerfulness of the war effort:
the "war-radicalism" which prioritised the importance of the "community"
"working together" rather than the individual or the family looking
only to its own interests.
8. The creation of the Independent Television Authority, which began broadcasting
on 22 September 1955, was of major importance here. An American study
of the campaign which led up to the creation of 'independent" television
notes that
the introduction of commercial television needs to be viewed
in conjunction with other policies of the practical Conservatives
who were inspired by Lord Woolton to crusade against the Labour
Government's declared intent to make operative a social ethic. His
programme was conceived and ideally designed to associate 'Tory
democracy' with the consumption aspirations of the majority. Many
of its advocates were perceptive enough to understand that the
subtle and long-term impact of commercial television would reinforce
the political results of the vast expansion of hire purchase,
government subsidized loans for home ownership, the drive to get
low-income groups to purchase shares of corporate stocks, and the
pervasive growth of advertising inspired by motivational research.
They had observed and benefitted from American experience in
selling "people 's capitalism" in a welfare State."
ilson, 1961, p.13)
9. Some accounts of commercial television take this point further and argue
that the advent of "popular" forms of television had an unambiguously
liberalising and civilising effect
"Thanks in part to the illustrative possibilities of the medium,
in part to the strength of the BBC tradition, leavened now by the
more informal and 'democratic' approach of the ITN, television was
able to establish new standards in the popular exposition of
serious subjects. In particular, it rescued such 'difficult'
and hitherto barred subjects as abortion law, prostitution and
homosexuality from the plane of Sunday newspaper sensationalism,
and gave them humane, informed, and serious treatment .... this
was a development of the greatest significance in the growth of
an educated democracy."
(Hopkins, 1963, pp.408-9)
Accounts of this kind confuse the increasing willingness and ability of
television to speak about previously difficult or deviant subjects, with
the possibility of deviant groups (homosexuals, prostitutes, or individuals
in search of abortion) being allowed their own voice, in substantially
uncoded a fashion. They ignore the way in which serious television almost
always "packages" its treatment of deviants (by balancing a deviant with a
critic, for example). But accounts of this kind tend also to ignore the
ways in which deviant topics are treated in the situation-comedies and
variety shows which dominate "prime-time" television in the early evenings.
It is by no means clear that the treatment of homosexuality and women's
issues generally have been the subject of "humane, informed and serious
treatment" in this kind of television at any time during the last 25 years.
10.The notion of a "gallery of folk devils" derives from Stan Cohen (1972).
Cohen sees the folk devils as "visible reminders of what we should not be"
(Ibid, p.10); whose existence is usually affirmed during "moral panics" over
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behaviours that have been seen as troublesome to one of society's self-
appointed moral guardians. As Cohen observes, most of the folk devils
that have been identified in this way in post-war Britain have been
youthful.
11. The introduction of a military metaphor into the criminal justice field
appears to stem from the 1950's, and indeed from the late 1950's after
only three years of rising crime rates. Given the relatively crime-free
situation in Britain in the 1950's, and the more pressing importance of
other issues (technological change, continuing poverty, health and
education inequalities and many others), the rapidly increasing emphasis
on crime in the late 1950's as an object for a militaristic campaign
has struck even moderate commentators as 'rather unrealistic" and
unjustified (cf. Sparks 1971)
12. The support given in political speeches and White Papers to the
funding of research did not extend, as political support sometimes did
in the same period in North America, to a carte blanche to enter all
sections of the 'control culture' for the purposes of doing research. The
attempt of the Morris's to carry out a rounded, and thoroughly respectable,
sociological enquiry into the 'social system t
 of Pentonville Prison
encountered considerable opposition from the prison officers, and it is
an open secret that the Home Office only allowed the publication of
Pentonville (Morris and Morris, 1963) after the authors had agreed to omit
a chapter to which the Prison Officers Association had objected. The
centralised control of the Home Office over access to the whole social
control apparatus, and in particular the insistence that researchers
should have to sign the Official Secrets Act, acted as a deterrent on much
research in this period, with the result that some more social-democratically
and treatment-oriented members of the prison service and the police attempted
to carry out research of their own, and to be trained to carry out more
sophisticated projects. The topical emphasis was on the importance, in
crime control and treatment work, of the "dual role" of researcher-practitioner.
(R.L. Morrison, 1962).
13. The major difference between the studies is that Christoph is rather more
concerned than Tuttle to emphasise the opportunism involved in consensus
politics: Tuttle seems to see the consensus, in characteristically
liberal style, as the realisation of the worthy objectives of humanitarians
and liberals. Christoph concluded his study, however, with the observation
that "the passage of the Homicide Act was more the culmination of a search
for political consensus than the finest flowering of enlightened criminologynl
(Christoph 1962, p.164)
14. The absence of any such popular penal politics, and the reliance on pressure
group work and the realisation of "enlightenment", was to have parlous
effects in other areas, including the "reform" of prostitution law, also
in 1957. For our discussion of "Wolfenden reformism", see c.4.
15. Norman Buchan, M.P., personal communication, November 1979.
16. Quoted in Christoph, op.cit. p.50. Pertinently for our argument Christoph
concludes that "the vote took place only a short time after the Nenni
telegram incident, in which the Labour Party had disciplined or threatened
to discipline 36 left-wing M.P.s for their intervention in the Italian
general election". (p.72).
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17.Lord Simon wrote a letter to The Times, setting out a number of hypothetical
cases in which the operation of the compromise clause would prove illogical.
He pointed out that under the terms of the new clause, the murder of
Duncan by Macbeth would have been a strictly second class affair.
18.The ancient doctrine of "constructive malice" required only that the court
established an "intent to kill" on the part of a defendant for that person
to be accused of a murder; all other unjustifiable homicides should be
treated as manslaughter. This intent to kill would be arrived at in terms
of the Law asking what the "reasonable man" might have intended in a certain
circumstance (that resulted in a homicide) . The major objections to this
are the objections that have been made to the concept of the "reasonable man"
in Law. Morris and Blom-Cooper write
"Half a century of Freud and the work of social and clinical
psychologists over the last 25 years have cast serious doubts
on the reality of the man who travels daily on the Clapham omnibus
Beneath the surface of the 'reasonable man' may lurk a whole range of
repressed feelings which in a moment of stress may be released with
terrifying results."
(Morris and Blom-Cooper, 1964, p.315)
19.The concept of diminished responsibility in the Heald Report was intended
to extend the definition of insanity that had been allowed in British
Courts under the so-called M'Naghton Rules. Daniel M'Naghton (who was
alleged later to be an "extreme delusional paranoic") was tried for the
murder of the Prime Minister's Secretary in 1843. The rule arrived at in
this trial was that -
"To establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be
clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act,
the accused was labouring under such defect of reason from a
disease of mind as to not know the nature and quality of the
act he was doing, or if he did know it ... he did not know what
he was doing wrong."
The main criticisms made of the rules since, have concerned their
failure to deal with mental disorders which result in disturbances of an
"impulsive" and "transitory" nature, and (associated with this) the
extreme difficulty of mounting an effective legal defence under the n2les.
Concepts of diminished responsibility are less demanding to "prove", as
they are not defined by such strict rules. They also allowed recognition
in the courtroom of offenders of difficult degrees of culpability and
in this way they enshrined the new principle recommended by the Royal
Commission of 1953.
20.The two parts of the Bill identified firstly an operative principle
(for identifying the presence or otherwise of mental responsibility)
and then a set of homicide situations (or more accurately of victims)
as if these could be organically related as criteria for distinguishing
the capital from the non-capital murder.
21.We have ourselves examined the meagre empirical claims of the retentionists
separately in Appendix One (in order not to disturb our major concern
with the patterns of ideology).
22.We should also add, for the record, that in June 1969 Duncan Sandys, M.P.,
attempted unsuccessfully to head off the affirmative resolution of both
Houses to make abolition of capital punishment permanent, by bringing
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th a Bill proposing that the extension of abolition should only be voted
on in a separate and new piece of legislation.
23.This recommendation was arrived at after the Committee had been supplied
with "carefully checked figures in relation to murder as opposed to any
other kind of killing and there can be no question that murder is on the
increase." (Scottish Conservative Party, 1978, p.12) . The figures which
are for murder, attempted murder, culpable homicide (i.e. manslaughter)
and rape in Scotland over the period 1957-1976. Also a detailed summary
was provided on the 83 murders and culpable homicides in Scotland in 1977
by the Chief Law Reporter for The Scotsman. The status of the figures for
1957 to 1976 is not discussed in any way in the Report, and the "murders"
for 1977 turn out to include all homicides including those in which the
defendant was found not guilty and also those "murders" in which the
police charge of murder was reduced to manslaughter by the jury. At least
27 of the cases described are self-evidently quarrels within a family or
among kinship groups and another 10 between close acquaintances. The
thin information provided on the other cases does not allow any further
detailed criticism of the pamphlet; but the information certainly does not
allow for the 83 homicides to be dealt with as if they were "murders".
Very few of the cases described appear to be pre-meditated murders of the
kind which are described in the mass media's characterisations of homicide,
and which underly the anxiety on the basis of which capital punishment is
proposed as a deterrent.
24.The functions of capital punishment in the U.S. are rather similar to
the functions of the gallows in eighteenth century England: to control the
underclass by terror. In the U.S. in the twentieth century, that underclass
is black, and it has been shown, in the most politically impeccable of
research projects, that capital punishment is virtually never carried out
except against poor, usually black defendants. (Wolfgang and Riedel, 1973).
It was on these grounds (i.e. that it was discriminatory), rather than on
its inherent obscenity, that capital punishment was declared unconstitional
by the Supreme Court in 1973, and it was this rather absurd reasoning which
has since been undermined (the vast majority of the U.S. Prison population
is poor and black). Friedenberg puts the point succinctly: "If the poor
and black are to be protected from the public executioner, it must be
through a just recognition that his function is obscene and his services
abhorrent to the dignity of the state, however much they may be cherished
by a majority of its fearful and resentful citizens" (Friedenberg 1976, pp.10-11)
Currently, it seems that almost any argument for capital punishment can be
put in the U.S., provided that it does not cut through the metaphor to
speak directly of the attempt to terrorise "the black underclass into
submission": the latest "respectable" argument being the economic cost-
benefit analysis in support of capital punishment being forwarded,
vigorously, by Lehtinen (1977)
25.on the several occasions on which he was accessed by television to comment
on the law and order issue during the General Election of 1979, Sir Melford
Stevenson, the recently retired High Court judge, was clearly at pains to
reactivate the kind of imagery in use in the 1948 speech by David Maxwell Fyfe.
inong other asides, Melford Stevenson alluded that the fear of the "eight
o'1ock walk" would in his view, be effective in deterring individuals from
going on political demonstrations and other "revolting occasions".
(ITN, News at One, 24 April 1979).
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26. After 1949, the crime rate (measuring the total of all indictable offences
known to the police) began to rise again (from 459,869 to 524,506).
Crimes of violence increased during this same period (1949-1951) from
7,206 to 9,716.
27. Examples of such populists that spring to mind are Ernest Bevin,
George Brown, Ray Gunter, and (in his opposition to 1960's 'permissiveness',
and in his advisory work for the Police Federation) James Callaghan.
28. We discuss the relation of organised crimes to the working class community
in Chapter Six.
29. From the early 1970's onwards, the violence on housing estates and in inner
city areas was probably also attributed in the class to "blacks", for
reasons we discuss in Chapter Three.
30. Peter Marsh has also noted the presence and significance of the "flutter"
amongst adolescent football supporters. In this case, the flutter wins
reputation within a youth group precisely by engaging in the kind of
unregulated and extreme violence that is rejected by the adult "respectable"
working class. (Marsh 1976)
31. Cf. Garfinkel (1949).
32. Ian Brady and Myra Hindley were responsible for the so-called "Moors Murders"
of 1965, in which a young girl and two young men were subjected to sadistic
sexual practices and then murdered. Reginald Christie (as discussed earlier
in this chapter) was found guilty in 1953 of the murder of six women at his
house in Rillington Place, Notting Hill, and was hung on July 15th of
that year.
Graham Young was an ex-patient at Broadmoor Hospital for the Criminally
Insane who was found in 1972 to have committed two murders, two attempted
murders and two offences of causing grievous bodily harm, all within nine
months of his discharge. Although this was the first time that a person
released from Broadmoor had committed homicide this rather controversial
case led rapidly to the establishment of an Interdepartmental Committee on
Mentally Abnormal Offenders (the Butler Committee). For an account of the
proposals contained in the 1975 report of this committee, see Ewins (1976)
and for a critical review see Bottoms 1977.
Donald Neilson, the so-called "Black Panther", was found guilty at Oxford
Crown Court in July 1976, of the murder of 17 year old Lesley Whittle after
kidnapping her and holding her hostage down a drainage shaft in Staffordshire.
He was also accused of three other murders and three attempted murders, and
he awaits trial on these charges.
Borrell and Cashinella in their lurid account of Crime in Britain Today
(written from the vantage point of crime reporters for The Times and Daily
Express) extend their own list of "violent criminals" in the post-war period
to ten (including the Richardson brothers, the Hosein brothers, and the
Krays whose 'violence' was committed as part of their involvement in the
criminal underworld), (Borrell and Cashinella, 1975), (see our discussion
in Chapter Five). A grisly collection indeed, but hardly typical of the
average murderer in post-war Britain.
33. The typical homicide in Britain (and most western societies, excluding the USA)
is the end-result of family struggles of a rather conventional kind, usually
resulting from the use of a kitchen knife, or similar implement, in a fit of
temper. Cf. Morris and Blom-Cooper 1964, and West, 1964.
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CHAPTER THREE
The Disciplined Consensus and the Youth Question
The late 1950's and early 1960's have been widely discussed as a
transitional period of major significance in British social life and politics.
But the exact character of the transition, and the proper periodicisation of
this transition, have often been put in the vaguest of terms. The formulation
we find to be most useful is that in Policing the Crisis:1
"The period between 1961 and 1964 is transitional: not
between Prime Ministers but between two variants of the
consensus management of the State. The self-regulating,
spontaneous cohesion of British social and political life,
underpinned by the consumer boom, was destroyed during
this transition. In its place, Labour attempted - drawing
on an alternative repertoire - to construct a 'social-
democratic' variant, based on an appeal, not to individualism,
but to the 'national interest', and to a prosperity which
would have to be struggled for, defended at home and abroad,
and for which belts - especially those of the working classes -
would have to be tightened. This dominates the period, up to
the Heath victory of 1970."
(Hall et al, 1978, p.235)
The key connection which Macmillan had never investigated and which
only a Labour Government could initiate was that of corporatism.
"Corporatism" was almost in the nature of a necessity for the Labour
party in Government in the early 1960 ' s since it was only via the creation of
a corporatist alliance between capital, labour and the State that rising economic
expectations that had been generated in the working class in the 1950's could be
fulfilled, without having to countenance a fundamental attack on existing
structures of power and inequality. No such economic and social strategy was
seriously under consideration within the Labour Party under Harold Wilson.
For Labour in the early 1960's
"The secret was to expand productivity: to make labour
more productive - which in conditions of low investment,
meant rising the rate of the exploitation of labour. The
potential sharpening of conflicts of interests between the
classes could ... be dampened down by subsuming everyone
- 152 -
into the 'higher' ideological unity of the national
interest."
(Hall et al, op.cit., p.236)
P.nd the way to realise the "ideological unity of the national interestt'
was
"(to draw) all sides into an active partnership with
the State: to make labour and capital equal 'interests',
under the impartial chairmanship of the 'neutral' State;
to commit each side to national economic targets; to persuade
each to regulate the share which it took out of the common
pool; and thus to establish a tripartite corporate bargain
at the centre of the nation' s economic life .... Each party
had its constituency; each its duties - principally of
discipline. Capital defended business, and would be rewarded
with profits. Labour defended the working man and would be
rewarded with a higher standard of living. The State
represented 'the rest' - the nation - and stabilised the
contract, enforcing it on the community."
(Ibid.)
In brief, Labour's strategy for defending and "improving" capitalism
in the 1960's depended on
"the construction of a disciplined form of consent,
principally under the management of the corporate
State."
(Ibid., p.237)
The disciplining of society was demanded, however, not only because of
the economic opportunities which had been lost in the "free for all" of Tory
economic policies of the 1950's. It was also widely thought to be necessary
- in the aftermath of the Profumo scandal and a series of other revelations
of "corruption" in high places - in order to introduce a new sense of (Puritanical)
moral purpose to government as well as to business •2 The demand for "discipline"
was in fact generated and/or experienced at several different levels of the
social formation for what were thought to be different reasons. In the field
of welfare and penal policy, as we suggested at the end of our narrative section
in Chapter Two, the benevolent but increasingly a-political liberalism that had
been given official support by R.A. Butler and other reform Conservatives began
to put under increasing challenge by events. Not the least important of these
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events, we will argue here, was the increasingly troublesome character of
youthful behaviour, especially after the emergence of "Rock 'n Roll" and then
the Teddy Boys in 1955-6 and, again, after the Mods and Rockers during 1961-4.
But there was also a general sense amongst professionals that the direction of
post-war social reconstruction had been lost and that the alternative
contemporary reality - of "affluence" - provided no guarantees that social order
could be fully maintained merely by the exercise of benevolence. As a
consequence, we would argue, a series of official investigations took place,
at a fairly rapid speed and over a relatively short period of time overall,
into nearly every aspect of the welfare and penal system. In 1961, the
Streatfield Committee reported on sentencing in the magistrates courts
(advocating greater consistency of sentencing and, an increase in the amount of
training of magistrates) and a rather unmemorable Criminal Justice Act was
legislated. In 1962, the Morison Committee reported on the Probation Service
and the first Royal Commission into the Police for years reported, concentrating
its recommendations on the need for larger and more technologically sophisticated
police forces. In 1963, the Home Office Prison Commission was abolished,
and a series of investigations into the future of the prison system initiated
by the Advisory Council on the Treatment of Offenders, beginning with a paper
on The Organisation of Aftercare. In professional social work, in the meantime,
further moves in the direction of amalgamation of different specialisms and
also in the general direction of professionalisation took place in the creation
of the Standing Conference of Organisations of Social Workers. (P. Hall, 1976,
p.12). Socialsckers were also given extra powers, in the Children and Young
Persons Act of 1963, to undertake preventative work with families.
None of these individual reports r initiatives, koked at by themselves,
would give any clear indication of the significance of the transition in State
social control in progress during this period. Taken individually, indeed, they
are mostly very tedious examples of the technical concerns and private knowledge
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that was characteristic of "penology" in the 1950's and early 1960's, or else
unremarkable examples of these concerns being legislated. But taken together,
they read much more "symptomatically". That is, they give a clear sense of
the officials and bureaucrats who were in the position to influence the policy
directions of each part of State apparatus of the penal and welfare "taking
stock". They were assessing the scope and the coverage of their institutions
and their personnel in the light of the new tasks they might confront, as
"official society" - the State - came to make new demands on their institutions
and staff, in the production of a more disciplined form of social consent.
The shift towards a tighter disciplining of civil society was elaborated
"in ideology" in both its social-democratic and Conservative forms and indeed
the ideological work done in reformulating the earlier versions of social-
democracy and conservatism had its own effects during the 1960's, independently
of the effects of the changed economic conditions (in the shift from a consumer-
based boom to an economic strategy based on productivity). In particular, as
we shall see, social democratic formulations of the question of crime prevention
were transformed, from their reliance on the rhetoric and image of reconstruction
of a class society to an involvement with the treatment and rehabilitation of
individuals and families. Conservative formulations began - slowly - to
jettison the compromise of Butskellite notions of social welfare and individual
care, and to resurrect "Authority" as the proper, most effective source of
discipline.
3.lThe Fàbians and 'treatment'
One of the most important attempts to revise the social democratic
tradition in criminology, during the period of transition, was the argument put
by Barbara Wootton, in Social Science and Social Pathology, originally published
in 1959. The significance of this forthright attack on classical notions of
freewill and responsibility lay, in part, on the fact that its author was
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personally involved in Labour politics at Westminster, as well as being a
magistrate and an increasingly prominent member. of the official advisory bodies
that were developing around Government Departments in the later 1950 ' s •
Social Science and Social Pathology was mainly concerned to argue that
the continuing insistence of conservative thinkers on the existence of freewill
(and therefore criminal responsibility) was inhuman and also ineffective
in practice. The debates between conservatives and philosophical critics who
wanted to argue for a modification of the freewill position could, and must be,
"by-passed" in favour of allowing decisions that could ensure that "socially
inadequate persons" should be given the help and treatment which their
behaviour showed them to require.
"Primarily what would be involved (in abandoning concepts
of responsibility) is a shift of emphasis in the treatment
of offenders away from considerations of guilt and towards
choice of whatever course of action appears most likely
to effect a cure in any particular case."
(Wootton, 1959, p.251)
Wootton's argument developed out of a detailed examination of the
logical failures in the existing legal rules for adjudicating criminal
responsibility (especially the M'Naughton Rules, which still governed English
law in cases other than those excepted by the Homicide Act of 1957), and was
heavily influenced by the belief that the existing rules prevented the giving of
treatment to many people who needed it (by placing them in prisons, in particular,
on the grounds that they appeared, in law, to be responsible for their actions;
when "in reality" they should have been sent into mental (or other rehabilitative
and correctional) institutions). Though she is critical, at length, of the
'scientific pretensions" and the "ethical blindness" of psychiatry in the past,
Wootton argued that:
"there is no question as to (contemporary psychiatry's)
humanising effect upon the treatment of socially refractory
persons, and particularly of offenders against the law.
For those who, like the author of these pages, abhor all
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forms of violence and regard the use of force at best as
a lamentable last resort, this humanizing influence is a
good in itself, never to be discounted even if it should
prove to be accompanied by awkward side effects."
(Wootton 1959, p.134)
The humanizing effect of contemporary psychiatry would also require
Governmental policy to counter the long-term effects of environmental and
economic deprivation (Lady Wootton was particularly concerned with the "new poor"
of the 1950's, the unemployed, the single parents, and the sick, all of whose
welfare benefits, and living standards, had fallen behind the general increase
in affluence) . But for Barbara Wootton, the barriers to full citizenship
in existing society also included the disorders of personality to which
psychiatry should be allowed to offer a cure.
The Wootton formulation was followed up in the orthodox criminological
texts of the 1960's, most of which continued to be social-democratic in
emphasis and wider political concern. Howard Jones in Crime and the Penal System
reformulated Wootton a little on the question of rehabilitation by arguing that
"There is no reason why (arguments insisting on punishment
on a moral basis) should prevent the criminologist from
continuing with his researches on a completely empirical
basis. If moral restraints are important, they will be
vindicated."
(Jones, 1965, 3rd edition, p.lilLl)
Social democratic criminologists had become interested during the late
1950's in an increasing variety of individual, cultural and familial problems
confronting such a social order. Thus, the earlier psychiatric investigations
of the broken family were extended in the studies of J.B. Mays in Liverpool into
the organisation of delinquent behaviour as a normal, subcultural, response in
deprived and disorganised urban areas. (Ma?s, 1954) . The geographical limits
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of subcultures (as specifically neighbourhood forms) were then challenged by
Jephcott and Carter, in a study of Nottingham, where subcultural formations
were observed on certain streets, but not on others, within the same neighbourhood.
(Jephcott arid Carter, 1954). Street level traditions were as much of a problem
as neighbourhood norms.
John Clarke has already shown how these studies were taken, by social
democrats within the Fabian Society in particular, as evidence of the central
role of the family in transmitting social values and behaviour, and how these
social-democrats (Margaret Stewart, David Donnison, Douglas Jay, Peter Townsend
and others) began to formulate a "sociological" rather than a "psychiatric"
conception of the family - notably in response to the investigations carried
out by the Ingleby Committee, from 1956 onwards, into both the operation of the
juvenile court and the workings of the local authority children 's departments.
(Clarke, 1980). The "sociological" conception of the family that was advanced
involved a recognition of the fact that, even after the reforms of the period
of social reconstruction, there remained a "few families that get into serious
difficulties" (Donnison and Stewart, 1958, p.7) . They did so primarily
because of "multiple problems" they experienced in relationships, rather than
because of the material problems (of "need") that had been stressed in 1940's
studies. It was from families with these characteristics that many of the
delinquents of the welfare state were thought to emerge
many delinquents suffer from grave social handicaps.
The parents of many of them are not equipped to cope
sensibly with the pressures and problems of the modern
world. Many are educationally backward ... parents with
little insight, with few of the skills required for the
care of children in the modern world and without the
self-confidence and poise needed to seek advice and
follow it."
(Margaret Stewart 1962, pp.18,25)
With a reassertion of their Darwinian perspective on the need for
survival within a competitive "modern" society, the Fabians proposed the creation
of a "Family Service" to supplement and/or replace the psychiatrically-inspired
- 158 -
endeavoui-s of workers in the existing child care services. The Family Service
was intended as a means of intervening in problem family situations in order
to resolve the disabling features of the families' relationships. In so doing,
the family service should also be allowed to work through problems connected
with the children's delinquencies on what the Fabians in a 1962 pamphlet wanted
to call "case committees". Parents (whose children "were for the most part
co-operative") would sit on these committees with professionals, in more
informal surroundings than were possible in the court, in order to deal with
problems in the family relationships that might be expressed (amongst other
things) in the "symptom" of delinquency. One of the benefits of such a
removal from the courtroom would be the possibility of circumventing existing
legal requirement of having to prove that children from problem families were
guilty of an offence before intervening in order to meet "their needs"; but
another would be the possibility of reducing the "stigma" which the Fabians
thought attached to a juvenile court appearance (in respectable working class
communities, in the school and the labour market). The family service would
be able to intervene in ways in which a psychiatric caseworker (dealing with
an individual) never could, and also in ways that would be impossible if the
child was to be over-hastily, and prematurely, removed into a residential
situation. As Margaret Stewart put it
"Social workers with heavy case loads have little time to
spare for parents once their children have been removed
from home. Often when the children return, the material
conditions and parental attitudes which contribute
towards their delinquency or maladjustment are still
present."
(Stewart, 1962, p.25)
Although the Fabians demand for a Family Service (composed of a new
brand of social worker, given a set of statutory powers in the area of
preventative interventions into problem families, and acting as a supplement
to the existing juvenile court) has not been successful in its original
conception, there is no question that the Fabians' ideological work in the area of
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"deprived youth" was enormously influential during the 1960 's. Interventions
by local authority social workers into "multiple-problem families" with a view
to "preventative" work on family relationships were given support in the
children and Young Persons Act of 1963 (which allowed the use of State money, in
cases of need, for the purchase of clothing and foodstuffs).
The proposals for a family service did find a modified place in the
introduction of social workers into the decision-making process in the juvenile
court, especially in respect of the decision over the placement of children
found to be in need of care or control via the non-criminal care proceedings,
introduced by the Children and Young Persons Act of 1969. This was largely the
result of the formulation of the Fabians' work as Labour Party policy by
Lord Longford. Longford had in 1961 published a christian version of Barbara
Wootton's and the Fabians' arguments in his The Idea of Punishment, 4 arid he
then proceeded to act as chairman of the Labour Party's Study Group on 1Home
Policy", which resulted in the publication of Crime a Challenge to Us All in
1964. This document acted as a framework for the ideological offensive for a
reform of juvenile justice mounted throughout the 1960's by senior social
workers inside the Civil Service and in positions of influence in relation to
the Labour Party. The main emphasis in this "offensive" was on the need for a
reduction in the use by courts of criminal procedures with juveniles and for
their replacement by "care proceedings", in which parents of troublesome
youngsters were to be encouraged, voluntarily, to agree to treatment of the
youngster by local authority social workers. (Cf. Bottoms, 1974).
within academic social policy and criminology in the 1960's, then, texts
began to adopt a "pragmatic", "multi-factoral" approach in which crime and
delinquency, neighbourhood problems, and sometimes poverty itself were symptoms -
primarily - of a variety of problems in the relationships of a family. Sometimes,
"pragnatically", studies would show how these problems were sustained and
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supported by other problems in the broader neighbourhood ("criminal"
subcultures, lack of leisure facilities) (Morris, 1957) or in the local schools.
(Power et al 1972). There remained an overall belief, however, in crime as an
(ultimately - identifiable) pathology, (i.e. as a concrete behaviour pattern,
produced by factors "in" families, and "in" school and leisure relationships),
and the influence of the philosophical determinism of Wootton and others ensured
that such "behaviour" was never seen to have any real significance as a form
of willed behaviour. Everything happened at the level of appearance, and
operated at the level of the inter—relationships of family, school and neighbourhood
(which were and are, for social democrats, the essence of the social formation);
nothing much happened at the point of work and even less happened in the minds
and consciousness of the young people who were being processed between different
"influences" of home, school, leisure and social control. "Social reproduction" -
the reproduction of social relationships and the social formation as such ias
seen to occur successfully because of the peculiar qualities of the family,
and to be contradictory and unsuccessful almost exclusively because of the
existence of troublesome, problem families (which were closely associated, as
in the subcultural studies of Mays, Jephcott and Carter and others, with the
continuing reproduction in particular urban areas of problem streets, problem
housing estates and neighbourhood, and troublesome youth groups)
The sociologised conception of the family being advanced was, of course,
neither new nor "genuinely" sociological. It was a displacement, into talk
about different families' adaptation to "modern society", of the traditional
Fabian division of society into the productive (the respectable working class)
and the unproductive (the lumpenproletarian elements, unfit for the struggle
for survival, even in a reconstructed society) . The categorisations that
developed were primarily administrative, in that they did not identify the
characteristics of one group as against another in any definitive way, but rather
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simply specified the action to be taken in cases where an individual had
already been identified.
This "administrative rationalisation" (as Clar)ce calls it) was not,
however, a cynical cover: it constituted an attempt at legitimising the
development of a Fabian attack on the "deprivation" that persisted in the
aftermath of social reconstruction. In other words, the creation of a Family
Service was genuinely thought, within Fabian and broader social democratic
circles, to be a viable means of moving beyond the "economistic" concerns of
1940's social democrats to the reform of problematic social relationships. Of
course it was not the intention of the social democratic critique of
'relationships" to speak of theories of estrangement or alienation. But it was
the concern of social-democrats to endow "treatment" and intervention with a
rationale over and above its utility to an individual. So as John Clarke
correctly observes, Fabian ideological work for a Family Service was a decided
1°f,
modification and even a challenge, to the more restricted vision of the alliance
of psychology and "sociology" (environment and economics) implied in the work
of John Bowlby and other psycho-therapeutic thinkers.
The social democratic attempt to endow treatment and therapy with a
more "sociologised" conception of family relationships was to be a casualty'
of the struggles leading up to the passage of the Children and Young Persons Act
in 1969. Tony Bottoms has shown how it was necessary for the proposal to replace
juvenile courts by a family tribunal (which had been rewritten more or less
directly from the Longford Report into the 1965 White Paper, The Child, The Family
and The Young Offender) to be expunged (in the later White Paper, Children in
Trouble, drawn up by senior civil servants in the Home Office Children's
Departments (1967)), in order that the introduction of the new care proceedings
could even begin to be accepted by sections of the treatment establishment, as
well as by the inagistracy and the police. (Bottoms, 1974) . What is not made so
clear is that Children in Trouble put an end not just to the possibility of
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abolishing the impact of court appearances on juveniles, but also to the whole
political purpose, (the context and objectives of "treatment") underlying the
formulation of the Longford Committee.
The Longford Report of 1964 (like the similarly named Report into
Pornography in 1972) was an essentially moral document; indeed it remains one
of the clearest statements of Labour social democratic critique of British
social order after the thirteen years of Conservative Government from 1951 to 1964.
The major indictment made of Conservatism (which has both an historical and a
contemporary ring to it) was that it had given ideological encouragement to a
'get rich quick ethos of the affluent society - Tawney's "acquisitive society".
This nurturing of acquisitiveness had led flj0 a weakening of the moral fibre".
In the place of this as "the overriding motive in life" continued the
Study Group
Socialists substitute the ideal of mutual service
and work towards a society in which everyone has a chance
to play a full and responsible life."
(Longford, 1964, p.5) . (my emphasis)
This quotation (apart from stringing together, in one highly. condensed
sentence, nearly all the key "connotative" terms of social-democratic ideology)
set the terms for a critique of social order of Britain in the early 1960's -
in which a moral repugnance at the reformed capitalism of the period of
affluence sat uneasily with the identification of continued existence of
inequalities of opportunity and life chances. Delinquency was a symptom of
moral and structural problems in social order, but according to the Longford
Report, it was mainly working class children who suffered in both respects.
If they pursued acquisitive goals (like their middle class counterparts), as
Tory ideology urged all people to do, they tended to find their avenues to
success blocked (because of their lack of education or manners), and also they
were more likely to be policed, arrested and given the stigma of a courtroom
appearance. They were more likely to "finish up" as delinquents than those
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middle class children involved in acquisitive activity (who, if they pursued
their goals legitimately, had a good chance of success, but who also, if they
should "become delinquent" could get " treatment" or counselling at the expense
of their middle-class parents), But also "acquisitiveness" could in this view
be normal (within moderation) but if not moderated (as under the general
conditions encouraged by the Conservative Government in the 1950's) it was
abnormal and de-moralising in unpacking the moral tie between an individual
and civil society and upsetting the balance between self-interest and the ideal
of "serving the community". It was also the case (aitbc>uh Lczq2rã &Ià act
comment on this) that the working child who tried to acquire the skills and
behaviours required for "acquisitive" self-advancement, but who failed, could
often be heavily labelled (as a poor learner, educationally subnormal, or even
as °maladjusted") and sent off to particular institutions (like the E.S.N.
or maladjusted school for "treatment"). Middle class children in such a bind
were merely "disturbed". The working class child who was disturbed by the
double pressures of acquisitiveness and deprivation did not get help to solve
his original problem (he is treated for backwardness in institutions). The
disturbed middle class child tended, on the other hand, to receive professional
psychiatric help "in the community".
So, as John Clarke observes, the logic of the Longford Report's proposals
for action "begins as (a critique of) the unequal administration of the law
(and is) redefined (through the redefinition of delinquency from criminal offence
to symptom of neglect, defect or inadequacy) as the unequal distribution of
facilities for care and treatment". (Clarke, 1980, p.85). Delinquency was a
syniptom of an individual de-moralisation, a detachment of the individual from the
moral controls that are a pre-requisite to entry into full citizenship, to which
must be added the larger problem of the material deprivation of the members
of the "lower class" blocking off the chance of effective rehabilitation and
increasing the possibility of recidivism and entry into a life of crime.
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The conception of the problem family and individual advanced by the
Fabians did not recommend a "permissive" response. Indeed, the major thrust of
the Longford Peport involved the removal of all legal obstacles facing social
workers trying to intervene preventatively and "correctionally" into the private
lives of problem families and individuals. The social worker was then to be
given the legal power to act on behalf of the State in loco parentis, by
implication providing the "proper" moral socialisation which the parents had
obviously failed to engender. This moral socialisation would presumably be
sufficiently sustained and powerful to combat the "get rich quick ethos" which
the Longford Report had identified as the ioot cause of fam1' an&
	 vua.
disorder.
12 The Political Character of Professional Liberalism
Support was also given to "treatment" as a response to individual disorder
in the caring ideologies which were being elaborated during the 1950 ' s and
1960's in the increasingly widespread and professionalised occupations of mental
health, social work arid special education. But the goals of treatment in these
"occupational ideologies" tended to be disconnected from the aims which were
emphasised by Fabians or by social democrats generally. So - for example - the
diagnosis of "maladjustment" in children, and the removal of children so
classified intoecial schools, was justified, by the Committee on Maladjusted
children in 1955, as being required by the fact that a child
"is developing in ways that have a bad effect on
himself or his fellow, and cannot without help be
remedied by his parents, teachers, and other adults
in normal contact with him."
(The Underwood Report, 1955)
A later child psychiatry text observes that the term "maladjustment"
was actually an
"administrative, educational term used to describe a
group of children requiring a special type of
educational provision."
(Barker, 1976, p.265)
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In other words, the use of the terni was (and is) ideological in as much
as it simply asserted the existence of a psychiatric condition which was
identified by the decision taken by professional experts to remove a child
from a conventional into a special school.
A similar ideological move occurred some four years later in the
development of an array of apparently neutral terms for the description of
mental disorder in the Mental Health Act of 1959, each of which conditions
(from psychosis to schizophrenia) was primariiy defined by the administrative-
legal decision which was taken in the particular individual case. The ideology
of mental health at work here was one which allowed an essentially practical
decision taJen by three medical experts (to "section" a patient into a mental
hospital indefinitely) to be justified by the fact of the decent and caring
intentions of the experts and by the fact of the condition itself.
In the crime and delinquency field, also, professional liberals came
to exercise an increasing influence throughout the 1950's and 1960's. The
professionalism of the practitioner (for example, in approved schools) was said
to be exhibited in the particular mixture of psychiatric and educational skills
he brought to individual cases. In some cases, it was further underwritten
by a claim to scientificity, where practitioners claimed to be working within
experimental research programmes, evaluating the "impact" of particular types of
treatment on particular types of offender. The liberalism of these projects
and of the professional's own practices lay in the fact that the decisions
taJen in individual cases were always made in the interests of the client. They
were attempts to fulfil the client's needs (of an emotional or social character).
No other political or moral consideration was involved.
Clearly, however, the "caring" ideologies were expressions of the
particular interest of the rapidly expanding caring professions. That is to say
that these ideologies expressed explicitly the ideals and also implicitly the
material interests of these professions: they identified the needs (maladjustent,
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mal-socialisation and mental illness) to which these professions were a
response, and they demonstrated the need for these professionals to be employed
in numbers to deal with these problems. The "caring" ideologies were an
expression of an enormous reconstruction in the occupational structure that
was taking place in this period. Between 1959 and 1974, for example, the
overall number of workers employed by local authorities (of whom very large
numbers were workers in health, education and welfare) increased by 60 per cent,
as compared to the increases of only 6 per cent in central government (civilian)
employment and 3 per cent in the private sector labour force (Klein, 1976,
table 13)
In speaking of caring ideologies, however, we should be clear that the
ideas which were articulated were often only dubiously related to any proven
interest of the client. Later critiques have shown how these ideologies have
worked to prioritise certain (professional) claims to knowledge and to
correctional expertise at the expense of others
"The medical profession, for example, has successfully
persuaded everyone that health services are the vital
element in the maintenance of health, when clearly they
are only element. Equally, doctors have successfully
defined mental handicap as a problem for the medical
profession with unfortunate consequences for services for
this group.
In housing and town planning the definitions of the
professionals rather than the definitions of those who
live in houses asserted to be unfit have carried the day
(Wilding, 1981)
In practice, the only features of liberal professionalism which was
ally agreed, in that period or later, were that such professionalism needed
to be accorded greater power and influence in society, in part in order that the
professional could proceed to have his or her beneficial impact on clients.
This impact might result variously from the care worker's own skills in
psychiatric insight or in the management of casework itself; from Ihe care
Worker's own elevated moral purposes (for example, from his or her Christianity),
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or, indeed, in some cases from his or her social democratic commitments. But
the only definitive characteristics of professional liberalism as such were
the quest for greater social power and its claim to be able to cater - expertly -
to the emotional and social needs of the client.
The absence of any clear or agreed conception of a desirable social
order in professional liberalism was mirrored in an essentially amoral and
pragmatic literature on social policy. The "faith of the counsellors", as
Paul Halmos called it, consisted primarily in the commitment of professional
mental health workers and social workers to unpack the "intrapsychic"
disabilities of clients: client problems (like anti-authoritarian behaviour,
on the one hand, or manic depression, on the other) were "presenting symptoms"
of personality disturbance rather than of wider social conditions. The
intervention of professionals into client's lives was justified in terms of the
support and correction the professional could allegedly bring to the disturbed
of young delinquents and isolated housewives alike. (Ualmos 1965).
A similar a-moral and non-political posture was adopted on the question
of crime and delinquency by criminologists during this period. For all the
references to the classical writings of Durkheim on the normalcy of crime (and
social pathology) in anomic, unequal or repressively structured societies, there
were few calls from orthodox criminology in Britain in the 1950 's for the
abolition of inherited wealth. Even the narrower concerns of the social-
democratic criminology of the 1940's with "economic offences" and the more overt
examples of the criminality of the powerful were increasingly forgotten in the
1950's. To have suggested that sections of the self-confident and influential
middle-class entrepreneurial groups were involved still in the behaviours of
which they had been accused in the 1940's, would have been to question the
consensus within which rehabilitative, correctional criminology had quite happily
been situated. To have suggested, as a few political critics in the fifties
actually did, that the fundamental trajectory even of a reformed British capitalism
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was personally unhealthy and dangerous, as bohemian critics were to do, or
increasingly exploitative (at the point of consumption as well as at the point
of production) albeit in a more consensual and affluent a style (as per the
New Left critique that was to develop from the late 1950's and onwards) would
have been to have been misbelieved, in the context of generalised talk of
affluence and prosperity. To have argued for multi-factoral investigations
of the behaviours, personalities or culturaj]. groupings of middle-class adults in
powerful social positions would - in the context of the 1950's and early
1960's - have been purely facetious. Official and popular criminology was
established by then, quite "naturally", as being to do with the behaviour of
the recalcitrant sections of working-class populations, and particularly its youth
ful fractions (ungrateful members of the Welfare State). To "conform"
was self-evidently to exhibit qualities of maturity and mental health, without
the need for any consideration of the demands and obligations, or the actual
psychic or material effects, of "conformity". Professional liberalism was
(and is) a political perspective which privileges existing social and political
relationships and pathologises all departures from them, whilst simultaneously
claiming to be above (or neutral in) the political realm.
The increasing development of treatment work as a professional occupation,
and in some accounts as a scientific expertise, gave further encouragement in
this period to a particular kind of righteous crusading which had often before
been characteristic among amateurs working with delinquent children and with
adult criminals, 5 but which was also to become a feature of the professional
treatment workers in the Welfare State. Uncommitted outsiders who have visited
treatment institutions often notice, and comment on, this particular aspect of
treatment ideology, passing it off as a belief that is necessary in order to
carry though the work. The truth is that many people are attracted into
treatment work out of this felt sense of "mission", to "save the children", and
that this motivation has now to be articulated within the more professionalised
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description of what delinquency work is about, the treatment ideology itself.
It is an enormous paradox that a firm existential sense of purpose should have
come to characterise a practice that the more informed and honest treatment
worker will admit is an inexact science, and at the time that itdd - namely,
in the context of the developing uncertainties of the 1950's. This was a period
in which the dominant moral values were being increasingly challenged, not
simply by the "rebellious youth of the Welfare State", but also by
intellectuals, politicians outside the consensus (especially on the Left), and
also by a developing "bohemian" culture organised around jazz, popular music and
drama. It was the decade in which the presence of vast arsenals of nuclear
weapons around the world, and the general atmosphere of Cold War politics, created
a deep anxiety in many sections of the population; and gave rise, in particular,
to bohemian revolt in the arts and in literature, and to a committed politics
of the Left, culminating in the formation of the New Left, the first March to
Alderinaston in 1961 and the political satire, of all places, on the BBC. But
/had
these were developments which seem to have little effect on the ideological and
political parameters of liberal professional ideology, or on the practical
activities of treatment workers.
The resilience, or perhaps the isolation, of treatment workers in the
contexts of the developing uncertainties of the 1950's, is evident very clearly
even in the autobiographical writings of social-democratic Lord Longford, who
had begun his involvement with crime-talk in 1939, when he had been admitted as
an official visitor to Oxford Prison. Reflecting on why he should have done
this, and then continued to spend much of his life visiting prison and being
engaged in penal reform, Longford recalls that he "never counted the rigours
of a day spent on politics as an honest day's work", that, after his conversion
to the Labour cause, he wanted to be "a genuine Labour man ... making contact
with them (the working class) at the bottom" and that finally, as a result of
conversations with a friend in the Jesuit order, his "conviction (had) strengthened
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that there were whole lost tribes in the ranks of the working class, and
that it was my special vocation to live among them". (Packenham, 1964, pp.114-6).
Paternalistic and Christian sentiments of this kind, and the commitment
to prison visiting, as an appropriate form of personal practice, also found a
place in the biographies of the earlier penal reformers, whether on the moderate
Left (Elizabeth Fry) or indeed on the Right (Samuel Hoare, Home Secretary in
the last Conservative Government before the war), and also are part of the
private commitment of many of their contemporary successors. 6 Amongst treatment
workers at large, a similar sense of mission and purpose, heightened perhaps
by the genuine financial and psychic sacrifices that are involved in doing
treatment work amongst juvenile and adult offenders or the mentally ill,
continues to segregate the treatment worker off (physically and morally) from
the contradictory, and ambiguous, secular world. Many residential workers are
quite literally segregated off from the mundareproblems of life in the wider
/the
society, by having their material needs (for food and home) provided by residential
institution, as well as by having their social and personal needs fulfilled by
their colleagues. But they still feel able to pathologise their clients for the
difficulties they have experienced in the mundane problems of life in "the
outside wor1d	 It was, and is, essential for treatment ideology to show that
the treatment workers' clients are in : need of some kind of salvation. Treatment
workers have varied, however, in the extent to which they have believed that
they themselves were and are free from any similar requirement, and in the
extent to which they see the world itself as being in need of control or
correction. It is no accident, however, that many treatment workers have
exhibited a preference for working in isolated, correctional institutions for
youth, for in locations of this kind, treatment workers are themselves
geographically distant from the contradictions, temptations and material
conflicts of the city, of large industry and of urban neighbourhoods. Moreover,
these institutions were often built - in the nineteenth or early twentieth
century - to contain cells, within which a monastic contemplation could be
ercouragedin the client, for penitence; and a moral code enforced by treatment
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staff (involving the discipline of self-denial, and the achievement of grace
through work) that might be difficult to sustain in open, urban, and secular
class society. With a base in isolated residential institutions, and a
superstructure of scientific terminology and professional knowledge, the
treatment worker was able to "live in ideology", in less troubled a style than
other sections of non-commercial middle-class society.
33 Radical Liberalism and the Critique of Institutions
Where the more conservative of professional liberals expressed their
altruism and care in Christian terms or in some similar form of evangelical
practice in monastic settings, their radical critics within the liberal
treatment profession (especially during the 1960's) began to mount a critique
of institutions, whether for use with adult or youthful populations.
In respect of adult offenders, one of the main liberal initiatives
of the 1960's was the attention given to developing "alternatives to imprisonment"
(a project that was later to be called, and reformulated, as "decarceration").
After unsuccessful attempts had been made by penal reform organisations in 1951
and 1957 to win approval of the Home Office's Advisory Council of the Treatment
of Offenders for the introduction of reforms in this area, success was achieved
in the inclusion of provisions for suspended sentences, parole and new methods
for enforcing the payment of fines in the 1967 Criminal Justice Act. As
Richard Sparks noted in a review of the reforms of the period
"It is clear that one motive for the introduction of this
measure was to reduce the numbers committed to prison,
and the prison population."
(Sparks, 1971, p.13)
The adult prison population had risen from 18,457 in 1957 to 26,909
in 1967, and, as we shall see later, this was thought by some to be threatening
prison security and, by others, to be compromising the ability of prisons to
carry out their officially rehabilitative purpose, of aiding prisoners on release
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"to lead a good and useful life".
In the area of mental health, just the same radical liberal initiatives
were occurring in the same period. The Royal Commission on Mental Illness
and Mental Deficiency, reporting in 1957, pronounced on the development of "a
reorientation of the mental health services towards community care and away
from hospital care except where the special facilities of the hospital
services are needed". In the Mental Health Act of 1959, some move towards this
goal was made in the abolition of certification (a practice that tended to
confine the certified person in a mental hospital for a considerable period, and
also to carry considerable stigma) and the reclassification of most mental
hospital patients as being of informal status. (K.Jones et al 1975, p.3). Work
carried out by Professor Jack Tizard at the Maudsley Hospital in the 1950's and
1960's was highly influential in showing that significant proportions of the
existing populations of mental hospitals suffered not from some ineradicable
handicap but from "previous emotional deprivation and lack of one-to-one
relationships", (Jones, ibid, p.5), problems which were not eased in the under-
staffed and over-crowded nineteenth century monoliths that were being used as
residential mental hospitals. There was increasing recognition throughout the
1960's of the fact that "at least some of the problems of the mentally handicapped
in hospital were of the hospital's making" 7 . One consequence of this changing
liberal sensitivity to the effects of institutionalisation and of labelling
on the careers of the individual mental patient was to be the White Paper of
1971, Better Services for the Mentally Handicapped, which constituted a major
attack on the use of hospitals for the residential care of the mental patient,
and announced a transformation in their function, such that they would have to
deal with out-patients, day patients and in-patients in co-ordinated therapeutic
programmes for all.
Two years before this White Paper, the Children and Young Persons Act
(a crucially important Act which we will discuss at length in Chapter Five).
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had, amongst many other provisions, included a commitment, in Section 7,
to the eventual abolition of junior detention centres from the State's
response to delinquency, and the architects of this Act also quite clearly
envisaged that the future development of Intermediate Treatment would be
effective, preventatively, in steering young people who were "at risk" away
from institutionalization.
So a defining characteristic of the radical version of professional
liberalism throughout the 1960's (distancing itself from the more conservative,
evangelical version of the professional task that was "in place" in treatment
occupations) was the commitment to finding alternatives to the institution,
ai-id the move towards "the community" as the appropriate site for doing treatment
work. This elevation of "the community" was apparent in a variety of settings
(for example, in the Probation Service, which turned towards "detached"
work in the community as a major initiative in this period and in "community
development" work by young planners, architects and others in the ill-fated
CDP's of the late 1960's and early 1970's), but in the areas of delinquency
and its treatment, the convolutions in the use of the term were most apparent
in the renaming of old approved schools, remand homes and a great variety of
other institutions (as well as the purpose-built institutions that joined them,
in 1971) as "Community Homes", in the belief presumably that this designation
would somehow re-situate these buildings into their neighbourhood and into the
local networks of social and economic relations. Even institutions could
become alternatives to institutions, in the perspective and terminology of
the radical liberal.
The official criminological debates of the later 1960's were almost
entirely conducted between radical and orthodox liberal professionals, who
were by then in possession of enormous social power and influence. Years of
consensus politics and of State investment in welfare and in economic management
had very largely extinguished the critique of the welfare state mounted by
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orthodox conservatives and also the critique of a capitalist economic order
mounted by the Left. The narrow preoccupations of the ideologies of the
"caring" professions with the "intrapsychic" problems experienced by their
client (disabling them from the self-evident benefits of a conforming life),
were a further guarantee of the neutrality of the liberal professions on the
question of the moral or political purpose of social order in a consensus society.
It was this neutrality vis-a-vis politics, and the ongoing concern
with disturbances in the psyche, which was to inform and to structure the
reactions of liberal professionals to the youthful disturbances in the 1960's.
The behaviours of working-class youth during the Mods and Rockers events of
1962-5 and at the time of the Skinheads (from 1968 onwards) were read on a par
with the "student rebellions" amongst middle class youth in the early 1960's arid
during the events of 1968. Subsequent to the massive demonstrations in
Grosvenor Square against the Labour Government's support for America's war in
Vietnam, for example, a psychiatrist researching on soccer hooliganism offered
his view that
"the reasons for last week's hooliganism in Park Lane - in
which some demonstrators smashed windows, including one in
the Bunny Club - had more to do with the complex problems of
crowd hysteria than deeply held political beliefs.
Dr. John Harrington, of the Uffculme Clinic, Birmingham
says: 'There are many common factors between crowds of foothall
fans and demonstrators ... There's a state of suggestibility in
emotional crowds, akin to the first stage of hypnosis; people
aren't hypnotised to the point of being automatons but their
reasoning powers are diminished ...".
('Did the Foothall Fury Syndrome Hit Park Lane?' Sunday Times
28 June, 1968)
One response to the growth of the student movement in Britain was the
creation of student health services in universities and colleges, with a
particular emphasis on the provision of psychiatric support for the "disturbed"
(Maddison, 1972). In the meantime, liberal professionals working on child care
began to speak of children arriving in institutions with many more "problems" and
"disturbances" than had been apparent in previous generations: the Head of one
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of the experimental Community Homes established in the late 1960's spoke of
children in his home selling a newspaper (International Times, the journal of
the counter-cultures) as "clinically crazy". Professional liberals willingly
offered their skills in diagnosis to the task of identifying and correcting
the newly emerging pathologies of youth in this period. They may not always
have been enthusiastic or evangelical in this task (since professionalism did
demand a certain detachment), but they usually were able, th±ough the routine
exercise of diagnostic expertise, to find evidence of the need for treatment and
containment.
As the 1960's developed	 liberal and social-democratic conceptions
of youth became increasingly difficult to distinguish. 	 Indeed "Fabian"
conceptions of delinquency as a family disturbance and liberal interrogations
of delinquency as an expression of disturbances in the psyche were not in any
case contradictory in principle. They could in principle be applied, and
were indeed in practice applied, to single cases. So liberal professionalism
helped to sustain what a recent right-wing critic, Patricia Morgan, has called
"consensus psychology". (Morgan, 1978) . Devoid of any explicit moral purpose
(other than that of being professional) , liberal professionals set about the
correction of all deviations from the existing consensus but especially those
deviations that had been seen as troublesome by influential social forces in
local communities and in the national media. Morgan observes that such a
project could not possibly in itself have been successful since it did not
specify what form of behaviour would be moral and therefore legitimate to
particular client populations. The project was merely one of encouraging
conformity, by professional guidance and permissive client-centredness. It was
an attempt to underwrite existing consensual form of society by the force of
an aparent1y liberal toleration of the client, inextricably linked nonetheless
to a commitment to the correction of the client's behaviour.
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Conservatism and the Delinquent Generation
At the beginning of the 1960's, both liberalism and social democracy
were being articulated ideologically as justifications for State intervention
into civil society (into the family, on the one hand, and into the lives of
"disturbed" individuals on the other). The posture of pre-emptive readiness
of the State apparatus which we discussed earlier in the chapter had in this
sense been explained and justified. A similar conclusion had been arrived at,
but through different processes of reasoning, among Conservatives.
In Chapter One, we identified the widespread social democratic view
that the crime problems of the 1940's were only temporary. Delinquency,
especially, was expected to decline once a sense of order had been restored to
social life, and, in particular, once families had been brought together
permanently after full demobilisation from the war; but also, of course, once
the expected economic recovery had gained momentum. These sentiments began to
be questioned fairly early in the post-war period especially by individual
conservatives, as the official rates of delinquency failed to decline to the
predicted extent. An article in the official journal of the National Council
of Associated Children's Homes is typical of this questioning, in exhibiting
the secular views of conservatism alongside the Christian commitments of many
of the treatment workers
in 1948 the figures for children convicted of breaking
the law rose by twenty-six per cent over the previous
year in respect of children under fourteen, and by
twenty-three per cent for those between fourteen and
seventeen ... No doubt the conduct of the young will be
widely deplored, but will it be understood? Will
it be recognised that the malady that some of our
youngsters evidence is a malady for which we are all
in some measure responsible? It is the malady of
social aimlessness and our lack of a philosophy of
life, let alone religion. Above all, it is the malady of
insecurity. Those who do not know they are living in
God's world cannot feel at home."•
(Anon. In A.A. Jacka ed. (1958).	 Reprinting article of June 1949.)
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In susie of the post-war accounts, indeed, the "aimlessness" of youth and the
"absence of a philosophy of life" were seen to result from the inadequate
moral training received by many youths during the war-time period. Here, the
deprivation of youth was not simply a matter of their having lacked affection
within an intact family, or even their having missed out on geographical or
community stability (through evacuation) or economic stability (as a result of
the continuing inequalities of class). The deprivation was crucially
the absence of proper notions of authority and social order and, indeed of the
"meaning of life" itself. The psyche of the adolescent who had matured during
the early post war years, and who had been in trouble with the law, was a
psyche in which a commitment to delinquency was seen to have arisen because of
the absence of any solid philosophical and moral deterrent to delinquent
commitment. In many of the commentators' accounts, indeed, a generation of
youth existed which had to a large extent been deprived of appropriate moral
training. There was a delinquent generation. For this generation, indeed,
the need was not so much for training in social or occupational skills, as it
was a need for moral training (which may be attempted, as in Borstal or in
some approved schools, through work - but always in order to inculcate the
correct moral attitude)
In just the same period, large numbers of academic and political
commentators in the U • S . A. were pointing to the problems facing that society as
a result of the sudden and massive increase in the size of the youthful
population (the famous "baby boom" of the post-war period). (Cf. inter alia
Berger 1960, Goodman 1956, Keniston 1960). Widespread "conflict between the
generations" (including "delinquency", especially in gangs) was said to be
arising because the family, the school system and adult society generally,
were presented with "a magnitude of socialisation tasks" with which they could
not cope.
- 178 -
The notion of "a magnitude of socialisation tasks" belongs to a
demographer, Ryder, quoted by James Q. Wilson (1975). It was used by Ryder to
speak of the consequences of the increase in the numbers of the population
aged 14 to 24 in America from 24 millions in 1950 to 40 millions in 1970
in 1950 and still in 1960 the "invading army" (those
aged fourteen to twenty-four) were outnumbered three to
one by the size of the "defending" army (those aged twenty-
five to sixty-four ). By 1970 the ranks of the former had
grown so fast that they were only outnumbered two to one
by the latter, a state of affairs that had not existed
since 1910."
(Wilson, 1975, p.14)
For Wilson and other conservative theorists, of course, "socialisation"
is a one-directional process (from the adult generation to the youth); and it
is largely dependent on the successful transmission of tradtional values by
established authority. It is a project that is threatered, in a paradoxical
fashion, by any rapid growth in the youthful population, not only in increasing
the pressure of "work" for existing socialisation agencies, but also in allowing
the growth of rebelliousness towards existing values amongst those who were in-
completely or ineffectively socialised into them. So the population changes
feed into changes in moral values, which are in turn more significant, according
to Wilson, than unemployment patterns or changes in judicial policies in
determining the rate of crime (Ibid., p.232); and increases in crime are
indications, for Wilson, of a decline in values which needs to be reversed by
concerted conservative leadership (p.235).
No such straightforwardly demographic explanation of the pattern of
delinquency and crime in Britain could be sustained, as the age structure of
the British population has been remarkably unchanged since 1931. The baby bulge
of the immediate post-war years, (which peaked in 1947 at 440,000 births, as
against 295,000 in 1938) did result in the absolute numbers of the young (those
under 15) reaching a higher figure in 1964 than in 1901, when Britain had its
youngest" population in this century, but "as a proportion of the larger
pu1ation their position advanced only slowly". (Noble 1975, p.40). By 1971,
the proportjon of the British population aged 30 and under was only 45.7 per cent
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of the overall population, and it was a slightly declining proportion of a
pu1ation that was already beginning to 	 in a way that already disturbed
the economic analysts (concerned for the size of the "productive population")
and specialists in social welfare (anxious about the effects of such ageing on
the cost of pensions and related benefits to the State).
But from 1955 and onwards throughout the 1960's and early 1970's the
continuing rise in the official rates of juvenile delinquency, as well as the
increasing significance of juvenile delinquency within the Criminal Statistics
as a whole, provided evidence of the "magnitude of socialisation tasks"
confronting the treatment worker in the child care and juvenile justice system.
28,244 males aged 14 t 17 were convicted of indictable offences in England and
Wales in 1961 as against 13,517 in 1955; whilst the figures for 17 to 21
year olds rose from 11,269 in 1955 to 27,667 in 1961. Figure One, over the
page, shows that the rate of increase after 1956 was far in excess of the rate
of increase in the convictions recorded against the over -21 population. 8 Talk
of conflicts of values between the generations was given greater impetus by
the mass media, with its increasing use of "youth" as a topic through which to
discuss the rapid social changes occurring in the "age of affluence", especially
in the coverage given the Teddy Boy "cult" of 1953-5 and the race riots of
1958 and 1959. Then in 1960, the Home Office Research Unit published a
tailed statistical investigation, by Leslie Wilkins, entitled Delinquent
lacerations, which appeared to demonstrate that children born between 1935 and
1942 had indeed been more delinquent over the post-war period, to 1957, than
those born in any other seven years. Some qualifications were made: the increase
in the 1935-1942 cohort's delinquency could not account by itself for the increase
code1inuency and crime after 1955, and, even more crucially for the explanation
of the delinquent generation as a function of war-time experience, the finding
that youths aged between 17 and 21 in 1955 (and thus beyond their "formative
Years" during the period of the war) had been even more delinquent. (Wilkins,
1960, passim)
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Figures like these provided support for Wilkins' assertion that there
existed a generation whose lives had been affected, in a lasting way, by the
effect of "evacuation, and by other disturbances" of the war time period
(i1kins, 1960, p.1) . Along with other less quantitative commentaries, like
that by T.R. Fyvel (1961), Wilkins' report helped to reopen some of the areas of
discussion of child care, and the relation of family life to broader context of
social and economic formations, that had originally been formulated in the 1940's,
and the question of the character and effects of family breakdown, separation
and loss, was once again placed on the agenda for social policy thinkers.
But the Delinquent Generations report and other commentaries on the increasingly
problematic behaviour of youth after 1955 also provided support for Conservatives
who wanted to argue for delinquency resulting from some decline in proper
moral socialisation during the war and also from the questioning of Authority
that had characterised the early years of the post-war settlement.
Throughout this period Conservative positions were represented in social
rk agencies by residential workers, approved school headmasters and others,
who wanted to insist on the role of social work in providing moral leadership
for wayward youth, providing the matriarchal or patriarchal guidance that was
thought to be absent in the child's biological family. But postures of
this kind often became difficult in practice (as the riot at Canton House
Approved School in 1959 was to demonstrate), since one element in troublesome
behaviour of youth in the 1950 's was indeed the rejection of established
hierarchies of class and generation. Social work practice in the 1960's was
th follow the less overtly coercive practice of providing a "substitute family
setting' with a primary emphasis on emotional and physical care and on
'accepting" reltionaships for children and youth from problem families and/or
for other children referred to the agency. Professional liberalism was
institutionalised as a state apparatus which would cope with, "manage" and,
hopefully rehabilitate children and youth who were casualties of faulty
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socialisation in each emergent generation. "iehabilitation" was "in place"
as the dominant mode of social control, at least throughout the 1950 's and
into the early 1960's.
The large Conservative election victory of 1959 marked the high point
of consensus politics and also perhaps of consensual social and criminal
policy. It was - for example - the year of R.A. Butler's White Paper,
Crime in a Changing Society, the most succinct unambiguous statement of
"rehabilitative optimism" in the post-war period. But the period between
1959 and 1964, as we have said earlier, was characterised by increasing
dissensus, uncertainty, and a "taking stock". Just at the moment when
rehabilitative initiatives were being taken in probation and after-care,
in sentencing research and in experimental programmes in juvenile institutions,
so also were the assumptions on which these optimistic programmes were based,
being questioned. The official victory of rehabilitation (its adoption
as State policy) was accompanied by the widespread feeling that rehabilitative
policy was premissed on circumstances which were now undergoing fundamental
changes.
At a simple level, the changes were signalled to liberals in the fact
that the statistical prediction and techniques which had been developed by
Hermann Mannheim and Leslie Wilkins in the early 1950's, in order to anticipate
the outcome of borstal training by reference to simple facts about a young
offender's background (Mannheim and Wilkins, 1955) started to break down: the
same social and personal factors were no longer so successful in predicting
10
reconviction.
Reconviction rates as a whole (in juvenile and in adult treatment
programmes) - which began to be investigated by researchers interested in the
interaction of types of treatment with "different types of offender" - began to
escalate in the same period and even writers committed to the possibility of a
correctionalist utopia began to observe the absence of differences in results
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between different programmes. "Treatments" of different kinds, lengths and
sophistication had no sigriificaht difference on the resulting behaviour of
their clients, measured in terms of reconviction, and, in some instances, in
terms of the attitude of the "client offenders". (Cf. Hood and Sparks, 1970,
c.7). There was no clear explanation within official social democratic or
liberal circles for such developments, since, as we have indicated, the increase
in the level of intervention in the life of "disorganised communities" or
"problem delinquents" should have resulted in a decrease in delinquent
involvements, as clients came, through the aid they received, to realise the
benefits of citizenship. So, although optimism about treatment was prolonged by
various attempts to argue that existing techniques for measuring the effects
of treatment were too unsophisticated, many social-democratic academic
criminologists and liberal professionals increasingly came to accept, from the
late 1960's, that justification for the control of youth in terms of
rehabiliation and treatment was unfounded.
The paradox was that official conversations at the State level gave
evidence of the ideological ascendancy of professional liberalism, whilst
conversations elsewhere anticipated its demise. So the 'demise of rehabilitation
otpimismwas already opening out a space for the Right to articulate and
elaborate its anxieties and criticisms of an unqualified or unlimited embrace
of treatment as a preferable system of social control.
One year after the publication of Delinquent Generations, the
Conservative Political Centre published a pamphlet by David Price, M.P., as
a "personal contribution", to the discussion of Crime and Punishment. (Price, 1961)
In Price's comments, the activities of the delinquent generation are allowed
to continue on into 1959 ("the last year for which I have figures"), and the
delinquency and crime statistics for which they are seen to be responsible are
seen as symptom and product of a general decline in moral standards. The
explanation offered out by Price was in fact quite complex - as it has to be, in
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order to fulfil the function of using delinquency as a metaphor carrying
several different arguments. This metaphorical explanation operates, in
other words, at several different levels; and we shall recite the explanation
point by point in order to illustrate the metaphors by now at work in
*
Conservative ideology.
1. Parental authority has declined.
Children have no respect for their parents.
2. Parents are shirking their responsibility for bringing up
children as "decent" citizens.
3. Wives are spending too much time at work. "A mother's love
is more important to a child's welfare than a television
or a motor car".
4. Children are not being taught the differences between
Right and Wrong. "I wonder how many children know the
Ten Commandments".
5. The war broke up homes and divided families, and the
housing conditions did not help.
6. There is overcrowding in schools.
7. Television is "clearly another contributing cause".
"I refer to 'kitchen sink' dramas, to plays about violence
and 'near to the knuckle' features about sex. A
distinguished friend of mine has told me of three criminal
cases in which he appeared where crimes were precise
reproductions of crimes featured on television".
8. Easy money. "The overpayment of youths in factories makes
some of them think that money or property are there for
the picking. In this context, the general lack of respect
for hard work on the one hand and excessive materialism on
the other do not provide the best atmosphere in which to
persuade a youth to earn his living rather than to steal it."
Price's argument is a treasury of traditional and contemporary
conservative themes: an alleged decline in parental authority being linked to
a decline in the authority of "society" (existing social arrangements), an
attack onvrking women, an assertion of simple moral dichotomies, an emphasis
on traditional schooling and the importance of individualism, a dislike of mass
Except where there are quotation marks, this version is my own precis
of Price's pamphlet.
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culturemd permissiveness, and a fear of the brute physical prowess of the
lower class, all of this underpinned by the moral dangers involved in paying
labour too highly. All of these factors were to appear and re-appear in
different combinations (with omissions and additions) after the early 1960's,
as the threat to Authority was seen to worsen, and to occur in different places
in the body politic. So were the arguments developed by Price to account for
the rise in crime amongst adults, which results from
1. The urging on all sides to increase the standard of living,
giving rise to "greed and covetousness".
2. The fact the "property has lost much of its respectability, and
is half apologetic today, so that fiddling leads to pilfering
and pilfering to theft".
3. The encouragement of these tendencies by heavy taxation
"which prompts every artifice to avoid it".
4. The devices developed by many people during and after the
war to circumvent rationing, shortages and controls have
lowered their respect for the law and their moral standards.
5. There has been a period of rapid social and political change
undermining authority. "There was too much hypocrisy in
the old days, but the trend has gone too far. Unofficial
strikes are the most obvious example."
6. The decline in respect for the law has been "abetted by
antiquated regulations which no longer command the support
of public opinion."
7. The "irksome, but inevitable, regulations ... surrounding
the motorist undermines at least subconsciously many decent
people 's enthusiasm for upholding the law".
8. The "hard core of talented criminals" are now using modern
scientific devices for their felonious purposes. The police
are underequipped by comparison.
The organising assumption informing the ingenious criminology of David
Price is the threat to Authority, variously resulting from inefficient or
selfish parents, industrial and social change, affluence itself, reformist
sentimentality, and the intrusion of State control into the lives of decent
people themselves (motorits and businessmen) . The primary source of this threat
is made clear, earlier in the pamphlet, where Price is clear about "the fallen
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nature of man. What theologians call original sin. Some men are wrong 'uns.
They are bad through and through". The precipitating cause, however, was the
impact of Welfare State reconstruction and affluence on the political and
social controls that had previously kept the sinful in place, in unambitious
traditional working class neighbourhoods or in the discipline of the production
process itself. These controls had been weakened - in particular - by the
security given the worker economically (he has income to spare) and socially
(he has a safety net, in the Welfare State) . Alarm was sounded at the
possibility of a collapse in Authority, which could only be averted by an
increase in the size of the Police Force, a multiplication in the numbers of
Detention Centres, by a determination to protect the public from criminals,
and by the introduction of reparation systems for those who are nevertheless
victiniised in crime. A developing attack on the treatment worker ("there is a
danger in thinking of crime simply as a disease and punishment simply as a
cure. This is heresy, because it denies freewill") collapses into patriotic
sentiment ("A strong country can afford to redeem its criminals; a weak society
cannot") coupled with the cost-benefit-mindedness of the modern manager
('redemption is good economics. A reformed prisoner goes out into the world
and thereafter earlE his own way")
The reintroduction of corporal punishment, due for debate in the
Conservative Party's Annual Conference of that year, was nonetheless dismissed
on two grounds. Firstly, by reference to the opposition expressed in the
Report of the Advisory Council on the Treatment of Offenders of 1960
"In case you may think that the Council was composed of a
lot of 'wets' and 'softies', let me tell you who some
of the members of the council were. Their chairman was
one of Her Majesty's Judges. They include a holder of
the Victoria Cross, the Chief Officer of the City of
London Police, a recorder and a Chairman of Quarter
Sessions, a Metropolitan magistrate, some lay justice and
two Members of Parliament. Its members included a
criminologist, representatives of the Churches and of the
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medical profession. Four of its members were women.
It was in fact a very broadly based Council."
Broadly based this may have been to David Price, but hardly
representative even of the liberal-democratic consensus. This particular
consultation was with the various representatives of Authority. The Law, the
Military, the Police, the House of Commons, the Church, Doctors and an academic
eopert had considered, and rejected, the use of the cane as a means of coercing
the recalcitrant sections of the servant population.
A second reason for Conservatives to oppose corporal punishment was
that no other developed European country was using it in 1960. For England to
reintroduce it would "place us in the same category as Abyssinia or Saudi
arabia". Refomtst Conservatism was - and is - more sensitive to "international
views" than earlier, more confident, "real" Conservatism.
We have examined Price's pamphlet in some depth because it represents
a vigorous attempt to display an appropriate Conservative political diagnosis
of crime and delinquency, with a full use of metaphor, allusion and powerful
social imagery, as a critique of the dangers within the prevailing politics of
consensus. Most of the themes in this pamphlet occurred and re-occurred with
regularity in the later attacks upon "permissiveness" and upon the Welfare State,
in the 1960's and, especially, in the 1970's. But here the reference (for the
first time) was to the failure of the "delinquent generation" to internalise
the appropriate moral codes of deference and recognition of Authority.
conservatism, too, like liberalism and social-democracy, had articulated its
own justifications to support vigilant, pre-emptive and correctional interventions
by the State into civil society in order to defend the consensus from exterior
threat. The alliance of social worker and courts arid police continued to receive
support in such accounts (no fundamental attack on permissiveness or on the
Melfare State was being mounted here), but an emphasis on the protection of
established Authority and on the maintenance of social discipline was increasingly
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visible and important. Consensus politics and social policies were supported
for so long as they did not allow, or encourage, a challenge to the discipline
and authority of existing class forms.
3,5 The Youth Problem as a Metaphor
The characterisation of youth as a social problem was not merely the
result of "work" done by spokesmen for established political parties or by
representatives of the liberal professions or the law enforcement apparatus.
It was also achieved as a result of the work of the mass media, especially
during the so-called period of affluence. With an effectivity born of its
role as a form of information - provider and soothsayer for the adult working
class, the popular newspaper constructed an elaborate mythology about the
behaviour of youth, making sense of the resentments experienced by the older working
class at the easy life being experienced by the idle offspring of their own
generation. Anthony Smith and his co-authors examined this process in the
Daily Express and the Daily Mirror in this period and concluded that
"Youth was in both papers ... and perhaps in the whole
press of the period, a powerful but concealed metaphor
for social change: the compressed image of a society
which had crucially changed, in terms of basic life-
style and values - changed, in ways calculated to upset
the official political framework, but in ways not
yt calculable in traditional political terms."
(Smith et al, 1975)
In this section, we shall look briefly at this way of understanding the
significance of and its relationship to the emerging patterns of social control
of the "youth problem"; but we shall also want to pay attention to the
institution with perhaps the greatest (though least closely examined) significance
of all for the disciplining of working class youth - the labour market.
The analysis we presented in Chapter One of the anxiety over youth in
the 1940's does of course suggest that these anxieties may have performed a
"metaphorical" function in that period also, underlining both the benefits and
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the dangers in the programme of social reconstruction being attempted by the
Labour Government. The concern was, on the one hand, to celebrate the role of
youth as members of a family (preparing for full adult citizenship in the new
society) and, on the other, to point to the real social problems that could be
caused by youth who had been improperly socialized in broken families and/or
by falling into "bad company". This "bad company" could take the form of the
conventional gangster or the illicit capitalist operating in the black market.
So in the 1940's "youth" was a powerful "metaphor" which created a link in
popular consciousness between the problems of individual young people, and the
questions of "family", "community" and "social reconstruction".
Smith's interpretation of the preoccupation of the popular press with
youth during the 1960's as a metaphor for an adult generation's own concerns
could also have been applied without too much alteration to popular reaction to
youth in the 1840's and in the 1890's. In both these periods, the question of
troublesome youth and indeed of juvenile delinquency was of massive public
concern ( in popular newspapers and literature, arid in the activities of the
new police and the courts). (Gillis, 1974, cc.2,3). But the preoccupation
with youth could clearly be "read" then as an ideological displacement of
other more difficult problems (in the 1840's, widespread unemployment and
starvation, especially in the industrialising cities; and in the 1890's, the
rapid social changes resulting from the new wealth brought into Britain from
the empire). So the emergence of "moral panics" over youth is not exclusively
of the 1960's: it has happened in other historical periods.
It is clear, however, that there are periods in which the anxieties are
more heavily worked than others, and moments when the anxieties over social
change result in more intense official and unofficial reactions against
problematic youth than others. Stan Cohen put this eloquently in his now
classic study of the "social reaction" against the Mods and Rockers
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"The Mods and Rockers symbolized something far more
important than what they actually did. They touched
the delicate and ambivalent nerves through which post-
war social change in Britain was experienced.
No-one wanted depressions or austerity, but messages
about 'never having had it so good' were ambivalent
in that some people were having it too good and too
quickly .... Resentment and jealousy were easily
directed at the young, if only because of their
increased spending power and sexual freedom. When
this was combined with a too-open flouting of the work
and leisure ethic, with violence and vandalism, and
the (as yet) uncertain threats associated with drug-
taking, something more than the image of a peaceful
Bank Holiday at the sea being shattered."
(Cohen, 1972, p.192)
Cohen suggests that "ambiguity and strain!' was greatest at the beginning
of the Sixties. We have ourselves already indicated that there were indeed
major transformations in the political and economic order between 1959 and 1964,
in the transition from people 's capitalism to corporatism as the form of
the consensus. But there were also significant "youth movements" in the early
1950's, the "ignorantly blissful years" when the first fruits of the post-war
boom led the Economist to comment that "the miracle has happened ... full
employment without inflation" (Jefferson, 1973, p.9). It was in this period
(prior to the currency crises of the later 1950's) that the societal reactions
against youth helped to construct and to signify the Teddy Boy as a t'folk
devil". The fact that sections of working class youth were spending their
significantly increased wages on clothes (in order th create a generation style)
helped to throw into relief the lack of "style" - and indeed the relative lack
of increase in spending power - amongst adult members of the working class:
and the resulting resentments (felt by magistrates, police and by the mass of
working people) fuelled a process of labelling in which the wearing of
"Edwardian" dress was sufficient to signify a delinquent commitment.
(Rock and Cohen, 1970)
The moment of "1968" was also a crucial moment of strain in the relations
of adult and youth. Not only was this the year in which a generation of middle-
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class youth effectively dis-affiliated itself (in demonstrations, sit-ins and
other activities) from the politics of both social democracy and conservatism:
it was also the year of the emergence of the Skinhead as the archetypal youth
cultural figure within the working class. (Fowler, 1972) . "Societal reaction"
to the Skinheads (and to the middle class youth groups of the late 1960's)
was certainly both intense and anxiety-ridden, although the anxieties may
have "worked" differently at different locations in the class structure.
(Clarke, 1973)
For working class youth, the most telling "strain" has always been the
question of "getting a job", and the silence of criminologists, and other
conaaentators on youth, on the labour market for youth in the post war period
is evidence of the failure of existing ideological perspectives (especially
social democracy and liberalism) to penetrate beyond appearances. In this
respect, Simon Frith is right to chide the authors of the most well-known studies
of the Teddy Boys (Rock and Cohen, 1970) and the Mods and Rockers (Cohen, 1972)
for having concentrated (like the mass media they criticised) on the more
celebrated or visible aspects of working class youth (the "violence" or
"unruliness" of the behaviour of some) rather than penetrating to an analysis
of the changes in class and generational relations of which these behaviours
(Frith, 1978)
were an expression. Even the concern of the Birmingham Centre with mass media
discussion of youth as a metaphor, or with youth cultural "styles" (the Mod,
the Skinhead) as an attempt to syinbolise, or appropriate, a lost sense of
community, can be criticised for a failure to speak to more material changes
in the situation of working class youth. 11 These changes may be spoken
about in terms of the rather marginal demographic changes that were occurring
in the age structure of British society, but the changes in the size and
character of the juvenile labour market were much more consequential
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3.6 The Juvenile Labour Market 1950-68
A liberal American economist has recently observed that:
the failure of simple Keynesian policy in Europe
and the U.S.A. (in the 1970's) is forcing economists
and policy makers to take a closer look at the structural
problems that have commonly been omitted from consider-
ation in the conventional (or even monetarist) models
(There is a) need to examine the malfunctioning of
labour markets in greater institutional detail than
has here before been fashionable."
(Stein, 1976, p.xii)
One consequence of the optimism of the earlier post-way economists, in
other words, is an absence of good analysis on labour markets. A similar
silence exists in the work of sociologists, both in Europe and North America.
In Britain, until recently, the relative lack of serious analysis could
be justified, in part, by reference to the very low overall totals of
unemployment. Officially, the unemployment rates in Britain between 1948 and
1954 fluctuated, narrowly, between 1.2 and 1.4 per cent (Shonfield, 1959),
and Peter Oppenheimer, writing in 1970 on economic performance between 1951
and 1964, reflects the mood of satisfaction that was prevalent amongst
consensus economists in Britain on this score
"Britain's employment record, like that of other European
countries, has been excellent in the post-war period.
Registered unemployment averaged under 2 per cent of
the labour force in all but four of the thirteen years of
Tory rule and under 2.5 per cent in all but one, that one
being 1963 when the figure of 2 .6 per cent was due to
exceptionally bad weather in the first three months of the
year. These are very low totals."
(Oppenheimer, 1970, p.137)
Two observations have to be made about these "low totals" however.
Firstly, the satisfied talk of economists concerning "low rates of
unemployment" suppresses any examination of the changing role of women in the
labour market. In particular, it suppresses the extent to which women, who
had been enthusiastically recruited into the "official" labour market (into
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production) in the period between 1939 and 1943 (some 2,160,000 "extra"
workers aged between 14 and 59 (E. Wilson, 1977)), were increasingly subjected
to an ideological offensive to return to "the home". Women were heavily
discouraged from thinking of themselves as a reserve army of labour, from
registering for work and therefore from contributing to the overall rate of
official unemployment. So the talk of a "low rate of unemployment" is in part
a product of considerably ideological work expelling women from the waged
labour market. The	 which is also suppressed by talk of high rates of
unemployment and by the widely expressed notion that women did accede to the
ideological pressure to return to the home, is that the "participation rate"
of women in the labour market did increase throughout this period, but that
the increases were largely a reflection of women having to take on jobs with
very low rates of pay in the public sector or in private sectDr consumer
industries. No research that we know of deals with the effects of the
increasing occupancy by women of the roles of domestic and waged labour on
family relations generally or on parent-youth relations in particular, but it
would seem self-evident that the differentially-advantaged structural
positions of working women, their husbands, and their children vis-a-vis the
consumer markets must have been very significant in fuelling the sense of
resentment that was felt by many working class adults towards the activities
and behaviours of affluent "youth".
The "low rates of unemployment" spoken of by Oppenheimer also suppress
the question of the internal organic changes within the labour market itself
which were occurring in the period of the "boom". Chief among these
structural changes for our purposes were the structural changes in the
juvenile labour market.
The demand created in the economy by State intervention, expenditure
and planning percolated throughout the labour market and in the 1950' s, in
particular, helped to create a market for casual juvenile labour. Up until 1957,
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this market was largely composed of young men who were about to undertake
their National Service or who had just completed it. "Periodic unemployment"
was, therefore, quite common at a certain level in the class structure, and
at this level being "employed" might mean being employed for short periods in
casual, unstable, and unskilled temporary jobs. The "low" overall rates of
unemployment in the period 1945 to 1964 are in part explained, in other words,
by the existence of this market for casual labour, a market at the margins
of the "full time" labour market. The relationship between the existence of
this casual labour market for youth and the changes in youthful behaviour in
the 1950's and 1960's has been altogether ignored by commentators of the
social-democratic Left and Right, in part because of the uncritical acceptance
of the period as being one of (relatively) full employment and (therefore) a
relatively uncontradictory labour market.
The development has in fact been more closely examined by Marxists
working in the U.S., in part because the State has always "run" a higher rate
of unemployment in that country. In an outstanding article of 1969, Pmtree
and Rowntree showédhow this unemployment was concentrated throughout the 1950's
and 1960's amongst youth and how the unemployment figures for youth would
have been much higher had it not been for the rapid expansion of the education
system and the military. Between 1950 and 1965, there was an increase of
3.68 million in enrolment in schools and universities (such that the new
entrants to the over-24 population must have spent the equivalent of 20.2 years
in school and college) and an increase of 960,000 enro1mnts in the armed
forces, figures that were increased during the last years of the Vietnam War.
(Rowntree and Rowntree 1969, p.11). The overall impact on the pattern of
labour for young people was considerable
"In 1950, only about 22.8 per cent of all men between the ages of
20 and 24 years were either in the armed forces or in schools;
in 1965 the figure was 40 per cent ... (another 4.5 per cent of
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20-24 years were unemployed) ... for men 18 to 24 years
old, the data are more impressive; of these 52.1 per cent
or more than half, were in school (or college), the military
or unemployed .... The figures for young women follow
the same pattern: in 1950, 24.3 per cent of women aged
18 and 19 and 4.5 per cent of women aged 20 to 24 were in
school (or college): by 1965 the figures had increased to
37.7 per cent and 11.8 per cent respectively."
(ibid. p.16)
In the United States, in other words, during the high point of the
post-war boom, "if (the youth) ventured outside army or school they met
sesiploynent rates two to five times the average". (Ibid.)
The Rowntrees' analysis puts a rather different light on the significance
of the distinction so commonly made by American criminological writers at
the time, between "college boys" and "corner boys".
Harry Braverman's analysis of American capitalism in this period locates
the source of the massive declines in employment in U.S. in the accelerating
automation and oligopolisation of the large American and multi-national
corporation. But Braverman is also able to show that the automation process
was helping to "deskill" a vast proportion of the labour force (since machines
could do the work), whilst simultaneously expanding the consumer sector of
cepitalism (24 hour supermarkets, garages, etc., etc.) within which this
deskilled young working class had to struggle for employment. The parlous
Situation of American youth in the labour market was no accident: it was a
lawlike and necessary feature of changes in the system of production, that is
"... as capital moves into new fields in search of
profitable investment, the laws of capital accumulation
in the older fields operate to bring into existence the
'labour force' required by capital in its new
incarnations."
(Braverman, 1974, p.382)
This "labour force" is, indeed, the "reserve army of labour" that is
spoken of by Marxist economists and social theorists, and as Braverman observes,
writing primarily (but clearly not exclusively) of the United States
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"This ... surplus population, the industrial reserve army,
takes a variety of forms in modern society, including
the unemployed; the sporadically employed; the part-time
employed; the mass of women who, as houseworkers, form a
reserve for the 'female occupations'; the armies of migrant
labor, both agricultural and industrial, the black population
with its extraordinarily high rate of unemployment, and
the foreign reserves of labour."
(Braverman, op. cit. p.386)
The reconstruction of the British economy during "the boom" also
generated an attack on what had become, in terms of international competitiveness,
the "backward sectors of the economy", particularly in order to introduce
the benefits of technology. Phil Cohen has put this succinctly
"Craft industries, and small scale production in general,
were the first to suffer; automated techniques replaced
the traditional hand skills and their simple division of
labour. Similarly the economies of scale provided for by
the concentration of craft resources meant that the small
scale family business was no longer a viable unit. Despite
a long rearguard action many of the traditional industries
and ... many of the service and distributive trades
rapidly declined or were bought out .... There was a
gradual polarisation in the structure of the labour force
on the one side the highly specialised, skilled and well-
paid jobs associated with the new technology, and the
high growth sectors that employed them on the other the
routine, dead end, low paid and unskilled jobs associated
with the labour intensive sectors, especially the service
sectors."
(P. Cohen, 1972, p.18)
Speaking specifically of the East End of London, with an analysis that
could be applied directly to the North East and North West of England, South
Iqales, Ulster and the Lowlands of Scotland, Cohen continues
"As might be expected, it was the young people just out of
school, who got the worst of the deal. Lacking openings in
their father's trades, and lacking the qualifications for
the new industries, they were relegated to the jobs as vanboys,
office boys, packers, warehousemen etc. and long spells out
of work. More and more people, young and old, had to travel
out of the community to their jobs, and some eventually moved
out to live elsewhere, where suitable work was to be found."
(Ibid.)
One result of this process was the accentuation of the division that
had always existed between the stable, "respectable" sections of the working
class and what has variously and loosely been labelled the "disorganised",
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rough" or "lumpen-proletarian" sections of the class. Specifically, the
process helped to generate an "upward option" for some sectors of the
working class, and particularly for youth, who were successful in obtaining
apprenticeships in the new technologically-based industries, as well as those
who were able to move into one of the increasing number of "office jobs" that
were generated in the large industries, and in the associated expansion of
local authority employment. The process also helped to re-define (and yet
also to disguise) a set of occupations, less rewarding and reserved for the
unqualified school-leaver in particular, a "downward" option that was
available for some of the age of 14 (compulsory school-leaving age was not
raised to 15 until 1956, and to 16 until 1972)
The changes in productive relations in the labour market were, of course,
nirrored ly. quite massive changes in the structure of working-class housing
patterns and neighbourhoods. According to Clarke, Hall, Jefferson and
Roberts (1975) reflecting on the earlier work by Phil Cohen
"The impact of (this) post-war redevelopment on traditional
working-class neighbourhoods seems ... to go through three
broad phases. First, the break-up of traditional housing
patterns by post-war re-housing; the new housing estates and
new towns. The areas left behind decay; they drift downwards
towards the 'urban ghetto' or 'new slum' pattern, the prey
of rack-renting, speculative landlordism and multiple occupation,
the drift towards immigrant labour highlights and compounds
the ghettoising process. Then some parts of the ghettoes are
selectively redeveloped, through the combination of planning
and speculative property development. The entry of middle-class
families 'up-classes' certain neighbourhoods and 'planned
development' (the East End scheme is ... a classic instance
here) redefines the area towards this more 'upgraded', middle-
income pattern of life."
(Clarke,et al, 1975, p.36)
Rod they emphasise
these are not simply forces working abstractly on
an area. They graphically reconstruct the real material
and social conditions in which working people live."
(Ibid., p.37)
The accelerated entry of an immigrant population into Britain in the
1960's and into ghettoised housing areas, were developments that were generated
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by the economic logic operative at that time. That logic was creating an
upward option for a certain section of the labour force, and also rehousing
that section of the class in estates (and, particularly, in New Towns near to
and around the new industrial concentrations), whilst also generating an
increasing demand for casual and service employment (and also for workers in
the declining industries like textiles at a low rate of pay) that was not being
reliably answered in a. situation of full employment of "the class". The pool
of labour was enlarged, especially after 1955, (and before the Commonwealth
Immigration Act of 1962) by the active recruitment of Asians and West Indians
by large British firms (in the textile industry of West Yorkshire; and the
heavy industries of the West Midlands, in particular) as well as by those
who were moving to Britain for higher wages than would have been available
in the ex-colonies. This new reserve army of labour was allowed housing
space only in the areas vacated by the sections of the working class who had
been re-housed, or who had left the inner city in order to pursue an upward
option. In Birmingham, for example, in]965, the West Indian and Asian
population was concentrated almost entirely in three or four of the 81 square
miles of the city (Rose 1965) in what Rex and Moore came to call the
"twilight zones" of Sparkbrook and Eandsworth.' 2
 (Rex and Moore, 1967). It was
these areas that came to be the most heavily policed neighbourhoods in Britain
in the 1960's and 1970's (Lambert 1970), and which also became the areas in
mst urban centres most heavily inhabited by downwardly-mobile individual
members of the unemployed and semi-employed population.
Even before the recent development of high official rates of
unemployment, therefore, the logic of the labour market was generating very
different problems of policing and social control at different levels of the
British class structure. The police have always had more trouble trying to
control male youth caught in the interface of the unskilled labour market
und the "dole" than with any other section of society. So also have teachers
- 198 -
in "rough" schools had more difficulty with children who are about to leave
to one of these two destinations.
Until recently, the policing and teaching of working class girls tended
to be less problematic, even though the destiny of this fraction of society
was even more structurally inevitable. Only 17.2 per cent of girls entering
eaployment in 1974 entered employment with "planned training", with a further
1.77 per cent entering employment "leading to recognised professional
qualifications" (a very large proportion of which were in nursing) and 6.5
per cent taking an apprenticeship (7.75 per cent of which were in hairdressing).
The rest of the girls entering employment went into clerical work (40.5 per cent,
just under half of which was in "insurance, banking, finance and business
services"), and "other employment" (34.0 per cent, half of whom were in the
"distributive trades"). (Department of Employment (1975) quoted in Frith,
1978, p.29). Few changes have been noticeable in these overall figures since
1964, except for a slight increase in work with planned training. Very large
proportions of girls are excluded from training and from skilled jobs and
careers, and are presented with a choice between unskilled labour and marriage.
Partly as a means of "making sense" of this inevitable fate, however, a
working class "culture of femininity" has arisen which has the literal effect
of domesticati the aspirations of working class girls, and restricting their
activities to the maternal home and their own reproduction of it, through
(McRobbie, 1978)
marriage. The disciplining of working class women has in other words been
more dependent historically on class culture itself (and especially its
patriarchal form) than on the activities of the State police forces and the
discipline of the labour market.
We would argue, therefore, that the "material basis" of all aspects of
working class life in the 1950's and 1960's was the labour market and the
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differential effects that changes in the labour market were having on the
character of life for working class boys and girls. Several important changes
were occurring in the labour market as a whole (including the emergence of a
set of "white-collar" occupations to which many working people aspired), but
the most fundamental logic was the opening out of an "upward option" of
skilled occupations (and associated opportunities for mobility in the housing
iriarket) and a "downward" option of casual, unskilled and insecure jobs (with
their own associated housing markets in council estates, high rise blocks,
and inner city ghettoes). The image of "full employment" in the 1950's and
1960's orthodox political economy disguises, and fails to probleinatize, this
process of bifurcation, and, in particular, the continual reproduction in
Britain, in the "age of affluence", of an unskilled, untrained, and massively
alienated underclass of adolescents.
The initial bifurcation of "options" in the labour and housing markets
in the 1950's and 1960's for working class youth has had several other
consequences within the class, particularly in "unsettling ... the precise
position and role of the working-class family within a defensive class culture".
(Clarke et al 1975, p.37) . The relation of the youthful generation of males to
the parental generation became increasingly dislocated, firstly, in terms of
the 'traditional" relationship of the father and son (revolving around the
father's preparation of the son for the workplace) and, secondly, in terms
of the mother's role in providing support for, and devising some form of
psychic reward from the son ' s success. The family' s relation to adolescent
girls was dislocated by the structural changes in the labour market, but
possibly not to the same degree
"Though girls participated in the general rise in the
disposable income available to youth in the 1950 's,
girls' wages were, relatively, not so high as boys.
More important, patterns of spending would have been
powerfully structured in a different direction for
girls from that of boys. The working class girl,
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though temporarily at work, remained more focussed on
home, mum and marriage, than her brother or his male
peers."	 13(McRobbieand. Garber, 1975, pp.212-213)
For adolescent boys, as we have said, the structural changes in the
post-war economy involved a process of dislocation which was economic (and
therefore material, in Simon Frith's sense of that word) but nonetheless
"lived" at the cultural level. Phil Cohen has pointed to the effects of this
dislocation at the level of "community" institutions in working class neighbour-
hoods, in the decline of the corner shop, the pub and the working men's clubs
as centres of sociability and, more recently, he has pointed to effects of
the dislocation in creating problems for defining membership of "the community"
and in unhinging "more rudimentary forms of social closure", in particular,
the oral and fighting traditions of working class. One of the more important
of these in London was the local boxing culture, "a form of "hardness"
(that Was) anchored in street-fighting tradition", a form of cultural
apprenticeship into which the hard men and boys of an era were seduced and
socialised. The break-up of the local communities (of Notting Hill, Bethnal
Green and South London) in the post war period, however
"saw not just the decline of local boxing traditions, but
subcultures whose style and idioms constituted a nonpiace
realm of identity for massive sections of working class
youth (ie. teds, mods, rockers, skiiiheads arid greasers).
This meant that for the first time fighting techniques
Were no longer regulated, and transmitted through the
parent culture, but directly through the peer groupings
of youth".
(Robins and Cohen, 1978, p.93)
This "de-regulation" of local working class culture has been most
"visible" during the various moments of "moral panic" that have occurred amongst
social control agencies and the media over the adoption of particular styles
and particular subcultural forms of activity during the post war period. But
the attention given to the form and the style of particular youth subcultures
(in the media and in sociological and political reaction to these movements")
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has tended to suppress the extent to which these cultural forms and styles
were an expression of the material dislocations in working class job markets
and neighbourhood life which were occurring. The sociological focus on the
"subcultures" and the popular talk of "gangs" and "the delinquent generation"
has been in itself, we would argue, a metaphorical (and essential liberal)
way of displacing examination of the continuing reproduction of an underclass.
3.7 Three Moments of Moral Panic
We want to illustrate this argument by reference to some of the existing
sociological writing on post-war youth subcultures. Our concerns here are
twofold. We want to use this literature as a way of recalling the particular
"moments" in which the "youth problem" surfaced in popular and political debate,
and as a way of identifying the anxieties which were generated, and th
momentarily qualmed, by the activation of "social control". The ethnographic,
historical content of this literature gives us a sense, in other words, of the
material circumstances which were reworked in (conservative, social-democratic
and liberal) ideology.
But we also want to use this literature as a means of anticipation
and locating the marked shift in the character of "social reaction" to youth
after 1970, which will be a part of our concern in Chapter Five. Again, we
entirely accept the judgement of the Birmingham group that significant
changes occurred in the form of moral panics during the 1960's, in particular,
and that the "discrete moral panic" of the kind that occurred in the case of
the Mods and Rockers (where a dramatic event was followed by public disquiet,
some moral entrepreneurial activity and action by the control culture) was
gradually superseded by "law and order campaigns", where the sequence of events
was speeded-up and altered (with "the public" being sensitised in advance
to the possibility of dramatic events - like mugging- which would require a
firm response on the part of the agencies of social control) (cf. Clarke,
Hall, Jefferson, Roberts, 1978, pp.75-76). We want to try to understand the
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Rock and Cohen fail to give a detailed account of the economic and
social relations within which the rise and fall of the Teddy Boy occurred.
Tony Jefferson's observations on the styles adopted by the Ted give us a
clue to the class and the "conjurictural" significance of the Teds.
" ... if one examines the context from which the cultural
symbol was probably extracted - then the adoption (for
example) of the bootlace tie begins to acquire social
meaning. Probably picked up from the many American Western
films viewed during this period when it was worn ... by the
slick city gambler whose social status was grudgingly high
because of his ability to live by his wits and outside the
traditional working class mores of society ... the symbolic
cultural meaning (of the ties) ... (was) its expression
both of their social reality (basically outsiders and forced
to live by their wits) and their social 'aspirations'
(... to live smartly, hedonistically and by their wits) ."
(Jefferson, 1975, p.86)
According to this view, the Teds were the first of the post-war working
class youth subcultures to "explore" the downward option; and their dress was
an attempt to mark themselves off - to establish a generational identity
within the class as well as a "rough" working class identity within the
generation. Another expression of this was what Jefferson calls the "extreme
touchiness" of the Teds to "insults real or imagined" (Ibid., p.82). He
notes that the first Teddy Boy killing, the Clapham Common murder of 1953,
was the result of the taunting of a Ted by other youths.
The use of violence by Teddy Boys was often directed at ethnic outsiders,
particularly at Cypriot cafe proprietors, and, notably in the Notting Hill and
Nottingham riots, at blacks. In what is now a familiar paranoid reaction, the
luinpen youth of early 1950's were inclined to interpret the restriction on
their opportunities (relative to others) in terms of the influx of West Indian
migrants and Cypriots (who were particularly resented for their ownership of
cafes - of major significance institutionally in 1950's youth culture). A
widespread myth amongst luiupen youth and adults (especially the Teds) in the
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1950's was that "the coloured immigrants (were) either pimps, landlords or
on the rackets", (Ibid, p.83), a view that had violent repercussions in the
riots of 1958. Jefferson observes that the fact that
"ilarge numbers of working class adults responded in the
way they did, by joining in, demonstrates that it was
not only the young 'lumpen' who were experiencing a
worsening of their socioeconomic position."
(Ibid, p.83) (my emphasis)
The fact that the majority of arrests were of youth and that the courts
handed down their exemplary sentences on nine unskilled working class (male)
adolescents, was in part a reflection of police practice in riot situations.
But the treatment of these sentences in the press at the time is evidence of
the extent to which the youth question was already firmly established (as a
result of ideological work amongst social democrats and Conservatives) as a
question of "delinquency", resulting from individual pathologies or individual
malice, and decidedly not from the structural contradictions of a reformed
people's capitalism. The Notting Hill and the Nottingham riots were not to be
the last "race riot" in Britain in which the question of the origins and
significance of racism was submerged beneath ite view of authoritative figures
(in the judiciary and the police) that "fighting in the street" is an activity,
y definition, of delinquents.
But the Teddy Boy's decline cannot be seen as a result of the intensity
of the sentences handed down in the London courts in 1958 (the Notting Hill
events occurred in the very last months of a youth subcultural style). The
decline must be seen to have resulted from the aging of the Teddy Boy
generation (and thus, in part, from the disciplines of the workplace and the
"softer" but no less potentially effective controls, of "family responsibility").
But more significantly the Teddy Boy's "exploration" of the lumpen option was
increasingly irrelevant. After three years of balance of payments crises and
restrictive budgets, the economy was moving into "boom" again. In 1956, the
school-leaving age was raised to 15, and whilst this had the effect of delaying
- 205 -
the entry of some 267,000 young people into employment for a year, it helped
to contribute to the expansion of the job and financial aspirations of the
youthful generations in school at the time. In 1957, National Service was
ended, and a reduction in the size of the armed forces undertaken, from
7,000 in 1957 to 400,000 in 1962 (Skideisky 1970); and, as Conservative
coimentators since have consistently deplored, this did result in an expansion
of the horizons of youth culture in the working and the middle classes.15
One effect of the abolition of National Service was undoubtedly, to weaken
the appeal of "discipline" and traditional forms of class hierarchy within
the working class. It also "freed" working class youth to move directly into
the expanding labour markets in order to participate in the "consumer
revolution" that was being encouraged by the Conservative Government.
Stuart Hall caught the mood of this "exploration" in a lengthy review
of the work of Mark rth rams, Cohn Maclnnes and others on "The secondary modern
generation", written in 1959
"The outlines of the Secondary Modern Generation in the 1960's
are beginning to form. The Teddy Boy era is playing itself
out. The L.P., Hi-Fi generation is on the way in. The butcher-
boy jeans, velvet lapel coats and three-inch crepes are considered
coarse and tasteless. They exist - but they no longer set the
'tone'. 'Teds' are almost square. Here are the very smart,
sophisticated young men and women of the metropolitan jazz club,
the Flamingo Club devotees ... Suits are dark, sober and casual-
formal, severely cut and narrow on the Italian pattern. Hair
cute are 'modern' - a brisk, flat-topped French version of the
now juvenile American crew-cut. .. The girls are short-skirted,
sleekly groomed, pin pointed on stiletto heels, with set hair
and Paris-boutique dead-pan make up and mascara
A fast-talking, smooth running, hustling generation, with an
ad-lib gift of the gab, quick sensitiviiies and responses, arid an
acquired taste on for the Modern Jazz Quartet. They are the
'prosperity' boys - not in the sense that they have a fortune
stashed but in that they are familiar with the in-and-out flow
of money ... They have the spending habit
Their attitude to adults is less resentful than scornful.
Adults are simply 'square'. Mugs. They are not 'with it'.
They don't know 'how the wind blows'. School has passed through
this generation like a dose of salts - but they are by no means
intellectually backward. They are, in fact, sharp and self
inclined. Office boys - even van boys - by day, they are record
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sleeve boys by night. They relish a spontaneous giggle,
or a sudden midnight trip to Southend, they are capable of
a certain cool violence. The 'Teds' are their alter-ego."
(Hall, 1959, p.23) (my emphasis)
In the conclusion of this series of impressions, Hall gives a clear
sense of the possible relation between the appearance of a certain kind of
affluence in working class youth culture and the rise in delinquency rates
after 1955. The exploration of Harold Macmillan's consumer revolution
contained both a progressi1e element resulting from the "liberation" it
generated from some of the traditional restrictions of a class society, and
a cynical element also (a sense of being offered a fraudulent alternative).
Hall puts it in these terms
"They despise 'the masses' (the evening-paper lot on the tubes
in the evening), 'traditionals' 'cops' (cowboys) 'peasants'
and 'boheinians' .... Their experiences are, primarily, personal,
urban and sensational: sensational in the sense that the test
of a beatitude is being &le to get so close you feel 'you are
part of the act, the scene'. They know that the teenage market
is a racket, but they are subtiely adjusted to it nonetheless.
They stand at the end of the Teddy Boy era of the Welfare State.
They could be the first generation of the Common Market."
(Ibid) 1959b.
The delinquencies and violence of the secondary modern generation did not
take unfamiliar forms behaviourally. Rock and Cohen in analysing incidents
in 1958 and 1959 speak of a few "gang fights" and some attacks on solitary
strangers, but also emphasise a decline of the mass street fights of the
Teddy Boys, and speak of delinquent behaviour in this period as having a
"corrupted formalism" (Rock and Cohen, 1970, p.313). Even as such, however,
they were the object of an increasingly anxious social reaction. The "scornful"
attitude of the secondary modern generation to "adults" was reciprocated, with
the addition of a resentment at the new found affluence and comforts of the
undeser.7ing young ( who had not earnt their rewards). Resentment of a slightly
different order was fuelled in social democratic circles by the "disdainful"
and "ungrateful" attitudes that were generated towards the effects of the
e1fare state (Fyvel, 1961, cc.9,10). There were of course several critiques
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of the adequacy of the welfare state from a more thoroughgoing socialist
perspective, and also occasional pieces attempting to link behaviours and
values of youth to the inadequacies of the welfare state form rather than
to the inadequacies of the youth themselves. An American socialist writing
on "British Youth Today", in 1957, observed that
"the idealism of the early days of the experiment has been drowned
in its long-run operation. British socialism stopped short of
expectations; a transformation of society did not take place.
Class privilege and barriers are as high as ever, and nothing
close to freedom of opportunity exists. Socialists do not feel
a part of the experiment of the welfare state, and for them
socialism does not exist today.
What does exist is the welfare state, conceived and operating
under a concept of charity, and the payment for this charity is
high. A factory worker earning ten pounds a week (below the
average for the country) pays 15 per cent of his wage for income
tax and national health and pension plans. A young person who
comes in contact with the welfare state finds it impersonal,
bureaucratic and monolithic. It presents a drab face and a dull
routine."
(Winterhoff, 1957, p.25)
But these critiques of the welfare state and of the "hidden side" of
"affluence" from a socialist perspective were articulated before their time.
Youthful. behaviour was largely understood to be a product of the ingratitude
or simply the malsocialisation of the youth themselves. The ethnocentric
perspectives of both conservative and social democratic politicians were also
aggravated by the rapid embrace by the secondary modern generation of the
artifacts of American youth culture (Ibid, c.12). A series of panics over the
"corrupting influences" involved in this opening out to North America developed
(as they did, also, in public political discussions of changes that were
alleged to be occurring in the typical English murder)
	 In November 1954,
in the debates on the Queen's Speech for the 1954-5 Parliamentary Session,
Dr. Horace King, the Labour 1.P. for Southampton, West, regretted that
"the Gracious Speech contains no proposals to make the so-called
American comic illegal. Public opinion has changed on this
question somewhat since we debated the matter in the House just
over two years ago, in August 1952. At that time, there was a
tendency to regard critics of the American comic as puritans and
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spoilsports who had forgotten that they were children
themselves, or, as is sometimes the case, Communists merely
indulging in anti-Americanism. Public opinion has changed.
The work of voluntary societies, the teachers' unions, a
conference of educational associations, the annual conference
of the British Federation of Psychologists, the ISPCA, and
the National Federation of Women's Institutes have all gone
on record against this kind of influence. Parents,
magistrates and educational authorities all share in and
voice the need for protecting our children."
(Parliamentary Papers (Commons) (Hansard) Vol.535
(1954-5) Col.74)
Several, examples were given by King of the "repulsive" contents of the
comic, including references not only to violence but to "the words"
("Friendship is for suckers, Loyalty, that's for "jerks") and the work of
Frederic Wertham, an American psychologist, was quoted to suggest that the
comics were "retooling democracy for illiteracy". They did so, for King, via
a combination of "subliminal Fascism" and straightforward "commercialism".
"It may be that television, the film and the comic strip will
win in the long run, and that mankind, which is just on the
march towards literacy, may be allowed to slip back into a
state in which there are more illiterates than literates.
This conjures up for those of us who believe in social democracy
a nre fearsome picture even than the horror comic itself,
with comic strip election addresses and Frankenstein or
fascist legislation and legislators ... Short cuts to a
superficial acquaintance with culture, knowledge, humour or
art will always be tempting. The technical resources of an
unchecked commercial culture may very easily debase human
standards."
(Ibid, Col.76)
Social democracy's defence of "human standards", here, is directed against
the alliance of illiteracy and commercialism; no attempt is made to speak
of the appeal of a commercial culture ( or "low culture" generally) to working
people in general. So social democracy here locates itself in a moralistic
defence of "standards" just at the moment that youthful sections of the class turned
for self-expression and for an entertainment they found relevant to their own
lives to the styles encouraged by the "mass" cultures constructed by American
commerce. But the particular forms of style and activity adopted (from rock
and roll dancing to hanging around the cafe) were reflections not of the content
of mass culture itself, but of the way in which these artifacts of mass culture
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(like the Teddy Boy tie) were appropriated within the class. The way in which
the "secondary modern generation", for example, responded to mass culture
was very different from the way in which the exploration of the "downward option'1
inby the Teddy Boys had occurred. This particular youthful generation
later softened into what Ray Gosling termed the Dream Boy generation, at the
height of the period of "people' s capitalism". They were the fraction of
working class youth which in the early 1960's preferred the 4ersey Beat of
Freddy and the Dreamers and Cilla Black to the Rolling Stones. They comprised,
oa the one hand, the "ordinary" boy, who watched football with Dad, listened to
records and went to youth club dances, or the "ordinary" girl whose psychic
world was described in weekly "boy meets girl" magazines like Mirabelle and
tsrilyn (and later, Jackie, and 19). That we do not speak of this group
nuch here and that they were not spoken of in detail in earlier accounts is
evidence of the fact that they were one of the most successfully "policed"
of post-war youthful generations. They were successfully "policed" ,in part, by
the upwardly mobile faniily,but also in part by the fact of the prospect of
entry into the "respectable jobs" that were the creation of the "people's
capitalism" of the 1950's, and the associated prospect of being able to
participate themselves, as full citizens,in the consumer revolution.
The promise of mass culture and mass produced consumer goods was riot
just of some release from earlier austerity: it suggested the possibility of
using the artifacts of such culture to symbolise personal success or to
solise one's generational identity. It is some indication of the
increasing distance of Labour politicians from their class that they could not
recognise the significance of mass culture for the class, responding to
these changes with a defence of "the standards" of High Culture rather
than via any appreciation of the cultural changes occurring, especially within
Youthful sections of the class. These cultural changes were above all a
product of the increasing possibilities and attractions of "affluence"for the
new cohorts of adolescents in the class.
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3.7 (b)
	
The Mods and Rockers: 1964-6
Politicians were not alone in their failure to "sight" such major
changes in the relationship of adult and youthful sections of the class.
For Stan Cohen, the emergence of the bike boys at Clacton in Easter 1964
(the "initial deviation") was largely to be explained as a matter of climate
and the general boredom that ensued
"Easter 1965 was worse than usual. It was cold and wet, and
in fact Easter Sunday was the coldest for eighty years. The
shopkeepers and stall owners were irritated by the lack of
business and the young people had their own boredom and
irritation fanned by rumours of cafe owners and barmen refusing
to serve some of them. A few groups started scuffling on the
pavements and throwing stones at each other. The Mods and
Rockers factions ... started separating out. Those on bikes
and scooters roared up and down, windows were broken, some
beach huts were wrecked and one boy fired a starting pistol
in the air. The vast number of people crowding into the street,
the noise, everyone's general irritation and the actions of
an unprepared and undermanned police force had the effectc
making the two days unpleasant, oppressive and sometimes
frightening
(Cohen, 1972, p.29)
Stan Cohen does not say much on the question of origins, in part,
because for him, any "original" division between the two youth groups was only
a "division initially based on clothing and life styles (which was later to
become) rigidified" (Cohen, 1972, p.29) primarily by a process of "spurious"
social reaction. His main concern was to explain the importance of the
"unorganised" and intensive reactions that occurred, especially in the national
press, and the way in which these reactions provided a basis on which those who
had been exposed to the events he describes interpreted (and re-interpreted)
their experience, as well as providing an "inventory" for use in understanding
any similar events that might occur in the future. This inventory was put to
use in the press some four weeks later, during Whitsun 1964, in order to explain
the situations which occurred on the seafronts at Bournemouth, Brighton and
Margate, when almost the only people on the beaches (on another cold Bank Holiday
weekend) were the bike boys, and the incidents that did occur tended to result
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in arrest and/or considerable "over-reporting" from the expectant reporters
who were on hand from the national press. Much of the activity in 1964, and
in the following two years, centred around motorbike races on the relatively
empty streets, and (in the classic Teddy Boy tradition) the attempt to
monopolise the largely empty cafes. It is quite clear that the inventory
adopted in the press considerably exaggerated and distorted what happened in
these seaside incidents, arid also that the imagery had a life of its own.
Headlines appeared in Whitsun 1964 concerning a "Mod Dead in Sea", for example,
when the death of the youth in question (a hiker) from a cliff outside Brighton
had nothing to do with the disturbances, and when public attention was focussed
again on East Anglian resorts in 1966, The East Anglian Daily Times headed a
report on a play attended by a group of long-haired youths with the headline
'Pears when Ton-up Boys Walked in Groundless" (30 May 1966). The initial
deviations of the groups of young people at Clacton on Easter Monday 1964
"receded" more and more into the background, as society's "moral guardians",
in the media and the magistrates l courts, produced and re-produced accounts
of the excesses of an over-paid, and under-controlled, generation of welfare
state youth (accounts which in some cases were entirely "spurious").
A telling aspect of the press reportage was the emphasis placed on the
allegedly affluent character of the youth involved in the troubles of 1964 to
1966: the most famous example being of a boy who told the magistrates in
Margate that he would pay the £75 fine imposed on him by cheque. At the same
time, according to Stan Cohen, there was an attempt in one paper to argue that
the young people involved were from all social classes, thus entirely
disconnecting the youth question from the question of class. And most of the
accounts were organised in terms of the division of the motor bike and scooter
riders into the "Mods" and "Rockers" polarity.
According to Cohen, and also according to the nostalgic exploration
of the 1964-66 incidents by Franc Roddam in the movie, Quadrophenia, released
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in 1979, all these themes were false. The youth who was offering to pay his
fine by cheque did so out of bravado (and had never written a cheque in his
life); and the average pay of a sample of those arrested at Margate in 1964
(investigated by New Society writers) was £11 a week. From the same sample,
"and from court reports and observation, it is fairly clear that "the typical
Rocker was an unskilled manual worker (and) the typical Mod a semi-skilled
manual worker. All but two had left school at fifteen". (Cohen, 1972, p.35).
And again, according to Cohen, the creation of the Mods and Rockers dimension
was spurious in part because initially (at Clacton, in 1964) "the rivalry
between .... those from London ... and other locals and youths from the
surrounding counties was a much more significant dimension" (Ibid, p.34) and
also because the majority of young people present "at the resorts during the
holiday periods came down by train or coach or hitched. The motor-bike or
Scooter-owners were always a minority ... " (Ibid, p.35). But spurious or
not, the Mods and Rockers were "created" and established as "folk devils",
and in the midst of the moral panic "magistrates handed down heavy fines and
detention centre sentences, as well as using the device of remanding in custody"
"as a form of extra-legal punishment". (Observer editorial, 25 April 1965,
quoted in Cohen, 1972, p.103).
Stan Cohen is concerned continually to emphasise the spurious content
of the social and legal reaction to the different bike-groups involved in the
"1tds and Rockers" incidents, and he is right to do so. But, for us, the
really important accomplishment of the reaction, especially in the mass media's
concentration on the groups on motor bikes was in its description of working
class youth whose activities fairly clearly reflected the existence of upward
and downward options within the class (the "office boy" Mod versus the Luinpen
Rocker) in exclusively cultural terms. Mass media accounts spoke only of
differences in the youthful consumption of leisure, and entirely ignored the
origins of this "bifurcation" at the point of production. A most essential
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feature of this ideological achievement was to construct a view of a whole
generation divided into one or other cultural style (against an adult
generation), with either a Vespa or a Harley Davidson as a symbol of its
preference, when the vast mass of the generation, at both a working class and
niiddle class location, in fact were caught still within Gosling's "Dream Boy"
world of respectability conformity.
This is to repeat, and re-emphasise our view, that existing sociological
accounts of the behaviours and styles of working class youth suffer from
(what can now more clearly be seen as) a tendency to emphasise the particular,
"conjunctural", features of the generational styles at the expense of the
ongoing logic of change in the youthful labour market. This has sometimes
resulted in speculations about the "origins" of the Nod which are offered
without reference to the ongoing, "organic" development of the upward option.
For example, Dick Hebdige quotes George Melly as seeing
"the progenitors of this (Mod) style ... in a group of working
class dandies, possibly descended from the devotees of the
Italianate style, known throughout the trend world as mods
who were dedicated to clothes and lived in London."
(Hebdige, 1975, p.87)
This may or may not be true as an account of the origins of the Mod style,
but it says nothing about the origins of the Mod as an adaptation that was
ppopriate and meaningful for youth at certain levels of the class structure.
In particular, the focus on the specifics of the Mod style displaces the fact
that the Mod adaptation was continuous, as a form of upward exploration, with
that of the earlier "secondary modern generation", as discussed by Stuart Hall.
There are two connected features of the moment of the Mods and
Rockers which are important for us. Firstly, we accept that the division between
the two styles or subcultures was a manufactured and "rigif.ied" product of a
moral panic and a process of labelling, conducted primarily within the newspaper
press, but also we note that this cultural process was one which mirrored, and
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yet also displaced, structural divisions that were occurring within the class,
between the incorporated, respectable, and upwardly mobile on the one hand,
and the downwardly-mobile underclass on the other. The rigidity of labels
reflected a rigid "material" division within the class.
Secondly, as already suggested, we want to emphasise the importance
of this "panic" having emerged when it did, at the end of the period between
1959 and 1964, in the opening weeks and months of the "disciplined consensus
of 1964-70". In particular, it is important to note that the "creation" of
the Mods and Rockers occurred in the immediate aftermath of the production of
a series of Governmental reports "taking stock" of the capabilities of the
existing State apparatus, from the Streatfield Report on Sentencing of 1961
to the A.C.T.0. Report on After-Care of 1963. The State was "in readiness"
for events like those on the South Coast sea coast in 1962. The vigorous
reaction of the police and the courts to the riotous attempts of groups of
youth to manufacture excitement in Hastings and Clacton may have also resulted
from a certain nervousness in influential circles as to the boundaries of
appropriate moral order, in a period in which the moral claims of established
Authority were being threatened by scandals involving the Conservative Front-
bench, by satire on late night television and by subversive agnosticism within
the Church itself. The creation of a stereotypical working class folk devil
might almost have been an ideological "necessity" at this particular moment
in the post-war history of British class society
3.7 (c)
	
The Skinheads 1968-1971
We begin by remarking on one of the least well publicised "events" of
1968. In that year, the supply of young people from schools exceeded the
demand for youth by employers for the first time in the post war period. In
the next three years, this shortfall was revealed to be an aspect of a long
term trend, rather than being the peak of a particularly unfortunate trade cycle.
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There was a "job loss" in the juvenile labour market of 25 per cent for boys
and 27 per cent for girls, during 1966 to 1971, almost all of which occurred
in areas of employment "traditionally available to the young unskilled"
(Youth Employment Council 1974).
"Up to 1966, new jobs were being created at the rate of
200,000 p.a., since then they have been disappearing at
100,000 p.a. In London, between 1966-70, 400,000 jobs have
disappeared, three times the number which would have been
reasonable to offset the population exodus."
(Jefferson and Clarke, 1974, p.39)
There was very little sense of the seriousness of these developments
in dominant political debates at the time. In part, this was because of an
emergent preoccupation with the security of middle class youth's adherence
to the established social order. But inpart it was because of the Labour
Gverninent's corporalist economic strategy was one which involved the use of
public expenditure (especially through the "regions" and through local
authorities) in job creation programmes. The overall employment rate in
Britain (as expressed in "U.S. concepts") was still only 3.9 per cent in 1971,
as against 5.9 per cent in the U.S., and 6.2 per cent in Canada. (Social
Trends (9) (1979) Table 5.13). Also important is that the burden of
unemployment after the turn-around date fell unequally, and was particularly
concentrated amongst young blacks. According to the 1971 census, some 17.6
per cent of West Indians born after 1951 (born in the West Indies) ere out of
work, and 7.2 per cent of those born after 1951 in the U.K. (Smith, 1973,
p.7).
It is surprising that the relation of "1968" to the juvenile labour
market has been the subject of so little comment. Undoubtedly the principle
significance of "1968" in contemporary retrospective analysis is that it
signalled the development of a rebellion against "bourgeois" life-style and
institutions inside the bourgeoisie itself. In the United States, this rejection
took the form primarily of a drug-oriented counter-culture, spawning new forms
of personal consciousness and communal living; although latterly the counter-
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culture drew on the lessons of the civil rights movement in the South in
order to mount a resistance movement against the war waged by the U.S. State
on the Vietnamese people. The reactions of the State to non-violent forms of
protest and rebellion (in particular, during the Democratic Party Convention
in Chicago in August 1968) were later to give rise to the participation of
the Sons and daughters of middle-class America in the use of "revolutionary
violence" in groups like Weatherman and the Symbionese Liberation Army.
(Jacobs, 1970)
In Europe, the subversion of "bourgeois" ideology were most marked of
all in France, in the "days of May", in particular, and in the entry of thousands
of students into the factories in order to forge alliances with the proletariat,
against the power of the class from which most of the students had originated.
In Italy and in West Germany, similar developments occurred, in these cases
giving rise, eventually, to the "revolutionary violence" of the Baader-Meinhof
Group, on the one hand, and the Red Brigades on the other (as well as helping
to strengthen political groups to the left of the social democrats, and
communists, respectively).
Even in Britain (whose internal political history has tended (outside
of Ireland) to be less volatile than those in the U.S.) the developments in
the areas of direct-action "student" radicalism in 1968 were extra-ordinary
and also rapid. A demonstration of more or less average size for London (of
5,000 people) on 22 October 1967 organised by the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign
under the slogan "US Get Out of Vietnam Now", resulted in some confrontations
with the police outside the American Embassy in Grosvenor Squares This gave only a
small hint of the major confrontations that were to occur only six months
later on 17 March 1968, when a further VSC demonstration estimated officially
at 25,000 but thought by the organisers to be in excess of 100,000 marching
in support of victory for the NLF of Vietnam, was handled by the police
with considerable severity, and reported by the mass media in highly
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perjorative and selective fashion. (Hal].oran, Elliott, and Murdock 1970).
It was in the light of this experience, in particular, as well as a result
of the reactions of universities and colleges to demands for internal
democratisation, that the Revolutionary Socialist Students Federation was
founded, at a conference at the London School of Economics, on 15 June 1968.
The RSSF was the umbrella organisation within which national support was
forthcoming for a series of direct action campaigns (sit-ins; talk-ins, etc.)
in universities and colleges, many of which are now forgotten, but all of
which were given headline, and sensationalist, treatment, during 1968 and
1969 - fuelling and amplifying popular resentment of "students" as a parasitic
unproductive and undisciplined "mob".
In the very same moment" as these events occurred, sections of the
more predictably unmanageable youth, the rough working class, were bringing
another form of politics to the street. There is some debate as to the
overall significance of the Skinhead style of presentation (Clarke 1973;
Daniel and McGuire 1972; Taylor and Wall 1976), but all the commentators are
agreed that the style emerged during 1968-9, and that the Skinheads' activities
were organised around (real or symbolic) fights at foothall matches (which
may have been exaggerated in mass media reports) and around occasional bouts
of "paki-bashing" and "queer-bashing" (which may have been under-played in mass
media reports) (Pearson, 1976). The "violence" of the Skinhead was a highly
stylised attempt simultaneously to defend an already out-dated form of white
working class privilege (the respectable, patriarchal, Protestant, individual
craftsman) against "alien" outsiders from Pakistan and elsewhere/ and also
to celebrate other key values of traditional working class community in the
face of the increasing threat of middle class and especially student influence
over popular music and over leisure and recreation style and taste. The Skinhead
can be seen as a forlorn attempt by the offspring of the respectable working
class to "retrieve" the lost coherence of a class experience. As John Clarke
has observed, the moment of the Skinhead occurred in the aftermath of four years
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of "rising unemployment", rising prices, falling real wage levels, and the
relative worsening of the situation of the lowest paid manual workers (which
had hit the young especially hard, notably through the loss of apprenticeships).
But the anxieties produced by the increasing restrictions in the labour market
were not "lived" in work time, so much as in the all-important periods of
freedom r youth (during the weekends and during weekday evening outings to
night clubs and youth club).
The populist activities of young white male Skinheads were at their
most intense and uncontrolled during the football season of 1968-9, and it
was in that year also that State agencies of social control began to nve
towards a more active posture of pre-emptive as well as reactive policing of
youth. After six or seven years of amplification of "football hooliganism"
in the mass media, and under pressure from the Football League and also from
organisations representing respectable working class football supporters, the
police finally took on the responsibility of making arrests in the crowd, (using
the so-called "Mob-Squads") bringing charges which would not have been sustained
outside the context of football ("pushing" and "swearing" - which constituted
70 per cent of the offences for which youths were charged at grounds in the
Metropolitan Police district in 1969). (M.W. Jones, 1969). The publicity
given the Skinhead's reputation gave rise to a situation where the wearing
of cherry red boots and denim jeans hitched high was an invitation to close
scrutiny by the police as well as by youth club leaders, teachers and the
general public alike. The severity of popular reaction against the Skinhead at
the time did not necessarily indicate fundamental opposition on the part of the
respectable working-class to the implicit, racist and sexist, politics of
the Skinhead, but it did indicate a lack of approval for the Skinhead's use
of street "aggro". "Aggro" was, indeed, a denial of the authority of the
parental generation of the working-class, - by virtue of involving what the
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respectable proletarian would see as the methods of lumpenproletariat.
Isolated in this way from the class as a whole, even this most populist of
post-war youth cultures was left to the mercy of "the law", an instrument for
which (in its "peace-keeping" functions) the respectable working class has
great respect.
The intensification of police activity vis-a-vis youth in this period
is evident in the official criminal statistics. In 1968 itself, the number of
17-21 males found guilty, or cautioned for, indictable offences increased from
4,600 to 5,200 per 100,000 population; whilst the numbers of 14 to 17 year old
males dealt with in this way increased from 5,000 to 5,800 per 100,000. The
increases in the criminalisation of 10-14 year olds and the over 21's were
less significant (the over-21 rate has been remarkably constant over the
twenty years from 1957 to 1977). There was actually a slight decline in the
numbers of females found guilty of indictable offences, or cautioned, for
100,000 population in 1967, but there was a gradual increase in 1969 (to 800
14-17 year olds per 100,000 and 500 per 100,000 17-21 year olds) at the end
of the year. Overall, however, there was a more rapid increase in 1968 in the
number of offences recorded by the police, per 100,000 population, than in any
year since 1957 (at the time of the concern over "the delinquent generation"):
a rise in one year from 2,717 to 2,892 offences per 100,000 population
(Criminal Statistics 1977 Table 2.2); an increase of over 81,000 indictable
offences known to the police in one year.
We take it as more than simply a chance coincidence that such an
increase in the rate of criminalisation should have occurred in a year of such
significance for the prospects of working class youth entering the labour
market. No one-to-one causality needs to be implied for us to endow the
moment of 1968, especially given also its broader meaning for middle class youth,
with a special significance for the State's relationship with y9uth as a whole.
And no vulgar economism is required in order that we can recognise that the
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policing of the underclass from 1968 onwards would increasingly have to proceed
in an increasing number of cases without the accompanying disciplines of
employment itself.
What was crucial, however, was that the essential logic of this
criminalisation process (as a contribution to the control of "surplus populations")
and also the intensification of this logic at the end of the 1960's was lost
from view, and was "displaced" by ideological explanations of the cause and
significance of the "youth problem" itself. Social democratic, liberal, and
conservative commentators remained in agreement in their assessment of the
youth problem as an immediate and serious matter (youthful misbehaviour was
pathological and "anti-social" and in 1968 it appeared to be "out of control")
and they therefore also agreed, for different reasons, on increasing the scope
and intensity of various measures of State social control. They did not
publicly "problematize" the increasing inability of the British capitalism to
maintain its earlier high levels of employment for youth.
Conclusion : the Youth Question in 1969
Writing in 1981, the connection between the decline of the labour
market for youth and the identification of "youth" as a continual and
increasingly serious problem of social control appears much more obvious than
it did in the earlier post war period. The decline of that labour market
that began in the late 1960's has accelerated rapidly throughout the 1970's
to the point where 128,200 school leavers were unemployed in June 1981,
asainst only 19,300 in 1971. Moreover, that cohort's search for jobs had
to proceed in an economy in which 2,680,500 people (or 10.6 per cent of
people registering for work) were unemployed, as against only 775,800 people
in 1971 (3.4 per cent of "total employees") (Economic Trends 333 July 1981
Table 36). The decline in the labour market has by all accounts been most
damaging to the work prospects of young blacks and to girls. And, as we shall
see in Chapter Six, the decline in life prospects for cohorts of youth leaving
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schooL throughout the 1970's (which was an "organic" product of the long-term
emergence of crisis in all western capitalist societies) has been intensified
in Britain by the Thatcher Government. Cuts in public spending have
resulted in massive job losses in industries which had hitherto depended
on some form of state subsidy as well as in the public sector itself. And
the prospect that has emerged for the cohorts of youth who left school in
1980 and 1981 or those coming up to school-leaving age in the immediate
future, has been one of medium - or even long-term workiessness. It is in
just such a "conjuncture" that the hopelessness originally proclaimed in
the New Wave and Punk music of the late 1970's has spilled over into the
street riots of the summer of 1981.
I shall discuss these riots at greater length in Chapter Seven. But
their significance is clear for the argument advanced in this chapter.
It would be a foolish sociologist indeed who attempted to analyse the
events of 1981 in Brixton, Southall, Toxteth and Moss Side primarily in
terms of the cultural perspectives of 1960's subcultural and labelling
theory. This is not to deny that some of the features of the "moral panics"
discussed by Stan Cohen (in relation to the Nods and Rockers events in
1962 to 1964) were observable in 1981. The serious riots in London,
Moss Side and Toxteth on the 5th to 8th July produced a massive sensitivity
in the local and national newspaper press to any form of street disturbance,
and, as a result, incidents which were actually dismissed by police as
normal Friday and Saturday evening events took on the character of
"a copycat riot" in the newspaper reports appearing on Sunday or Monday
morning. Incidents were reported in several cities in the Midlands, Lancashire,
Yorkshire and in Dundee, on the weekend of 11th to the 13th July, as if
each of these incidents was a continuation of the riots earlier in the week,
when many of these incidents (from shopwindows being broken to fights and
woundings) were quite typical of the routine events on weekends, which go
largely unreported in the newspaper press. So some exaggeration and spurious
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reportage did occur in the press treatment of the riots of 1981. But this
was decidedly not the essential significance of those events.
It is also clear that the riots and the other street events of 1981
involved adolescents and youth exhibiting a wide variety of subcultural
memberships. In Southall, for example, on 3 July, several hundred young
white male Skinheads were confronted in the Hanibrough Tavern, during a concert
of a so-called'Oi" group, the 4 Skins, by even larger numbers of young Asians
associated with the Southall Youth Movement, and the Skinheads were put to
flight. On 26 July, about 1,000 youths who were variously identified as
"Mods" or simply "motor cyclists" were involved in a riot in Keswick,
Cumberland (Guardian, 27 July 1981); whilst in Brixton and in Bristol throughout
the summer many of the young blacks involved in confrontations with the police
wore the dreadlocks of the West Indian Rastafarian cult (cf. for example
Guardian 11 July 1981) . The significance of these various styles in the
assertion of the generational and ethnic identity of these youth groups is
undeniable, and it is a matter of great curiosity that so many of the
styles in evidence during the late 1970's and early 1980's (the Skinhead,
the Mod and even the Teddy Boy) were reproductions of styles originally
created in earlier historical moments. The question of what these styles were
"representing", when reproduced for a second time around, is an intriguing
one for subcultural analysts. What is crucial r our purposes, though, is
the dramatic illustration that was provided by the riots of 1981 of the
argument in this chapter.
It is quite clear that the primary "cause" or "context" of the street
riots was the sense of desperation within the youthful population that had
been produced, quite suddenly and dramatically, by the ongoing collapse of the
labour market, which was then amplified by the pursuit of free market economics
by the Thatcher Government. So the emergence of delinquency and youthful
disorderliness on a mass scale, like the earlier more modest "productions"
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or "creations" of the Teddy Boy, the Mod and Rocker and the Skinhead, was
an artifact of significant changes in the social relations of a class society.
Each of these youthful problems were fundamentally working-class in
character, and indeed each was specifically produced at the margins of the
proletariat proper, from amongst sections of youth caught between the "dole"
and the casual or low-paid labour market. They were all products of the
contradictory and precarious existence of the reserve army of labour, which
now increasingly experiences its existence as an underclass facing a long-term
prospect of continuing and uninterrupted unemployment.
To highlight this corinexion is no longer to make a controversial point.
But I want to insist that this "connexion" was at work continuousy (though
much less visibly, so far as politicians and the press was concerned) throughout
the post-war period in the production of particular youth cultural styles
within the working class, and that the significance of each style can be
deduced partly from their specific "moment" of emergence. To say this might
suggest that the interpretation of each "deviant" style can be undertaken
in a kind of functionalist-behaviourist fashion, in the manner of Robert
Merton, with each style "emerging" as a solution to the particular anomic
strains experienced by each youthful cohort. There is certainly some benefit
to be gained from such an approach, although not by an insistence on "anomie",
in Merton's use of that term, as the key element of strain. But what must be
added to this historicist interpretation of style and behaviour is a clear
conception of the overall set of social and ideological relations within which
the strains are being experienced. The concern of the earlier part of this
chapter was indeed to try and describe the character of the social formation
in place in Britain in the late 1950's and early 1960's. It was a social
formation in which the earlier injustices and inequalities of capitalist economy
had been mitigated to some extent by the "affluence" generated by the post-
war boom and celebrated (exaggeratedly) by a popular media. It was also a
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social formation in which the previously dominant forms of authority (the
Law, the Church, and authoritarian and competitive forms of schooling) had
increasingly been replaced by an apparently consensual set of social
relations. The State now "legitimated" its authority over society as a whole
through its provision of social welfare, public health and an increasingly
progressive educational system, opening out the possibilities of social mobility
for the under-class.
The youthful disturbances discussed in this chapter were usually
interpreted by contemporary social democrats (as we have seen) merely as
instances of individual or family pathology. But increasingly throughout the
1960's they were also interpreted by Conservative commentators as a product
of the increasing "permissiveness" of authority and the State towards anti-
social or even behaviour and as an example of the weakening of the "moral
fibre" of individuals that allegedly results from becoming dependent on a welfare
state.
As delinquency rates continued to increase throughout the 1960's, and
as middle class and working class youth alike continued to engage in what
Conservative and social democratic opinion could agree in defining as "anti-
social" behaviour, so State response to youth took on an increasingly
authoritarian and coercive character. The earlier social democratic campaign
for the creation of a family service providing care and support for damaged
individuals, "re-tooling" them for participation in the reconstructed social
democracy was gradually replaced by an essentially a-political and a-moral
conception of care as a form of social control. In the public debates which
occurred around the passage of the Children and Young Persons Act of 1969,
which we will discuss in Chapter Six, the overwhelmingly dominant problem
given attention by politicians and professionals was the problem of how to
maintain social discipline amongst youth. Other conceptions of the functions
of care provision for youth by the State, including the function of encouraging
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personal growth and interpersonal consideration (espoused by the architects
of the Act in the Home Office Children's Department), were allowed to
surface, but they never attained what can be described as the dominant position
within official ideologies of care. The overwhelming official conception of
child care and juvenile justice encouraged by both political parties and by
the liberal professions since the 1960's has been one of providing professional
care (or management) of difficult children in the name of social discipline
within existing social arrangements.
We shall see later that even this "liberal" conception of the exercise
of State social work has come under attack from the Right. These attacks
intensified throughout the 1970's, as the decline in the juvenile labour market
began to accelerate and as a series of events (from the mugginpanic of
1972-3 to the riots of 1981) have been seen to threaten the maintenance of
"law and order". Increasingly, the Right has come to insist that the threat
to social discipline and cohesion arises out of the failures and inherent
limitations of social democratic and liberal politics as such, especially
in the alleged failure of these politics to place the question of moral
socialisation at the centre of their policy thinking in the fields of education,
social welfare and justice. The rationale for the State's authoritarian
interventions into the lives of troublesome youth and their families (of
providing care and support at the State's expense) has been challenged, as
being an ineffective way of encouraging a disciplined self-reliance in the
underclass. In its place, as we shall see in Chapter Six, the Right has
increasingly demanded social politics that encourage individual and social
remoralisation. The "disciplined consensu' of the late 1950's and early
1960's, operated and reproduced with the political support of both Labour and
Conservative Parties in Government, has been almost entirely subverted
ideologicaliy, and the "liberal" and permissive institutions that were created
in this period (from the small professional child care agencies through to the
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"family courts" created by the Children and Young Persons Act) have been
increasingly called upon to perform an entirely different task of social
remoralisation It is this transformation in the form of the State
which we will discuss in more detail in Chapter Five.
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Footnotes to Chapter Three
1. The major criticism we would have of the formulation of Labour's
strategy for economic corporatism - through the construction of an
appeal to the "national interest" - is that it does not identify the
difference between the stress on community interest in Labour Party
policy in the 1940's and 1950's and the rhetoric of the "national
interest" in Labour circles during tne 1960's. The i rftsicrn f these
two notions was always implicit in Wilson's versun of "socialism",
as economic policies which were in the interest of Big Capital,
like a strict incomes policy, were "sold" to the Labour Movement as
a move in the direction of rational planning of a socialist economy.
2. The demand for a new sense of moral purpose took different forms.
In particular, the early 1960's witnessed the rapid growth of satire
and of an early form of counter-cultural scepticism (of all forms of
State and governmental authority). This was most clearly evidenced
in the first appearance of Private Eye, in 1961, and, later, in the
beginning of satire even on BBC television (in That was the Week That
Was). The contradiction between a "puritanical" revolt against the
moral excesses of the Macmillan Government and the decidedly
uripuritanical scepticism of an increasingly confident non-commercial
middle class even found a reflection in the Church, when the Bishop
of Woolwich published an essay, Honest to God, asserting that
Christianity did not require a belief in the Christ or the God that
was celebrated by the Christian Church.
3. Barbara Wootton was first nominated as a Justice of the Peace in 1926
(by the St. Marylebone Labour Party), and was elevated to the House of
Lords in 1958. She has been a member of several government committees
dealing with crime and the penal system, and was also chairman of the
highly controversial Sub-committee on Cannabis of the Advisory Committee
on Drug Dependence (which reported in 1968). She also records, in her
recently published "reflections on fifty years experience", that it
"fell to (her) lot to pilot through the Lords the bill to abolish the
death penalty for murder" (in 1965) (Wootton, 1978). She is currently
a member of the Advisory Council on the Penal System, established in
1966. She is clearly one of the most continuously influential of the
social democratic criminologists, especially in terms of ensuring the
processing of social democratic legislation through Parliament, and
also in terms of representing social democratic politics in judicial
circles and within the crime control apparatus.
4. Lord Longford references the help he received in the preparation of
The Idea of Punishment from a group of Catholic priests, two Oxford
philosophers, Max Grunhut and Arthur Goodhart, and Herbert Hart (the
jurist). "In the midst of the Christian-humanist tension, the
influence, and still more the stimulus, of Barbara Wootton was not
concealed." (Pakertham 1964, p.125).
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5. The interplay of social work benevolence and Christian benevolence -has
been examined in the case of America by Platt (1969), and for Britain,
and especially in respect of the work of Mary Carpenter, by Manton,
(1976). Christian commitments of this kind are widespread in
contemporary social work, and are evidenced in the recent attempt to
translate these commitments into a working ideology by Butrym (1976).
This text is discussed, and the ideological nature of "care" as a
description of what social workers of the Christian persuasion actually
do, revealed, in Simpkin (1979).
6. A commitment to visiting prison does not involve a commitment to the
drastic reform or abolition, of prisons, and in many cases the members
of the treatment arid social-democratic establishments who visit prisons
on a regular basis have been amongst the most silent of commentators
on recent developments in penal policy and prison politics. The
commitment of the prison visitor seems to be an essentially personal
act, rather than a commitment to making public the function and
practices of even the most indefensible of nineteenth century creations.
The fact of being allowed entry, the requirement that the visitor
sign the Official Secrets Act, and the problems that might be encountered
in dealing with antagonistic prison officials, appear to silence the
regular prison visitor. The prison visitor is "co-opted" into the
private understanding of those members of our society who have seen the
inside of prisons. It is usually left to ex-convicts themselves to tell
the outside world about the prisons; and, given wider ideological
framing, the ex-convicts are amongst the last to be heard and believed.
7. Jones observed that Barton's Institutional Neurosis, published in 1958,
and Goffman's Asylums (1961) had made a similar point. It only
required the "specific empirical backing in the field of the mental
handicap" elaborated by Tizard, with others, in Patterns of Residential
care (1971), for the argument to give rise to legislation.
8. By 1961, for example, 18 per cent of the 182,217 persons found
guilty of indictable offences in the courts of England and
Wales were under 14, 17 per cent were 14 to 17 year olds, another
17 per cent were 17 to 21 year olds and 22 per cent were between 21
and 30. Only 26 per cent of the offender population were over 20, in
other words; and 52 per cent was 17 or under. Moreover, the size of
the "offender population" aged between 12 and 21 was steadily increasing
as a proportion of the total throughout the 1960's. By 1969, 47.5 per
cent of all persons found guilty of indictable offences were aged 14 to
21, as against 34 per cent in 1961 (Criminal Statistics, 1969, table 3).
9. Our use of the Delinquent Generations Report is not intended to suggest
that we accept the statistics on which they were based as some real
measure of actual youthful behaviour. The interpretation of the
statistics in that report does not take into account the increases in
police and social work establishment after 1951, and does not address
the question of increased public sensitivity to "youth", especially
in the emergence of the aftermath of the "Teddy Boy" in 1953. These
were concerns for which Leslie Wilkins was to work on later, in his analysis
of "deviancy amp1ifiation'. (Wilkins, 1967).
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3.0. Mannheim and Wilkins scored individual male offenders being sent
to Borstal in terms of the numbers of their prior offences; their prior
institutional experiences; fines and/or probation; whether they were
living with parents; whether they lived in an industrial area;
whether there was evidence of drunkennes; and the "job history" of
the offender. Different weights were given to each of these factors
through multiple regression and five risk groups identified. As a
result, it was asserted an offender's "base expectancy rate" (of
reoffending after release) could be established (cf. Mannheim -
Wilkins 1955).
11. An exception to this is Tony Jefferson who noted that the Teddy Boy
was to some extent a product of this "experience of unstable
employment and social isolation" (Jefferson, 1973, p.9).
12. The "twilight zone" was a conscious reformulation of the use (by the
Chicago School of Sociology in the 1920's) of the term "transitional
zone" as a description of the inner city housing zone surrounding
the "central business district". Where the zone of transition may
have been a temporary stopping-off place for Italian (and other)
migrants assimilating into American cities in the period between the
wars, the institutionalised racism of a metropolitan society like
Britain in the post-war period was thougtby Rex and Moore to guarantee
that the inner-city area would become a more or less permanent "home"
for the black population in Britain.
13. This is not to say however that girls were not involved in youth
culture in the 1950's (or 1960's) - there is evidence of girls who
saw themselves as Teddy Girls, for example: and the girls "went out"
a lot in the 1950's (although, unlike boys, they did not "hang about"
to any extent). But as McRobbie points out, girls' participation in
youth culture in the 1950's was relatively "invisible", and as Powell and
Clarke observe, the reproduction of girls as "wife/mother" was fairly
efficiently reinforced in the 1950's through the restriction of girls'
opportunities in schools, by the channelling of girls into "vocational
work" (see our discussion of the delinquency of girls in Chapter Four)
by teenage magazine "femininity" (Powell and Clarke, 1975, p.226).
14. Rock and Cohen's explanations of the "fall" of the Teddy Boy are
actually inconsistent with the early version of labelling theory they
use to talk of the development of the Teddy Boy phenomenon, in which
their concern is to argue that
"Just as social types are created and branded by the
community (so) on the individual level too the very
forces which attempt to arrest the delinquent's career
may have the opposite effect." (Rock and Cohen, 1970
p.3l8)
Some of the problems with labelling theory's attempts to explain the
development and decline of the youth cultural preferences are
discussed in Taylor and Wall, 1976.
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15. In speeches made at the time, Conservatives were at pains to show
that the ending of National Service was an unfortunate requirement of
economic policy. The heavy British military presence on the continent
of Europe, which has been entered into as a means of supporting the
post-war settlement in Germany, in particular, was proving to be a
heavy contributor to a worsening balance of payments position of the
British economy, as well as diverting investment from manufacturing
and engineering industries with no military connections. The Labour
Party's criticisms directed attention, in particular, to this aspect
of National Service (cf. Skideisky, 1970). It was no central concern
of either party to argue that the ending of National Service could
occur without implications for the question of "youth control", or to
argue that the ending of National Service was a worthwhile endeavour
in itself in freeing young people from the disciplines and hierarchical
obsessions of the military.
16. See our discussion of homicide in the 1950's in Chapter Two.
